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A B S T R A C T
In an era of significant air traffic expansion characterised by a rising congestion of the radiofrequency spectrum and a widespread introduction
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are being exposed to a variety of threats including signal
interferences, adverse propagation effects and challenging platform-satellite relative dynamics. Thus, there is a need to characterize GNSS
signal degradations and assess the effects of interfering sources on the performance of avionics GNSS receivers and augmentation systems
used for an increasing number of mission-essential and safety-critical aviation tasks (e.g., experimental flight testing, flight
inspection/certification of ground-based radio navigation aids, wide area navigation and precision approach). GNSS signal deteriorations
typically occur due to antenna obscuration caused by natural and man-made obstructions present in the environment (e.g., elevated terrain
and tall buildings when flying at low altitude) or by the aircraft itself during manoeuvring (e.g., aircraft wings and empennage masking the
on-board GNSS antenna), ionospheric scintillation, Doppler shift, multipath, jamming and spurious satellite transmissions. Anyone of these
phenomena can result in partial to total loss of tracking and possible tracking errors, depending on the severity of the effect and the receiver
characteristics. After designing GNSS performance threats, the various augmentation strategies adopted in the Communication, Navigation,
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management and Avionics (CNS+A) context are addressed in detail. GNSS augmentation can take many forms but
all strategies share the same fundamental principle of providing supplementary information whose objective is improving the performance
and/or trustworthiness of the system. Hence it is of paramount importance to consider the synergies offered by different augmentation
strategies including Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS), Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), Aircraft Based
Augmentation System (ABAS) and Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM). Furthermore, by employing multi-GNSS
constellations and multi-sensor data fusion techniques, improvements in availability and continuity can be obtained. SBAS is designed to
improve GNSS system integrity and accuracy for aircraft navigation and landing, while an alternative approach to GNSS augmentation is to
transmit integrity and differential correction messages from ground-based augmentation systems (GBAS). In addition to existing space and
ground based augmentation systems, GNSS augmentation may take the form of additional information being provided by other on-board
avionics systems, such as in ABAS. As these on-board systems normally operate via separate principles than GNSS, they are not subject to
the same sources of error or interference. Using suitable data link and data processing technologies on the ground, a certified ABAS capability
could be a core element of a future GNSS Space-Ground-Aircraft Augmentation Network (SGAAN). Although current augmentation
systems can provide significant improvement of GNSS navigation performance, a properly designed and flight-certified SGAAN could play
a key role in trusted autonomous system and cyber-physical system applications such as UAS Sense-and-Avoid (SAA).
1. Introduction
The origins of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) date
back to the early 1960s, when the United States Department of
Defense initiated the development of systems for three–
dimensional position determination [1]. After the US Navy
successfully tested the first satellite navigation system called
TRANSIT, the Space Division of the US Air Force initiated a
program, known as Project 621B that evolved into the Navigation
Signal Time and Range (NAVSTAR) program. In 1973, the US
Defense Navigation Satellite System (DNSS) was created, which
was later referred to as NAVSTAR Global Positioning System
(GPS). Various GNSS systems are currently in service or under
development. The US GPS and the Russian GLONASS
(Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema) have
achieved their Full Operational Capability (FOC) back in the
1990’s [2]. Other GNSS systems that are currently at the advanced
development or deployment stages include the European
GALILEO and the People’s Republic of China BEIDOU
Navigation Satellite System (BDS). GNSS systems typically use
signals 20 dB below the ambient noise floor and, despite several
research efforts devoted to interference detection and mitigation
strategies at receiver and platform level (mostly for military
applications), no effective solution has been implemented so far in
the civil aviation context. Thus, there is a need to characterize
GNSS signal degradations and assess the effects of interfering
sources on the performance of avionics GNSS receivers and
Differential GNSS (DGNSS) systems used for an increasing
number of mission-essential and safety-critical aviation tasks (e.g.,
experimental flight testing, flight inspection/certification of
ground-based radio navigation aids, wide area navigation and
precision approach).
GNSS signal deteriorations typically occur due to antenna
obscuration caused by natural and man-made obstructions present
in the environment (e.g., elevated terrain and tall buildings when
flying at low altitude) or by the aircraft itself during manoeuvring
(e.g., aircraft wings and empennage masking the on-board GNSS
antenna), ionospheric scintillation, Doppler shift, multipath,
jamming and spurious satellite transmissions. Anyone of these
phenomena can result in partial to total loss of tracking and possible
tracking errors, depending on the severity of the effect and the
receiver characteristics. Tracking errors, especially if undetected
by the receiver software, can result in large position errors. Partial
loss of tracking results in geometry degradation, which in turn
affects position accuracy. Consequently, GNSS alone does not
always provide adequate performance in mission-essential and
safety-critical aviation applications where high levels of accuracy
and integrity are required.
GNSS augmentation can take many forms but all share the same
fundamental principle of providing supplementary information
whose objective is improving the performance and/or
trustworthiness of the system. GNSS augmentation benefits in the
aviation domain can be summarized as follows:
 Increased runway access, more direct en-route flight
paths and new precision approach services;
 Reduced and simplified avionics equipment;
 Potential elimination of some ground-based navigation
aids (VOR, ILS, etc.) with cost saving to Air Navigation
Service Providers (ANSPs).
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a detailed
discussion on GNSS aviation applications, followed by a
description of models for GNSS performance threats in Section 3;
Section 4 presents the different augmentation strategies and the
identification of a pathway to a future GNSS Space-Ground-
Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN) is discussed in Section
5; an investigation of the potential of GNSS augmentation
techniques to support trusted autonomous Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) applications is presented in Section 6; The
conclusions of this article are summarised in Section 7 and
recommendations for future research are highlighted in Section 8.
2. GNSS Aviation Applications
Although different GNSS systems employ diversified hardware
and software features, all systems are composed by a space
segment, a control segment and a user segment (Fig. 1). The space
segment includes the satellites required for global coverage. These
satellites are predominantly in Intermediate Circular Orbit (ICO),
at nominal altitudes of 19,100 km (GLONASS), 20,184 km (GPS)
and 23,222 km (GALILEO) from the Earth’s surface.
BDS also employs satellites in Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and
Inclined Geosynchronous Orbit (IGSO). The user segment includes
the large variety of GNSS receivers developed for air, ground and
marine navigation positioning applications. The control segment
includes one or more Control and Processing Stations (CPSs)
connected to a number of Ground Monitoring Stations (GMSs) and
antennae located around the globe for Telemetry, Tracking and
Command (TT&C) signals down/uplink and navigation/integrity
signals uplink to the satellites. The GMS antennae passively track
all GNSS satellites in view collecting ranging signals from each
satellite. This information is passed on to the CPS where the
satellite ephemeris and clock parameters are estimated and
predicted. Additionally, satellite integrity data are analysed and
appropriate integrity flags are generated for faulty/unreliable
satellites. The ephemeris/clock and integrity data are then up-
linked to the satellite for retransmission in the navigation message.
The satellite clock drift is corrected so that all transmitted data are
synchronised with GNSS time.
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Fig. 1. GNSS segments.
The fundamental equation is the following:
ீݐ ேௌௌ =ݐ௦− ߂ݐ௦ (1)
where ீݐ ேௌௌ is the GNSS time, ݐ௦ is the satellite time and ߂ݐ௦ is the
difference between satellite and GNSS time. The corrections are
applied to the last term of equation (1), typically using polynomial
coefficients and a relativistic correction term. The correction
equation can be written as:
߂ݐ௦ = ܽ ଴ + ܽ ଵ(ீݐ ேௌௌ−ݐ଴௖) + ܽ ଶ(ீݐ ேௌௌ−ݐ଴௖)ଶ + ߂ݐ௥ (2)
where ଴ܽ, ଵܽ and ଶܽ are the polynomial coefficients for phase,
frequency and age offset; ߂ݐ௥ is the relativistic correction term and
ݐ଴௖ is the time of transmission of the corrections.
Typically, the ephemeris corrections are obtained through an
estimation of the Cartesian co-ordinates of the satellites along the
orbits by integrating the equations of motion. For integrity
purposes, suitable Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
techniques are employed. In particular, the health status of the
satellite subsystems is continuously monitored (satellite payload,
bus, solar arrays, battery power and the level of propellant used for
maneuvers) and any anomaly must be promptly detected and
resolved. When needed, spare satellites can be activated. The
Signal-in-Space (SIS) is also constantly monitored to guarantee the
required performance standards. Despite the significant
technological enhancements recently introduced in control
segment integrity features, current GNSS systems have limited
FDIR capability. In most cases, several minutes or even hours are
required to provide the required integrity information (i.e., use/do
not use signals) to GNSS users. Obviously, this is not acceptable
for mission-essential and safety-critical aviation applications.
2.1. GNSS Observables
There are basically three types of GNSS observables that can be
used in aviation GNSS receivers: pseudorange, carrier phase, and
Doppler observable. Pseudoranges are commonly used in real-
time aircraft navigation and can provide an accuracy ranging from
about 20 m (single frequency receivers) to about 2 m in Differential
GNSS (DGNSS) positioning. The carrier phases are traditionally
used in high precision trajectory determination applications (e.g.,
TSPI systems for flight test and flight inspection) and can achieve
sub-centimetre accuracy. However, it is also quite common to use
combinations of pseudoranges and carrier phase measurements
both in real-time and post mission applications. Moreover, it has
become common practice to take advantage of various
combinations of the original phase observation, such as double
differences and triple differences.
2.1.1. Pseudorange Observable
The concept of pseudoranging is based on measuring difference
between the time of transmission of the code from the satellite and
the epoch of reception of the same signal at the receiver antenna.
This is achieved by correlating identical pseudorandom noise
(PRN) codes generated by the satellite’s clock, with those
generated internally by the receiver’s own clock. If this time
difference is multiplied by the speed of propagation of the radio
wave, a range value is obtained which is the distance between the
satellite and the receiver’s antenna referring to the epoch of
observation. Both receiver and satellite clock errors affect the
pseudoranges. Therefore, they differ from the actual geometric
distance corresponding to the epochs of emission and reception.
The general pseudorange equation is:
௞ܲ
௣(ݐ௞) = (ݐ௞ −ݐ௣) × ܿ (3)
where ௞ܲ௣ represents the actual measurement, ݐ௞ denotes the
nominal time of the receiver clock ݇ at reception,ݐ௣ denotes the
nominal time of the satellite clock ݌ at emission and ܿdenotes the
speed of light. Equation (3) would correspond to the actual
distance between the satellite and receiver’s antenna, if there were
no clock biases, the signal travelled through vacuum and there was
no multipath effect. The clock drifts can be represented by the
following expressions:
ݐ௥,௞=ݐ௞ + ݀ ݐ௞ (4)
ݐ௞
௣ =ݐ௣ + ݀ ݐ௣ (5)
where the symbol ݎ denotes the true time and the terms ݀ݐ௞ and
݀ݐ௣are the receiver and satellite clock errors respectively. Taking
these errors and biases into account, the complete expression for
the pseudorange becomes:
௞ܲ
௣(ݐ௞) = ൫ݐݎ,݇−ݐݎ݌൯ܿ − (݀ݐ௞ − ݀ݐ௣)ܿ+ܫ௞,௣௣(ݐ௞) +
௞ܶ
௣(ݐ௞) + ௞݀,௣(ݐ௞) + ݀ ௞,௣௣(ݐ௞) + ݀ ௣௣(ݐ௞) +ߝ௣ (6)
Therefore,
௞ܲ
௣(ݐ௞) = ߩ௞௣(ݐ௥,௞) − (݀ݐ௞ − ݀ݐ௣)ܿ+ܫ௞,௣௣(ݐ௞) +
௞ܶ
௣(ݐ௞) + ௞݀,௣(ݐ௞) + ݀ ௞,௣௣(ݐ௞) + ݀ ௣௣(ݐ௞) +ߝ௣ (7)
where ܫ௞,௣௣(ݐ௞) and  kpk tT are the ionospheric and tropospheric
delays, depending on varying conditions along the path of the
signal. The symbols ௞݀,௣(ݐ௞) and ݀ ௣௣(ݐ௞) denote the receiver
and satellite hardware code delays respectively. The symbol
௞݀,௣௣(ݐ௞) denotes the multipath of the codes, which depends on
the geometry of the antenna and satellite with respect to
surrounding reflective surfaces. The term ߝ௣ denotes the random
measurement noise. The term ߩ௞௣(ݐ௥,௞) is the actual geometric
distance between the receiver’s antenna and the satellite at a
specific epoch and therefore:
ߩ௞
௣(ݐ௥) = ඥ(ݑ݌− ݑ݇)2 + (ݒ݌− ݇ݒ )2 + (ݓ݌− ݓ݇)2 (8)
The terms (ݑ௞,ݒ௞,ݓ௞) are the approximate Cartesian co-ordinates
of the receiver and (ݑ௣,ݒ௣,ݓ ௣) denote the position of the satellite
at the epoch of transmission. With reference to Fig. 2, assuming a
constant receiver clock error ݀ݐ௞ for measurements to any satellite
and omitting all other error terms in Eq. (6), the following system
of equations is formed:
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ ௞ܲ
ଵ(ݐ) = ඥ(ݑଵ− ݑ௞)ଶ + (ݒଵ− ݒ௞)ଶ + (ݓଵ− ݓ௞)ଶ− ܿ݀ ݐ௞
௞ܲ
ଶ(ݐ) = ඥ(ݑଶ− ݑ௞)ଶ + (ݒଶ− ݒ௞)ଶ + (ݓଶ− ݓ௞)ଶ− ܿ݀ ݐ௞
௞ܲ
ଷ(ݐ) = ඥ(ݑଷ− ݑ௞)ଶ + (ݒଷ− ݒ௞)ଶ + (ݓଷ− ݓ௞)ଶ− ܿ݀ ݐ௞
௞ܲ
ସ(ݐ) = ඥ(ݑସ− ݑ௞)ଶ + (ݒସ− ݒ௞)ଶ + (ݓସ− ݓ௞)ଶ− ܿ݀ ݐ௞ (9)
Therefore, the co-ordinates of the user receiver (and GNSS time)
can be derived from the simultaneous observation of four (or more)
satellites. If more than four satellites are visible, a least-square
solution can be determined. The GNSS receiver calculates its
position in an Earth-Centred Earth Fixed (ECEF) Cartesian co-
ordinate system (typically using WGS84). These co-ordinates may
be expressed to some other system such as latitude, longitude and
altitude if desired. Solution of the system (equation 9) requires
measurement of the pseudoranges to four different satellites. The
GNSS receiver’s computer may be programmed to solve directly
the navigation equations in the form given above. However, the
computation time required to solve them may be too long for many
applications.
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Fig. 2. Navigation solution in the ECEF co-ordinate system (at time zero,
the XE axis passes through the North Pole, and the YE axis completes the
right-handed orthogonal system.
As an alternate approach, these equations may be approximated by
a set of four linear equations that the GPS receiver can solve using
a much faster and simpler algorithm. The system of equations (9)
can be rewritten in the form:
௞ܲ
௜(ݐ) = ඥ(ݑ݅− ݑ݇)2 + (݅ݒ − ݇ݒ )2 + (ݓ݅− ݓ݇)2 + ܶ (10)
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
where ݑ௜,ݒ௜ and ݓ ௜ represent the co-ordinates of the ith satellite,
ܶ = ݀݇ݐ and the units have been chosen so that the speed of light
is unity. Linearization of equation (10) can proceed as described
in [3, 4]. The resulting set of linearized equations relates the
pseudorange measurements to the desired user navigation
information as well as the user’s clock bias:
ቀ
௨೙ି௨
೔
௣೙೔ି ೙்
ቁ∆ݑ௞ + ቀ௩೙ି௩೔௣೙೔ି ೙்ቁ∆ݒ௞ + ቀ௪೙ି௪ ೔௣೙೔ି ೙்ቁ∆ݓ௞ + ∆ܶ = ∆ ௜ܲ(11)
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4)
where ݑ௡,ݒ௡,ݓ௡, ௡ܶ are the nominal (a priori best-estimate) values
of ݑ௞,ݒ௞,ݓ௞ and ܶ; ∆ݑ௞, ∆ݒ௞, ∆ݓ௞, ∆ܶare the corrections to the
nominal values; ݌௡௜ is the nominal pseudorange measurement to
the ith satellite; ∆ ௜ܲ is the difference between actual and nominal
range measurements. The quantities on the right-hand side are
simply the differences between the actual measured pseudoranges
and the predicted measurements, which are supplied by the user’s
computer, based on knowledge of the satellite position and current
estimate of the user’s position and clock bias. Therefore, the
quantities to be computed (∆ݑ௞, ∆ݒ௞, ∆ݓ௞, ∆ܶ) are the corrections
that the user will make to the current estimate of position and clock
time bias. The coefficients of the quantities on the left-hand side
represent the direction cosines of the LOS vector from the user to
the satellite as projected along the Cartesian co-ordinate system.
2.1.2. Carrier Phase Observable
The carrier phase observable is the difference between the received
satellite carrier phase and the phase of the carrier generated by the
receiver oscillator. The same error sources that affect
pseudoranges, are responsible for the errors which determine the
positional accuracy achieved with carrier phases [5]. Clearly, the
mathematical formulation of any specific error component is
different from the pseudorange case (i.e., phase measurement
errors instead of range measurement errors). Since the antenna
cannot sense the number of whole carrier waves between the
satellite and the receiver (called the integer ambiguity), an extra
parameter is inserted in the carrier phase equation:
ߔ௞
௣ = ߔ௞(ݐ) − ߔ௣(ݐ) + ܰ௞௣ + ܫ௞,ః௣ (ݐ) − ݂ܿ ௞ܶ௣(ݐ)+ ௞݀,ః (ݐ) + ௞݀,ః௣ (ݐ) + ௞݀௣(ݐ) + ߝః (12)
The symbols ߔ௞(ݐ) and ߔ௣(ݐ) denote the phase of the receiver
generated signal and the phase of the satellite signal respectively,
at the epoch t of satellite signal reception. The symbol ܰ௞
௣ is the
integer ambiguity. The terms ܫ௞,ః௣ (ݐ) and ௞ܶ௣(ݐ) are the ionospheric
and tropospheric delays. The ionospheric delay factor has a
negative value because the carrier phase progresses when travelling
through the ionosphere. Furthermore, the tropospheric factor is
converted in cycles multiplying by /݂ ,ܿ where ݂ is the nominal
frequency and c is the speed of light in vacuum. The symbols
௞݀,ః (ݐ) and ௞݀௣(ݐ) refer to the receiver and satellite hardware
delays respectively. The symbol ௞݀,ః௣ (ݐ) denotes the multipath
effect and ߝః denotes the carrier phase measurement noise.
Assuming synchronisation of the satellite and receiver clocks,
omitting other error sources (receiver phase tracking circuits, local
oscillator, multipath and measurement noise), and taking into
account both the time of transmission and reception of the signal,
the equation for the phase observation between a satellite i and a
receiver A, can be written as [6]:
ߔ஺
௜( )߬ = ߔ௜(ݐ) − ߔ஺( )߬ (13)
where ߔ஺௜( )߬ is the phase reading (phase at receiver A of the signal
from satellite i at time )߬; ߔ௜(ݐ) is the received signal (phase of the
signal as it left the satellite at time t) and ߔ஺( )߬ is the generated
signal phase (phase of the receiver’s signal at time )߬. If ߩ஺௜(ݐ)
is the range between receiver and satellite, we have:
ݐ= ߬− ఘಲ೔(௧)
௖
(14)
Therefore:
ߔ௜(ݐ) = ߔ௜൬߬ − ఘಲ೔(௧)
௖
൰ (15)
ߔ௜(ݐ) = ߔ௜( )߬ − డః೔(௧)
ௗ௧ถ
௙
× ఘಲ೔(௧)
௖
+⋯ (16)
ߔ௜(ݐ) = ߔ௜( )߬ − ݂× ఘಲ೔(௧)
௖
+⋯ (17)
and finally:
ߔ஺
௜( )߬ = ߔ௜( )߬ − ௙
௖
ߩ஺
௜(ݐ) − ߔ஺( )߬ + ܰ஺௜ (18)
where ߔ஺௜( )߬ is the phase reading (degree or cycles); ߔ௜( )߬ is the
emitted signal; ௙
௖
ߩ஺
௜(ݐ) is the total number of wavelengths; ߔ஺( )߬
is the generated signal and ܰ஺௜ is the integer ambiguity. The carrier
phase measurement technique typically uses the difference
between the carrier phases measured at a reference receiver and a
user receiver. This is therefore an inherently differential technique.
2.1.3. Doppler Observable
The equation that associates the transmitted frequency from the
satellite with the received frequency is:
௞݂ = ௙೛
ଵା
ೝᇲ
೎
(19)
where ௞݂ is the received frequency, ݂௣denotes the emitted
frequency from the satellite, ݎ′ denotes the radial velocity in the
satellite-receiver direction and ܿ denotes the speed of light in
vacuum. The Doppler frequency shift is given by the
difference݂ ௣ − ௞݂. The radial velocity r’ is the actual rate of
change in the satellite-receiver distance and it is given by:
ݎᇱ= −
௙ೖି௙
೛
௙ೖ
∙ ܿ (20)
The integrated Doppler count between two epochs ݐଵ and ݐଶ is
given by:
ܰ(௧భ,௧మ) = ∫ (݂௣ − ௞݂)݀ݐ௧మ௧భ (21)
More information about the Doppler observable and on some of its
practical uses can be found in the literature [7, 8].
2.2. GNSS Error Sources
In the following paragraphs, the error sources affecting
pseudorange and carrier phase measurements are described. The
error sources can be classified into the five broad categories as
listed below:
 Receiver Dependent Errors: Clock Error, Noise and
Resolution;
 Ephemeris Prediction Errors;
 Satellite Dependent Errors: Clock Offset and Group
Delays;
 Propagation Errors: Ionospheric Delay, Tropospheric
Delay and Multipath;
 User Dynamics Errors.
2.2.1. Receiver Dependent Errors
Most receivers employ quartz clocks to measure GNSS time, which
are not as accurate as the atomic clocks of the satellites. Therefore,
there is an offset between the receiver and satellite clocks called
receiver clock error. This error affects both the measurement of the
signal flight time and the calculation of the satellite’s position at
time of transmission. Measurement Noise is a random error, which
depends entirely on the electronic components of the receiver.
Receivers for very precise measurements are designed to minimise
this error. Both noise and resolution errors can be reduced by using
appropriate filtering techniques. Theoretically, receiver noise can
be removed by averaging the measurements, but only over fairly
long periods of observation time.
2.2.2. Ephemeris Prediction Errors
The ephemeris data are required for both pseudorange and phase
computations. These errors are due to incorrect estimation of the
satellites ephemeris at the CPS. A model for evaluating these errors
(Fig. 3) is obtained by considering the three components of the
vector representing the difference between estimated and true
distance: Along Track (ATK), Across Track (XTK) and Radial
(RAD). The maximum error is experienced when the satellite has
an elevation of 0° on the receiver horizon and the line-of-sight
(LOS) user-satellite lies on the geometric plane containing ATK.
In general, the error can be expressed as a function of the three
components, in the form:
ܧܴܴ = ܴܣܦ ݋ܿݏߙ + ܣܶܭ݅ݏ݊ߙܿ݋ݏߚ + ܺܶܭ݅ݏ݊ߙ݅ݏ݊ߚ (22)
where ߙ is the angle between the LOS user-satellite and the satellite
vertical and ߚ is the angle between the ATK direction and the plane
containing the LOS and the satellite vertical. The US DoD precise
ephemeris is calculated from actual observation to the satellites
from a network of ground stations distributed around the world. It
is produced several days after the observation period and is
available only to authorised users. Other non-DoD organisations
produce precise ephemeris, both globally and locally, by suitable
modelling of all forces and moments acting on the satellites. Orbit
relaxation techniques can be developed within GNSS software.
These techniques solve for orbital errors in the broadcast ephemeris
and produce improved relative positioning [9-12].
2.2.3. Satellite Dependent Errors
Corrections to the drift of the satellite atomic clocks are computed
by the CPS and then broadcasted to the users in the navigation
message. The effect of satellite clock offset is negligible in most
positioning applications (using the polynomial coefficients
corrections computed at the CPS it is possible to reduce this error
down to 1 part per 1012). The residual error is due to the fact that
corrections from the CPS are periodic and not continuous. Group
Delays are the delays typical of the satellite electronic circuits.
They are estimated on the ground before the satellites are launched
and corrections are included in the navigation message.
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Fig. 3. Error components in ephemeris estimation.
2.2.4. Propagation Errors
As discussed, propagation errors include both ionospheric and
tropospheric delays. As the satellite signal passes through the
ionosphere, it is delayed for two reasons [13]. Firstly, because it
travels through a non-vacuum material (propagation delay); thus
the Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) codes are delayed, while the
carrier phase is advanced when passing through the ionospheric
layers. Secondly, because it bends due to refraction; for many
applications, the error caused by the bending effect can be
considered negligible if the signals are transmitted by satellites
with an elevation of 15° or more. The ionospheric delay is
dependent primarily on the number of electrons that the signal
encounters along its propagation path. It is therefore dependent
both on the ionosphere characteristics (variable during the day and
with seasons), and the path angle (elevation angle of the satellite).
It is possible to approximately evaluate the ionospheric delay using
the following equation [13]:
∆߬= 40.31 ்ா஼
௖௙మ
(23)
where ܶܧܥ is the total electron content integrated along the LOS
to the satellite in units of electrons/m2, ݂ is the frequency in Hz and
ܿ is the speed of light. TEC varies with time and depends on the
location of the ionosphere ‘pierced’ by the LOS to the satellite. At
the L1 frequency (1575.42 MHz), equation (23) can be written for
a satellite that is not at the zenith [14]:
∆߬= 0.162 ி∙்ா஼ೡ
௖
(24)
where ܶܧܥ௩ is the ܶܧܥ value for a vertical column located at the
pierce point, in units of 1016 electrons per m2 and ܨ is the obliquity
factor. Assuming that the active region of the ionosphere can be
represented by a thin shell at an elevation of 350 km, the obliquity
can be approximately expressed as a simple function of the
elevation angle in degrees (ܧ) of the satellite at the receiver’s
antenna [14]:
ܨ = 1 + 2.74 ∙ 10ି଺(96 − ܧ)ଷ (25)
Depending on the receiver design, different models can be adopted
to calculate the correction terms to be applied to the pseudorange
before solving the navigation equations. Particularly, L1 code-
range receivers use a sinusoidal model of the ionosphere (called
Klobuchar model), which takes into account the variations of the
ionospheric layers (low over night, rapidly getting higher after
dawn, getting slightly higher during the afternoon and rapidly
getting lower after sunset). The sinusoidal parameters (amplitude
and period) are transmitted in the navigation message. The
relevant equations are the following [15]:
ܫܦܸ = ܦܥ+ ܣܿ݋ݏቂଶగ(௧ି ః )
௉
ቃ(݀ ܽݕ) (26)
ܫܦܸ = ܦܥ(݊݅݃ ℎݐ) (27)
where ܫܦܸ (Ionospheric Vertical Delay) is expressed in nsec, ܦܥ
is the constant night-day offset (5 nsec), ܣ is the amplitude (whose
value is between 10 and 100 nsec), ߔ is the constant phase offset
(14.00 hours), ݐ is the local time, and ܲ is the period. The two
factors ܣ and ܲ are transmitted as coefficients of a cubic equation
representing a model of the ionosphere with varying latitude. As
the delay also depends on obliquity of the path, elevation is
included as an additional factor in the equation:
ܶܫܦ = [1 + 16(0.53 − ܧ௛)ଷ]ܫܦܸ (28)
where ܶܫܦ is the Total Ionospheric Delay (nsec) and ܧ௛ is the
elevation angle of the satellites over the horizon. As the ionosphere
is dispersive at radio frequencies, two signals at different
frequencies will be delayed by different amounts. Therefore,
double frequency GNSS receivers (e.g., GPS P-code receivers) can
measure the difference (Δܶ) between the time of reception of L1
(1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.60 MHz), and evaluate the delay
associated with both of them. For L1 we have:
∆ ௅߬ଵ = Δܶ൤ቀ
௙ಽభ
௙ಽమ
ቁ
ଶ
− 1൨
ିଵ
(29)
where:
∆ܶ = ସ଴.ଷଵ∙்ா஼
௖௙మ
ቀ
ଵ
௙ಽమ
మ −
ଵ
௙ಽభ
మ ቁ (30)
The troposphere is the lower part of the atmosphere (up to about 50
km) and its characteristics depend on local humidity, temperature
and altitude. The tropospheric delay for a given slant range can be
described as a product of the delay at the zenith and a mapping
function, which models the elevation dependence of the
propagation delay. In general, the total Slant Tropospheric Delay
(STD) is given by the sum of a Slant Hydrostatic Delay (SHD) and
a Slant Wet Delay (SWD), and both of them can be expressed by a
relevant Zenith Tropospheric Delay (ZTD) and a Mapping
Function (MF). The SHD (or “dry component”) account for about
90% of the total tropospheric delay and accurate estimations are
normally available. On the other hand, the “wet component”
(SWD) estimations are generally less accurate and there is a
significant variability depending on the actual models
implemented. Table 1 shows some typical values of the
tropospheric delay for various elevation angles [13].
Table. 1. Tropospheric delay for varying elevation angle.
Elevation Angle [°] Dry Component [m] Wet Component [m]
90 2.3 0.2
30 4.6 0.4
10 13.0 1.2
5 26.0 2.3
The total STD is given by:
ܵܶ ܦ = ܵܪܦ + ܹܵ ܦ (31)
ܵܶ ܦ = ܼܪܦ×ܯܨு + ܼ ܹ ܦ×ܯܨௐ (32)
where ܼܪܦand ܼܹ ܦare the zenith hydrostatic delay and zenith
wet delay, respectively (ܼܶܦ= ܼܪܦ+ ܼܹ ܦ); ܯܨு and ܯܨௐ are
their corresponding ܯܨݏ. There are many ܼܶܦmodels and ܯܨݏ
currently used in GNSS positioning applications. Popular models
include the ܼܶܦempirical models developed by Saastamoinen [16
and 17], Hopfield [18 and 19] and by the University of New
Brunswick [20]. Popular MFs include the ones described by Chao
[21], Ifadis [22], Herring [23], Niell [24], and Boehm [25].
2.2.5. Multipath Errors
GNSS signals may arrive at the receiver antenna via different
paths, due to reflections by objects along the path. Such effect is
known as multipath. The reflected signal will have a different path
length compared to the direct signal; therefore, it will give a biased
distance measurement (Fig. 4). Multipath depends on the
environment surrounding the receiver and on the satellite
geometry. Typically, multipath will be greater for low elevation
satellites and code multipath is much greater than carrier phase
multipath [26]. For code measurements, the multipath error can
reach a theoretical value of 1.5 times the chip rate. So, for instance,
the GPS C/A code chip rate is 293.1 metre and the maximum
multipath error is about 439.65 metres. However, values of less
than 2-3 metres are the norm and upper values of 15 metres are
rarely observed. For carrier phase, the maximum theoretical
multipath error is a quarter of the wavelength. This equates to
about 5 centimetres for the GPS L1 and L2 frequencies, although
typical values are less than 1 centimetre [27]. Multipath can be
accurately modelled and removed only at static points, by taking
observations at the same points and at the same hour on consecutive
days. This, however, is possible in a dynamic environment. Other
techniques use Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and signal
phase/frequency information to detect and quantify multipath.
Direct
Signal
Multipath
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GNSS Antenna
Fig. 4. Multipath error.
Despite several technological advances and research efforts
addressing multipath detection and mitigation techniques, this is
still a major error source in GNSS applications. Techniques such
as the Narrow Correlator [28], the Double Delta/Strobe Correlator
[29], or the Vision Correlator by Fenton and Jones [30], are not
capable of eliminating the multipath-related errors completely.
2.2.6. User Dynamics Error
There are various errors due to the dynamics of a GNSS receiver.
These errors range from the physical masking of the GNSS antenna
to the accuracy degradation caused by sudden accelerations of the
antenna. If carrier phase is used, the resulting effect of “cycle
slips” is the need for re-initialisation (i.e., re-determination of the
integer ambiguities). In general, a distinction is made between
medium-low and high dynamic platforms.
2.3. UERE Vector
The User Equivalent Range Error (UERE) is an error vector along
the line-of-sight user-satellite given by the projection of all system
errors. The value of this vector can be reduced only by careful
design of the receiver, since there is nothing the users of non-
augmented GNSS receivers can do to reduce other error sources.
The UERE is generally measured in metres and is given as either a
1-sigma error (often denoted as ߪ௥) or a 2-sigma error (95%). The
portion of the UERE allocated to the space and control segments is
called the User Range Error (URE) and is defined at the phase
centre of the satellite antenna. The portion of the UERE allocated
to the User Equipment is called the UE Error (UEE). Specifically,
the UERE is the root-sum-square of the URE and UEE. When SA
was on, typical values of the UERE vector for GPS were below 10
m (95%) for P(Y) code receivers and about 33 m (95%) for C/A
code receivers. With SA turned off, the UERE of C/A code
receivers is typically less than 20 metres, with the actual value
dominated by ionospheric and multipath effects. Dual-frequency
receivers (with the capability of removing almost entirely the
ionospheric errors), typically experience smaller UEREs. Users of
the new modernised GPS civilian signals, as well as future users of
GALILEO and BEIDOU, will be able to use multiple frequencies
to compensate for the ionospheric errors and thereby to achieve
lower UEREs. In GNSS systems the UERE values are strongly
dependent on the time elapsed since the last upload from the control
segment. As an example, Fig. 5 shows the GPS Standard
Positioning Service (SPS) UERE variation with time [31]. In GPS
normal operations, the time since last upload is limited to no more
than one day. The smallest UERE and best SIS accuracy will
generally occur immediately after an upload of fresh NAV message
data to a satellite, while the largest UERE and worst SIS accuracy
will usually be with the stalest NAV message data just prior to the
next upload to that satellite.
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Fig. 5. UERE variation with time in normal and extended operations [31].
The metric used to characterize whether the NAV message data
being transmitted by a satellite is fresh or stale is the age of data
(AOD), where the AOD is the elapsed time since the control
segment generated the satellite clock/ephemeris prediction used to
create the NAV message data upload. The AOD is approximately
equal to the time since last upload plus the time it took the Control
Segment to create the NAV message data and upload it to the
satellite. For Normal Operations (NOP), the GPS UERE budget
and the traditional SPS SIS accuracy specifications apply at each
AOD. Because the largest UERE and worst SIS accuracy usually
occur with the oldest NAV message data, the UERE budget and
traditional SPS SIS accuracy specifications are taken as applying
at the maximum AOD. For reference, the GPS UERE budgets for
SPS receivers at zero AOD, at maximum AOD in normal
operations, and at 14.5 day AOD in extended operations, are shown
in Table 2. The breakout of the individual segment components of
the UERE budgets shown in this table is given for illustration
purposes only assuming average receiver characteristics. The
actual GPS SPS ranging accuracy standards are better specified in
terms of the UEE and URE components and the overall error
budget is dependent on a number of assumptions, conditions and
constraints. Table 3 lists the error budgets and typical UEE values
applicable to airborne C/A-code GPS receivers in normal operating
conditions. Table 4 lists the condition and criteria that apply to the
URE budgeting.
2.4. DOP Factors
Ranging errors alone do not determine GNSS positioning accuracy.
The accuracy of the navigation solution is also affected by the
relative geometry of the satellites and the user. This is described
by the Dilution of Precision (DOP) factors. The four linearized
equations represented by Eq. (9) can be expressed in matrix
notation as:
൦
߂ ଵܲ
߂ ଶܲ
߂ ଷܲ
߂ ସܲ
൪= ൦ߚଵଵ ߚଵଶ ߚଵଷ 1ߚଶଵ ߚଶଶ ߚଶଷ 1
ߚଷଵ ߚଷଶ ߚଷଷ 1
ߚସଵ ߚସଶ ߚସଷ 1൪൦
߂ݑ௞
߂ݒ௞
߂ݓ
߂ܶ
൪+൦ЄଵЄଶ
Єଷ
Єସ
൪ (33)
where an error vector has been added to account for pseudorange
measurement noise plus model errors and any unmodelled effects
(e.g., SA), and ߚ௜௝ is the direction cosine of the angle between the
LOS to the ith satellite and the jth co-ordinate.
Table 2. GPS single frequency C/A code UERE budget.
Adapted from [31].
Segment Error Source
UERE Contribution [95%][m]
Zero
AOD
Max
AOD in
NOP
14.5
Day
AOD
Space
Clock Stability
Group Delay Stability
Differential Group Delay
Stability
Satellite Acceleration
Uncertainty
Other Space Segment
Errors
0.0
3.1
0.0
0.0
1.0
8.9
3.1
0.0
2.0
1.0
257
3.1
0.0
204
1.0
Control
Clock/Ephemeris
Estimation
Clock/Ephemeris
Prediction
Clock/Ephemeris Curve
Fit
Iono Delay Model Terms
Group Delay Time
Correction
Other Control Segment
Errors
2.0
0.0
0.8
9.8-19.6
4.5
1.0
2.0
6.7
0.8
9.8-19.6
4.5
1.0
2.0
206
1.2
9.8-19.6
4.5
1.0
User
Ionospheric Delay
Compensation
Tropospheric Delay
Compensation
Receiver Noise and
Resolution
Multipath
Other User Segment
Errors
N/A
3.9
2.9
2.4
1.0
N/A
3.9
2.9
2.4
1.0
N/A
3.9
2.9
2.4
1.0
95% System UERE (SPS) 12.7-21.2
17.0-
24.1 388
Table. 3. Typical UEE error budget (95%). Adapted from [31].
Error Source
Traditional
Spec., Single
Freq. Rr
Improved
Spec.,
Single
Freq. Rr
Modern
Single
Freq. Rr
Modern
Dual
Freq.
Rr*
Ionospheric
Delay
Compensation
N/A N/A N/A 0.8
Tropospheric
Delay
Compensation
3.9 4.0 3.9 1.0
Receiver Noise
and Resolution 2.9 2.0 2.0 0.4
Multipath 2.4 0.5 0.2 0.2
Other Errors 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8
UEE [m], 95% 5.5 4.6 4.5 1.6
*Assuming benign conditions [31]
Table 4. SPS SIS URE accuracy standards. Adapted from [31].
SIS Accuracy Standard Conditions and Constraints
Single-Frequency C/A-Code:
≤ 7.8 m 95% Global Average 
URE during Normal
Operations over all AODs
≤ 6.0 m 95% Global Average 
URE during Normal
Operations at Zero AOD
≤ 12.8 m 95% Global Average 
URE during Normal
Operations at Any AOD
 For any healthy SPS SIS
 Neglecting single-frequency
ionospheric delay model errors
 Including group delay time
correction errors at L1
 Including inter-signal bias (P(Y)-
code to C/A-code) errors at L1
Single-Frequency C/A-
Code:
 ≤ 30 m 99.94% Global 
Average URE during Normal
Operations
 ≤ 30 m 99.79% Worst 
Case Single Point Average
URE during Normal
Operations
 For any healthy SPS SIS
 Neglecting single-frequency
ionospheric delay model errors
 Including group delay time
correction errors at L1
 Including inter-signal bias (P(Y)-
code to C/A-code) errors at L1
 Standard based on measurement
interval of one year; average of
daily values within the service
volume
 Standard based on 3 service
failures per year, lasting no more
than 6 hours each
Single-Frequency C/A-
Code:
 ≤ 388 m 95% Global 
Average URE during
Extended Operations after 14
Days without Upload
 For any healthy SPS SIS
Equation (33) can be written more compactly as:
ݎ= ܤݔҧ+ Є (34)
where ܤ is the 4  4 solution matrix (i.e., matrix of coefficients of
the linear equation); ݔҧis the user position and time correction
vector ݔҧ≡ [߂ݑ௞߂ݒ௞߂ݓ߂ܶ]்; ݎ is the pseudorange
measurement difference vector (ݎ≡ [߂ ଵܲ߂ ଶܲ߂ ଷܲ߂ ସܲ ]்) and Є
is the vector of measurement and other errors (Є
≡ [Єଵ Єଶ Єଷ Єସ ]்).
The GNSS receiver (or post-processing software) solves the matrix
equation using least squares or a Kalman Filter (KF). The solution
is:
ݔҧ= −(ܤ்ܹ ܤ)ିଵܤ்ܹ ௥ (35)
The new term in the above equation is the weight matrix (ܹ ) that
characterizes the differences in the errors of the simultaneous
measurements as well as any correlations that may exist among
them. The weight matrix is given by:
ܹ = ߪ଴ଶܥ௥ (36)
where ܥ௥ is the covariance matrix of the pseudorange errors and
ߪ଴
ଶ is a scale factor known as the a priori variance of unit weight.
Applying the law of propagation of error (also known as the
covariance law), we obtain:
ܥ௫̅ = [(ܤ்ܹ ܤ)ିଵܤ்ܹ ]ܥ௥ [(ܤ்ܹ ܤ)ିଵܤ்ܹ ]் (37)
ܥ௫̅ = ൫ܤ்ܥ௥ିଵܤ൯ିଵ (38)
where ܥ௫̅ is the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates. If we
assume that the measurement and model errors are the same for all
observations with a particular standard deviation (ߪ) and that they
are uncorrelated, we can write:
ܥ௥ = ܫߪଶ (39)
where ܫ is the identity matrix. Therefore, the expression for ܥ௫̅
simplifies to:
ܥ௫̅ = (ܤ்ܤ)ିଵߪ௥ଶ = ܦߪ௥ଶ (40)
The term r represents the standard deviation of the pseudorange
measurement error plus the residual model error, which is assumed
to be equal for all simultaneous observations. If we further assume
that the measurement error and the model error components are all
independent, then we can simply root-sum-square these errors to
obtain the value ofߪ௥. Based on the definition of UERE given
above, we can use the 1-sigma UERE for ߪ௥. The elements of
matrix D are a function of receiver-satellite geometry only. The
explicit form of this matrix is:
ܦ = ൦ܦଵଵ ܦଵଶ ܦଵଷ ܦଵସܦଶଵ ܦଶଶ ܦଶଷ ܦଶସ
ܦଷଵ ܦଷଶ ܦଷଷ ܦଷସ
ܦସଵ ܦସଶ ܦସଷ ܦସସ
൪ (41)
The DOP factor can be defined as follows:
ܦܱ ௗܲ = ඥܶܽݎ ܿ݁ ௗܦ (݀ = 1, 2, 3, 4) (42)
where d is the dimension of the DOP factor. The diagonal elements
of C୶ത are the estimated receiver coordinate and clock-offset
variances, and the off-diagonal elements (i.e., covariances) indicate
the degree to which these estimates are correlated. The explicit
form of the C୶ത matrix is:
ܥ௫̅ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
ߪ௨
ଶ ߪ௨௩ ߪ௨௪ ߪ௨்
ߪ௩௨ ߪ௩
ଶ ߪ௩௪ ߪ௩்
ߪ௪௨ ߪ௪௩ ߪ௪
ଶ ߪ௪்
்ߪ ௨ ்ߪ ௩ ்ߪ ௪ ்ߪ
ଶ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
(43)
The various DOP values can be expressed as functions of the
diagonal elements of the ܥ௫̅ matrix or of the ܦ matrix. Converting
the Cartesian co-ordinates in matrix form to more convenient local
geodetic coordinates, we have:
ܥ௅ீതതതത =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
ߪே
ଶ ߪோ ߪேு ߪே்
ߪாே ߪா
ଶ ߪாு ߪா்
ߪுே ߪுா ߪு
ଶ ߪு்
்ߪ ே ்ߪ ா ்ߪ ு ்ߪ
ଶ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
(44)
Table 5 shows the relationship between the DOP factors and the
diagonal elements of the ܥ௅ீതതതത matrix and of the ܦ matrix in
equation (42). It is also evident that:
ܲܦܱܲ = √ܪܦܱܲଶ + ܸ ܦܱܲଶ (45)
ܩܦܱܲ = √ܲܦܱܲଶ + ܶ ܦܱܲଶ (46)
The PDOP is very frequently used in navigation. This is because it
directly relates error in GNSS position to errors in pseudo-range
measurements to the satellites. According to the definitions given
above, the 1-sigma Estimated Position and Time Errors (EPE and
ETE) of a GNSS receiver can be calculated using the PDOP (EPE
in 3D), the HDOP (EPE in 2D) or the TDOP. In general, we have:
ܧܲܧଷ஽ = ߪ௉ =ߪ௥ܲ ܦܱܲ (47)
ܧܲܧଶ஽ = ߪு =ߪ௥ܪܦܱܲ (48)
ܧܶܧ = ்ߪ =ߪ௥ܶ ܦܱܲ (49)
Table 6 shows the relationship between the EPE3D and the Figure
of Merit (FOM). This parameter is frequently used in avionics
GNSS receivers to provide an indication of the quality of
information provided by GNSS.
Table 5. DOP expressions.
DOP Factor D Matrix Formulation C Matrix Formulation
Geometric DOP (GDOP) ܩܦܱܲ = ඥܦଵଵ + ܦଶଶ + ܦଷଷ + ܦସସ ܩܦܱܲ= 1
ߪ௥
ඥߪே
ଶ + ߪாଶ + ߪுଶ + ்ߪ ଶ
Position DOP (PDOP) ܲܦܱܲ = ඥܦଵଵ + ܦଶଶ + ܦଷଷ ܲܦܱܲ = 1ߪ௥ඥߪேଶ + ߪாଶ + ߪுଶ
Horizontal DOP (HDOP) ܪܦܱܲ = ඥܦଵଵ + ܦଶଶ ܪܦܱܲ = 1ߪ௥ඥߪேଶ + ߪாଶ
Vertical DOP (VDOP) ܸܦܱܲ = ඥܦଷଷ ܸܦܱܲ = 1ߪ௥ඥ ߪுଶ = ߪுߪ௥
Time DOP (TDOP) ܶܦܱܲ = ඥܦସସ ܶܦܱܲ = 1ߪ௥ඥ ்ߪ ଶ = ்ߪߪ௥
Table 6. GNSS figure of merit.
FOM Est. Position Error 3-D (m) Est. Time Error
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
< 25
25-50
50-75
75-100
100-200
200-500
500-1000
1000-5000
> 5000
< 1ns
1ns-10ns
10ns-100ns
100ns-1ms
1ms-10ms
10ms-100ms
100ms-1ms
1ms-10ms
>10ms
There is a proportionality between the PDOP and the reciprocal
value of the volume V of a particular tetrahedron formed by the
satellites and the user position (Fig. 6).
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Fig. 6. PDOP tetrahedron construction.
In Fig. 6, four unit-vectors point toward the satellites and the ends
of these vectors are connected with 6 line segments. It can in fact
be demonstrated that the PDOP is the RSS (i.e., square root of the
sum of the squares) of the areas of the 4 faces of the tetrahedron,
divided by its volume (i.e., the RSS of the reciprocals of the 4
altitudes of the tetrahedron) [32]. Therefore, we can write:
ܲܦܱܲ = ට ଵ
௛ಲ
మ + ଵ௛ಳమ + ଵ௛಴మ + ଵ௛ವమ (50)
At a particular time and location, the four satellites shown in
Fig. 6, have determined elevations and azimuths with respect to the
receiver. From these satellite positions the components(ݔ,ݕ,ݖ) of the unit vectors to the satellites can be determined.
Using the Pythagorean theorem, the distances between the ends of
the unit vectors can be determined. Knowing these distances, a
tetrahedron can be constructed (Fig. 7) and the four altitudes of the
tetrahedron can be measured.
D
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C
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ܲܦܱܲ ൌ
S1+S2+S3+S4
ܸ
S1 = Area ABC
S2 = Area BCD
S3 = Area CDA
S4 = Area ABD
Fig. 7. “Cut and fold” tetrahedron for PDOP determination.
There is no approximation associated with the geometric
expression. Any residual error in PDOP determination is only due
to construction of the tetrahedron and measurement of the altitudes.
If the angleܣܥܣ෣ in Fig. 7 is small, one can recognise that the PDOP
will be large (poor) even without measuring the altitudes, since this
leads to a tetrahedron having a small volume. From the geometric
definition of PDOP we deduce that it is optimal from the user’s
point of view (i.e., low PDOP) to select the four satellites giving a
large volume of the tetrahedron (and a small RSS of the areas of
the 4 faces of the tetrahedron). This can be obtained primarily by
selecting a combination of satellites far from each other and
uniformly distributed around the receiver. The condition for the
maximum volume is with a satellite at the zenith and the other three
separated by 120° (azimuth) and low over the horizon. This
condition, however, would degrade the signal quality, due to the
longer propagation paths (i.e., a compromise between signal
quality and accuracy of the solution is therefore necessary). A
further consequence of the above construction is that if the ends of
the unit vectors are coplanar (a not unusual circumstance) the
PDOP becomes infinite, and a position is not obtainable. This is
the reason for which the various GNSS constellations have been
designed so that there are almost always 6-7 satellites in view
anywhere on Earth, giving an alternate choice of the 4 satellites to
be utilised. If m satellites are in view, the number of possible
combinations is:
ܰ = ௠ !
ସ!(௠ ିସ)! (51)
In most GNSS receivers the number of combinations ܰ also
corresponds to the number of PDOP/GDOP computations
necessary for selection of the best satellite geometry. Some
systems can automatically reject, prior performing positioning
calculations, subsets of satellites with associated DOP factors
below pre-set thresholds.
2.5. GNSS Performance Requirements in Aviation
The aviation community has devoted great efforts to the
rationalization and standardization of the navigation performance
parameters and requirements, thus specifying the so-called
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) that an airborne
navigation system must achieve [33, 34]. Accuracy, integrity,
availability and continuity are used to describe the RNP for
operations in various flight phases and within specified classes of
airspace. The four parameters used to characterize the navigation
systems performance are summarized [35]:
 Accuracy: The accuracy of an estimated or measured
position of a craft (vehicle, aircraft, or vessel) at a given time
is the degree of conformance of that position with the true
position, velocity and/or time of the craft. Since accuracy is
a statistical measure of performance, a statement of
navigation system accuracy is meaningless unless it includes
a statement of the uncertainty (e.g., confidence level) in
position that applies.
 Integrity: Integrity is the measure of the trust that can be
placed in the correctness of the information supplied by a
navigation system. Integrity includes the ability of the
system to provide timely warnings to users when the system
should not be used for navigation.
 Continuity: The continuity of a system is the ability of the
total system (comprising all elements necessary to maintain
craft position within the defined area) to perform its function
without interruption during the intended operation. More
specifically, continuity is the probability that the specified
system performance will be maintained for the duration of a
phase of operation, presuming that the system was available
at the beginning of that phase of operation.
 Availability: The availability of a navigation system is the
percentage of time that the services of the system are usable
by the navigator. Availability is an indication of the ability
of the system to provide usable service within the specified
coverage area. Signal availability is the percentage of time
that navigation signals transmitted from external sources are
available for use. It is a function of both the physical
characteristics of the environment and the technical
capabilities of the transmitter facilities.
In aviation applications, accuracy is a measure of the difference
between the estimated and the true or desired aircraft position
under nominal fault-free conditions. It is normally expressed as
95% bounds on Horizontal and Vertical position errors [34]. In the
avionics context, there are two distinguished types of accuracy that
must be considered: the accuracy relative to the navigation system
alone and the accuracy achieved by the combination of navigation
and flight control systems. This second type of accuracy is called
Total System Error (TSE) and is measured as deviation from the
required flight trajectory. In large commercial aircraft and several
military aircraft, the required flight trajectory and associated
guidance information is computed by a Flight Management System
(FMS) and constantly updated based on ATM and weather
information. The navigation system estimates the aircraft state
vector (i.e., position, velocity, attitude and associated rates),
determines the deviation from the required flight trajectory and
sends these information either to the cockpit displays or to an
Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). The error in the
estimation of the aircraft’s position is referred to as Navigation
System Error (NSE), which is the difference between the aircraft’s
true position and its displayed position. The difference between
the desired flight path and the displayed position of the aircraft is
called Flight Technical Error (FTE) and accounts for aircraft
dynamics, turbulence effects, human-machine interface, etc. As
illustrated in Fig. 8, the TSE is obtained as the vector sum of the
NSE and the FTE.
Required Flight Trajectory
Indicated Flight Trajectory
Actual Flight Trajectory
FTE
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Fig. 8. Navigation accuracy in aviation applications.
The integrity risk can be conveniently defined as the probability of
providing a signal that is out of tolerance without warning the user
in a given period of time. It is typically derived from the high-level
Target Level of Safety (TLS) which is an index, generally
determined through historic accident data, against which the
calculated risk can be compared to judge whether the operation of
the system is safe or not. The navigation integrity requirements in
various flight phases/operational tasks have been specified by
ICAO in terms of three key performance indicators: the probability
of failure over time (or per single approach), the Time-To-Alert
(TTA) and the Horizontal/Vertical Alert Limits. The TTA is the
maximum allowable time elapsed from the onset of the system
being out of tolerance until the equipment enunciates the alert. The
alert limits represent the largest horizontal and vertical position
errors allowable for safe operations. They are defined as follows
[36]:
Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL): the HAL is the radius of a circle in
the horizontal plane (the local plane tangent to the WGS-84
ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that describes
the region that is required to contain the indicated horizontal
position with the required probability for a particular navigation
mode.
Vertical Alert Limit (VAL): the VAL is half the length of a
segment on the vertical axis (perpendicular to the horizontal plane
of the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position,
that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated
vertical position with the required probability for a particular
navigation mode.
According to these definitions, in order to assess the navigation
system integrity, the NSE must be determined first and checked
against the Alert Limits (ALs) applicable to the current flight
operational phase. However, since the NSE is not observable by
the pilot or by the avionics on board the aircraft, another approach
to evaluate the system integrity has to be adopted. The standard
approach consists in estimating the worst-case NSE and
confronting this value with the corresponding AL. These limits for
NSE are known as Protection Levels (PLs) and represent high-
confidence bounds for the NSE. Similarly to the positioning errors,
the PLs are stated in terms of Horizontal and Vertical components
(HPL and VPL).
Table 7 lists the required level of accuracy, integrity, continuity and
availability defined by ICAO for the different aircraft flight phases.
Various applicable national and international standrads have been
used in this compilation [37-41].
An additional performance indicator that is often used to
characterise avionics GNSS receivers is the Time-To-First-Fix
(TTFF). The TTFF accounts for the time elapsed from the GNSS
receiver switch-on until the output of a navigation solution is
provided to the user within the required performance boundaries
(typically in terms of 2D/3D accuracy).
Table 7. Aviation GNSS Signal-in-Space Performance Requirements [37-41].
TYPE OF
OPERATION
HOR./VERT.
ACCURACY
(95%)
CONTINUITY AVAILABILITY INTEGRITY TTA HAL / VAL
En Route Oceanic 3700m/NA 1 − 10ିସ/hr to1 − 10ି଼/hr 0.99 to 0.99999 1 − 10ି଻/hr 5 min 7408m/NA
En Route
Continental 3700m/NA
1 − 10ିସ/hr to1 − 10ି଼/hr 0.99 to 0.99999 1 − 10ି଻/hr 5 min 3704m/NA
En Route Terminal 740m/NA 1 − 10ିସ/hr to1 − 10ି଼/hr 0.99 to 0.99999 1 − 10ି଻/hr 15 s 1852m/NA
APV-I 16m/20 m 1 − 8 × 10ି଺/15 s 0.99 to 0.999 1 − 2 × 10ି଻/App. 10 s 40m/50 m
APV-II 16m/8 m 1 − 8 × 10ି଺/15 s 0.99 to 0.999 1 − 2 × 10ି଻/App. 6 s 40m/20m
Category I 16m/4m 1 − 8 × 10ି଺/15 s 0.99 to 0.99999 1 − 2 × 10ି଻/App. 6 s 40m/10m
Category II 6.9m/2m 1 − 4 × 10ି଺/15 s 0.99 to 0.99999 1 − 10ିଽ/15 s 1 s 17.3m/5.3m
Category III 6.2 m/2 m
1 − 2 × 10ି଺/30 s
(lateral)1 − 2 × 10ି଺/15 s
(vertical)
0.99 to 0.99999
1 − 10ିଽ/30 s
(lateral)1 − 10ିଽ/15 s
(vertical)
1 s 15.5m/5.3m
The TTFF is commonly broken down into three more specific
scenarios, as defined in the GPS equipment guide:
Cold Start: The receiver has no recent Position, Velocity and Time
(PVT) data estimates and no valid almanac data. Therefore, it must
systematically search for all possible satellites in the sky. After
acquiring a satellite signal, the receiver can obtain the almanac data
(approximate information relative to satellites), based on which the
process of PVT estimation can start. For instance, in the case of
GPS receivers, manufacturers typically claim the factory TTFF to
be in the order of 15 minutes.
Warm Start: The receiver has estimates of the current time within
20 seconds, the current position within 100 km, and its velocity
within 25 m/s, and it has valid almanac data. Therefore, it must
acquire each satellite signal and obtain the satellite's detailed
ephemeris data.
Hot Start: The receiver has valid PVT, almanac and ephemeris
data, enabling a rapid acquisition of satellite signals. The time
required by a receiver in this state to calculate a position fix is also
called Time-to-Subsequent-Fix (TTSF). TTSF is particularly
important in aviation applications due to frequent satellite data
losses caused by high dynamics aircraft manoeuvres.
In aviation applications, GNSS alone does not guarantee the level
of performance required in several flight phases and operational
tasks. In particular, GNSS fails to deliver sufficient accuracy and
integrity levels for mission-critical and safety-critical operations
such as precision approach/auto-landing, avionics flight test and
flight inspection. Therefore, appropriate augmentation strategies
must be implemented to accomplish these challenging tasks using
GNSS as the primary source of navigation data.
3. GNSS Threats in Aviation
To meet the stringent SIS performance requirements of GNSS in
the aviation context (Table 7), it is essential to detect, isolate and
possibly predict GNSS data degradations or signal losses
experienced by the aircraft during its mission. This concept applies
both to civil and military (manned and unmanned) aircraft,
although in different flight and operational tasks. Suitable
mathematical models are therefore required to describe the main
causes of GNSS signal outages/degradations including Doppler
shift, interference/jamming, antenna obscuration, adverse satellite
geometries, Carrier-to-Noise ratio (C/N0) reductions (fading), and
multipath (i.e., GNSS signals reflected by the Earth’s surface or the
aircraft body).
3.1. Antenna Obscuration
Due to the manoeuvres of the aircraft, the wings, tail and fuselage
will obscure some satellites during the flight. Fig. 9 shows the
GNSS satellite obscuration algorithm.
Taking into account the aircraft shape (e.g. using a CATIA 3-D
model), the aircraft flight dynamics (pitch, roll and yaw variations)
and the geometric displacement of the GNSS satellites in view, the
Antenna Obscuration Matrixes (AOMs) can be generated for the
different flight conditions. Besides the AOM, other factors
influence the satellite visibility. In general, a satellite is
geometrically visible to the GNSS receiver only if its elevation in
the antenna frame is above the Earth horizon and the antenna
elevation mask.
Fig. 9. GNSS satellite obscuration analysis.
It should be noted that even high performance avionics GNSS
antennae have gain patterns that are typically below -3dB at about
5 degrees elevation and, as a consequence, their performance
become marginal below this limit (Fig. 10).
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Fig. 10. Avionics antenna gain pattern (L1 frequency).
In order to determine if a satellite is obscured, the LOS of the
satellite with respect to the antenna phase centre has to be
determined. To calculate the satellite azimuth and elevation with
respect to the antenna transformation matrix between ECEF (Earth
Centred Earth Fixed) and antenna frame must be applied. This is
obtained from:
ாܶ
௔ = ௕ܶ௔ ∗ ேܶ௕ ∗ ாܶே (52)
where ௕ܶ௔ is the transformation matrix between the aircraft body
frame and the antenna frame, ேܶ௕ is the transformation matrix from
ENU (East-North-Up) to body frame, and ாܶே is the ECEF to ENU
transformation matrix.
3.2. GNSS Signal
The received signal strength is affected by a number of factors
including transmitter and receiver characteristics, propagation
losses and interferences. When necessary, the various factors
contributing to the GNSS link budget and signal degradations due
to interference can be combine. Multipath induced effects are
considered separately. The ratio of total carrier power to noise
ܥ/ܰ଴ in dB-Hz is the most generic representation of received
signal strength. This is given by:
஼
ேబ
= ௧ܲ+ ܩ௧+ ܩ௥− ܮ௦− ܮ௔ − ܮ௥− ߪ௠ − ܰ௙ (dB) (53)
where:
்ܲ is the transmitted power level (dBw);
ܩ௧ is the satellite antenna gain (dBic);
ܩ௥ is the receiver antenna gain toward the satellite;
ܮ௦ is the free space loss;
ܮ௔ is the atmospheric attenuation (dry-air);
ܮ௥ is the rainfall attenuation;
ߪ௠ is the tropospheric fading;
௙ܰ is the receiver noise figure.
As an example, Table 8 shows the expected ܥ/ܰ଴ for a receiver
tracking a GPS satellite at zenith given a typical noise power
density of -205 dBW-Hz [75]. The values of ܥ/ܰ଴ listed in Table
14 should be compared against the values required to acquire and
track GPS signals. These thresholds are heavily dependent on
receiver design and for most commercial GNSS receivers they are
in the order of 28-33 dB-Hz for acquisition and 25-30 dB-Hz to
maintain tracking lock [42, 43]. Current generation avionics GNSS
receivers, which are designed to operate in high dynamics
conditions, typically exhibit better C/N0 thresholds [44, 45].
Table 8. Nominal receiver GPS signal power and received C/N0 [43].
SV Block
IIR-M/IIF Frequency P or P(Y) C/A or L2C
Signal Power
L1 -161.5 dBW -158.5 dBW
L2 -161.5 dBW -160.0 dBW
C/ܰ଴
L1 43.5 dB-Hz 46.5 dB-Hz
L2 43.5 dB-Hz 45 dB-Hz
The link budget calculated from equation (55) only refers to the
direct GNSS signal received from a satellite. Multipath effects,
which are due to the geometric and reflective characteristics of the
environment surrounding the GNSS antenna are not included in
this calculation and are discussed separately. The L-band antenna
on-board a GNSS satellite is designed to radiate the composite L-
band signals to the users on and near the Earth. In the case of GPS
(Fig. 11), the satellite viewing angle from edge-to-edge of the Earth
is about 27.7 degrees [46]. The satellite antenna is designed to
illuminate the Earth’s surface with almost uniform signal strength.
The path loss of the signal is a function of the distance from the
antenna phase centre to the surface of the earth. The path loss is
minimum when the satellite is directly overhead (90° elevation),
and is maximum at the edges of the coverage area (satellite at the
horizon).
Fig. 11. GPS satellite antenna coverage.
The difference in signal strength caused by this variation in path
length is about 2.1 dB and the satellite antenna gain can be
approximated by:
ܩ௧(݀ܤ) = 2.5413 ∗ ݅ݏ݊ܧ − 2.5413 (54)
where E is the elevation angle. Similarly, the avionics antenna gain
pattern shown in Fig. 8 can be approximated by:
ܩ௥(݀ܤ) = 9.8756 ∗ ݅ݏ݊ܧ − 4.7567 (55)
3.3. Radiofrequency Interference
Intentional and unintentional RF interference (jamming) can result
in degraded navigation accuracy or complete loss of the GNSS
receiver tracking. Jammers can be classified into three broad
categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum
Jammers (SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ). In
mission-essential and safety-critical GNSS applications, both
intentional and unintentional jamming must be detected in the
GNSS receiver and accounted for in the integrity augmentation
architecture. Fortunately, a number of effective jamming detection
and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression) techniques have been
developed for military GNSS applications and some of them are
now available for civil use as well. An overview of these
techniques is presented in [49]. The J/S performance of a GNSS
receiver at its tracking threshold can be evaluated by the following
equation [1]:
ܬ/ܵ= 10 ݋݈݃ ܴܳ௖ቂ ଵ
ଵ଴బ.భ(಴ ಿబ)⁄ ಾ ಺ಿ − ଵଵ଴బ.భ(಴ ಿబ)⁄ ቃ (56)
where Q is the processing gain adjustment factor (1 for NBJ, 1.5
for SSJ and 2 for WGJ), Rୡ is the code chipping rate (chips/sec)
and (ܥ/ܰ଴)ெ ூே is the receiver tracking threshold (dB-Hz). Since
the weak limit in an avionics receiver is the carrier tracking loop
threshold (typically the PLL), this threshold is usually substituted
for (ܥ/ܰ଴)ெ ூே . During some experimental flight test activities with
unaided L1 C/A code avionics receivers, it was found that in all
dynamics conditions explored and in the absence of jamming, a(ܥ ܰ଴)⁄ of 25 dB-Hz was sufficient to keep tracking to the satellites
[44, 45]. Using this 25 dB-Hz tracking threshold, the ܬ/ܵ
performance of the GPS receiver considering one of the satellites
tracked (PRN-14) during the descent manoeuvre was calculated.
The calculated C/ܰ଴ for PRN-14 was approximately 37 dB-Hz.
Using these ܬ/ܵ values, the minimum range in metres from a
jamming source can be calculated from:
ܴ௠ ௜௡ = ఒೕସగ൬10ಶೃು೟ೕషುೝೕశಸೝೕషಽೝ೑మబ ൰ (57)
where ܧܴ ௧ܲ௝ is the effective radiated power of the jammer (dBw),
l௝is the wavelength of jammer frequency (m), ௥ܲ௝ is the received
(incident) jamming power level at threshold = ܬ/ܵ+ ௥ܲ௦ (dBw),
௥ܲ௦is the minimum received (incident) signal power (dBw), ܩ௥௝is
the GNSS antenna gain toward jammer (dBic) and ܮ௥௙is the
jammer power attenuation due to receiver front-end filtering (dB).
3.4. Atmospheric Effects
GNSS signal frequencies (L-band) are sufficiently high to keep the
ionospheric delay effects relatively small. On the other hand, they
are not so high as to suffer severe propagation losses even in rainy
conditions. However, the atmosphere causes small but non-
negligible effects that must be taken into account. The major
effects that the atmosphere has on GNSS signals include [42]:
 Ionospheric group delay/carrier phase advance;
 Tropospheric group delay;
 Ionospheric scintillation;
 Tropospheric attenuation;
 Tropospheric scintillation.
The first two effects have a significant impact on GNSS data
accuracy but do not directly affect the received signal strength
(ܥ/ܰ଴). Ionospheric scintillation is due to irregularities in the
electron density of the Earth’s ionosphere (scale size from
hundreds of meters to kilometres), producing a variety of local
diffraction and refraction effects. These effects cause short-term
signal fading, which can severely stress the tracking capabilities of
a GNSS receiver. Signal enhancements can also occur for very
short periods, but these are not really useful from the GNSS
receiver perspective. Atmospheric scintillation effects are more
significant in the equatorial and sub-equatorial regions and tend to
be less of a factor at European and North-American latitudes.
Signal scintillation is created by fluctuations of the refractive
index, which are caused by inhomogeneity in the medium mostly
associated to solar activity. At the GNSS receiver location, the
signal would exhibit rapid amplitude and phase fluctuations, as
well as modifications to its time coherence properties. The most
commonly used parameter characterizing the intensity fluctuations
is the scintillation index ସܵ, defined as [47]:
ସܵ = ට 〈ூమ〉ି〈ூ〉మ〈ூ〉మ (58)
where I is the intensity of the signal (proportional to the square of
the signal amplitude) and 〈 〉 denotes averaging. The scintillation
index S4 is related to the peak-to-peak fluctuations of the intensity.
The exact relationship depends on the distribution of the intensity.
According to [47], the intensity distribution is best described by the
Nakagami distribution for a wide range of ସܵ values. The
Nakagami density function for the intensity of the signal is given
by:
݌(ܫ) = ௠ ೘
Γ(௠ )ܫ௠ ିଵ݁ (ି௠ ூ) (59)
where the Nakagami “m-coefficient” is related to the scintillation
index, S4 by:
݉ = ଵ
ௌర
మ (60)
In formulating equation (61), the average intensity level of ܫ is
normalized to be 1. The calculation of the fraction of time that the
signal is above or below a given threshold is greatly facilitated by
the fact that the distribution function corresponding to the
Nakagami density has a closed form expression which is given by:
ܲ(ܫ) = ∫ ݌(ݔ)݀ݔூ
଴
= Γ(௠ ,௠ ூ)
Γ(௠ ) (61)
where Γ(݉ ,݉ ܫ) and Γ(݉ ) are the incomplete gamma function
and gamma function, respectively. Using the above equation, it is
possible to compute the fraction of time that the signal is above or
below a given threshold during ionospheric events. For example,
the fraction of time that the signal is more than ݊ dB below the
mean is given byܲ(10ି௡/ଵ଴) and the fraction of time that the signal
is more than ݉ dB above the mean is given by 1 – ܲ(10௠ /ଵ଴).
Scintillation strength may, for convenience, be classified into three
regimes: weak, moderate or strong [47]. The weak values
correspond to ସܵ < 0.3, the moderate values from 0.3 to 0.6 and the
strong case for ସܵ > 0.6. The relationship between ସܵ and the
approximate peak-to-peak fluctuations ௙ܲ௟௨௖ (dB) can be
approximated by:
௙ܲ௟௨௖ = 27.5 × ܵ ସଵ.ଶ଺ (62)
Table 9 provides a convenient conversion between ସܵ and the
approximate peak-to-peak fluctuations ௙ܲ௟௨௖ (dB).
Table 9. Empirical conversion table for scintillation indices.
Adapted from [47].
Scintillation regime ࡿ૝ ࡼࢌ࢒࢛ࢉ [dB]
Weak 0.1 1.5
0.2 3.5
Moderate 0.3 6
0.4 8.5
0.5 11
0.6 14
Strong 0.7 17
0.8 20
0.9 24
1.0 27.5
Geographically, there are two zones of intense scintillation, one at
high latitudes and the other centred within ±20° of the magnetic
equator as shown in Fig. 12. Severe scintillation has been observed
in these two sectors, while in the middle latitudes scintillation
occurs exceptionally, such as during geomagnetic storms. In the
equatorial sector, there is a pronounced night-time maximum of
activity. For equatorial scintillation, peak activity around the vernal
equinox and high activity at the autumnal equinox have been
observed.
Fig. 12. Depth of scintillation fading at 1.5 GHz during solar maximum
and minimum years [47].
In order to predict the intensity of ionospheric scintillation on
Earth-space paths, the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) recommend that the Global Ionospheric Scintillation Model
(GISM) be used [47]. The GISM permits one to predict the ସܵ
index, the depth of amplitude fading as well as the rms phase and
angular deviations due to scintillation as a function of satellite and
ground station locations, date, time and working frequency.
Tropospheric attenuation in the GNSS frequency bands is
dominated by oxygen and the effects of other chemical species can
be neglected for most applications. Oxygen attenuation (ܣ) is in the
order of 0.035 dB for a satellite at zenith and its variation with
elevation angle (ܧ) can be approximated by [75]:
ܣ(ܧ) ≅ ଴.଴଻
௦௜௡ாା଴.଴ସଷ (dB)݂ ݋ݎ3 < ܧ < 10݀ ݁݃ (63)
ܣ(ܧ) ≅ ଴.଴ଷହ
௦௜௡ா
(dB)݂ ݋ݎܧ > 10݀ ݁݃ (64)
These formulae provide acceptable results only if ܧ > 3 degrees.
However, since several other errors affects measurements from
satellites with elevation below 5 degrees, a software mask is
typically employed in avionics GNSS receivers to exclude these
satellites form the navigation computations [45]. Tropospheric
rainfall attenuation has a minor effect in the GNSS frequency
bands. For instance, at a frequency of 2 GHz the attenuation for
high rainfall rates is less than 0.01 dB/km (rainfall attenuation
below 2 GHz is even less). Tropospheric scintillation is caused by
irregularities (primarily turbulence) causing variations of the
refractive index. This effect varies with time, frequency and
elevation angle. For small omnidirectional antennas, such as GNSS
antennas, the CCIR provided the following expression for the long-
term RMS amplitude scintillation [46]:
ߪ௠ = 0.025݂଴.ହ଼( ܿܿݏ ܧ)ି଴.଼ହ (dB) (65)
where ݂ is the frequency in GHz. The Noise Figure ( ௙ܰ) is related
to the system noise temperature ( ௦ܶ௬௦) in Kelvin as follows [48]:
௙ܰ = 10 ݋݈݃ ቀ1 + ೞ்೤ೞ
బ்
ቁ (dB) (66)
where ଴ܶ = 290K = 24.6 dB-K. ௦ܶ௬௦ for antenna plus receiver can
be computed using the Friis formula. Typical ௙ܰ values for state-
of-the-art GPS receivers are between 2 and 4 dB.
3.5. Doppler Shift
Doppler shift is the change in frequency of the received signal that
is experienced when the observer (aircraft) moves relative to the
signal source (satellite). The magnitude of the frequency shift
produced in the signal received from the nth satellite is a function
of the relative velocity measured along the satellite-aircraft LOS.
The Doppler shift of the nth satellite signal frequency is given by:
∆ ௡݂ = ݂ቀ|௩೙ሬሬሬ⃗|∓|௩ೌሬሬ⃗ |௖ ቁ ݋ܿ߯ݏ ௡ (67)
where ݒ௡ሬሬ⃗ is the nth satellite velocity component along the LOS, ݒ௔ሬሬ⃗
is the aircraft velocity projection along the LOS, ܿ is the speed of
light [݉ ݏିଵ], ݂ is the GNSS signal frequency [Hz] and ௡߯ is the
angle between the aircraft velocity vector and the nth satellite LOS.
In a practical aviation application, an optimisation process can be
initiated aiming to avoid any further observed increase in Doppler
shift. In particular, the presented algorithm studies the variations of
ݒ௡ሬሬ⃗ and ݒ௔ሬሬ⃗ for each tracked satellite and imposes geometric
constraints to the trajectory that are accounted for in the trajectory
optimisation process. With reference to the geometry illustrated in
Fig. 13, the following trigonometric relationship holds true:(ݒԦcos ௡߯)sinܧ௡= ݒԦcos ௡߯′ (68)
where ݒԦ is the aircraft velocity vector, ܧ௡is the elevation angle of
the nth satellite, ௡߯ is the relative bearing of the aircraft to the
satellite and ௡߯′ is the azimuth of the LOS projection in the
antenna plane.
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Fig. 13. Reference geometry for Doppler shift analysis.
From equations (67) and (68), the aircraft-satellite relative
geometric conditions that maximise or minimise Doppler shift can
be determined. In particular, combining the two equations, the
Doppler shift is given by:
∆ ௡݂ = ݂ቀ|௩೙ሬሬሬ⃗|∓|௩ೌሬሬ⃗ |௖ ቁୡ୭ୱఞ೙ᇱୱ୧୬ா೙ (69)
The above equation shows that both the elevation angle of the
satellite and the aircraft relative bearing to the satellite affect the
magnitude of the Doppler shift. In particular, reductions of ܧ௡ lead
to increases in Doppler shift, while ௡߯′ drives increments or
decrements in Doppler shift depending on the size of the angle and
the direction of the aircraft velocity vector. By inspecting Fig. 14,
it is evident that a relative bearing of 90° and 270° would lead to a
null Doppler shift as in this case there is no component of the
aircraft velocity vector (ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗ in this case) in the LOS to the satellite.
However, in all other cases (i.e., ݒԦ≠ ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗), such a component would
be present and this would lead to increments or decrements in
Doppler shift depending on the relative directions of the vectors ݒԦ
and ݒ௡ሬሬ⃗. This fact is better shown in Fig. 14, where a steady flight
without loss of generality is assumed.
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Fig. 14. Reference geometry for Doppler shift manoeuvre corrections.
As the time required for typical aircraft heading change
manoeuvres is much shorter than the timeframe associate to
significant satellite constellation changes, each satellite can be
considered stationary in the body reference frame of the
manoeuvring aircraft. Therefore, during manoeuvres leading to
Doppler shift, an initial aircraft velocity vector ݒపሬ⃗ can be considered
to define path constraints that avoid further signal degradation or
loss. This can be performed by imposing that the aircraft increases
the heading rates towards the directions ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗ or -ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗ and minimises
the heading rates towards the directions ݒெሬሬሬ⃗ and -ݒெሬሬሬ⃗. The choice of
ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗ or -ݒ଴ሬሬ⃗ is based simply on the minimum required heading change
(i.e., minimum required time to accomplish the correction).
Regarding the elevation angle (ܧ) dependency of Doppler shift,
equation (69) shows that minimising the elevation angle becomes
an objective also in terms of Doppler trajectory optimisation.
3.6. Multipath Analysis
Multipath is caused by the interference of multiple reflections
(from the ground and the aircraft structure) with the direct signal
transmitted by the satellite and represents a major source of error
in GNSS observations. The level and characteristics of multipath
depend on the geometry of the environment surrounding the
antenna, the reflectivity of nearby objects/terrain and the satellite
elevation angle. In order to build a reliable multipath model, a
combination of signal analysis and geometric ray-tracing methods
was adopted.
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Fig. 15. GNSS signal phases.
From Fig. 15, the ܵܰ ܴ and phase error for a single refection can be
represented as a function of direct and multipath signal amplitudes
and the multipath relative phaseߚ [49]:
ܵܰ ܴ = ܣ௖ଶ = ܣௗଶ + ܣ௠ଶ + 2ܣௗܣ௠ ݋ܿݏߚ (70)
ܽݐ ݊൫ߜథ൯= ஺೘ ௦௜௡ఉ஺೏ା஺೘ ௖௢௦ఉ (71)
where ܣௗ is the direct signal amplitude, ܣ௠ is multipath signal
amplitude and ߚ is the phase of the multipath. Fig. 16 shows that
both the multipath phase ߚand the multipath amplitude affect the
received signal. Therefore, we require a multipath model to
simulate these two factors, considering the reflections from the
airframe and from the ground. The commonly adopted
Aeronautical Multipath Channel (AMC) model developed during
the ESA-SDS research [50, 51].
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Fig. 16. Variation of ܣ௖ as function of the angle ߚ.
Fig. 17 illustrates the overall structure of the AMC model. Let
ℎ(ݐ, )߬ be the impulse response of the multipath channel model.
Then ℎ(ݐ, )߬ is given by [50]:
ℎ(ݐ, )߬ = 1 + ∑ ඥ ௜ܲଷ௜ୀଵ ∗ ௜݊(ݐ) ∗ ߜ(ݐ− ௜߬) (72)
where ௜ܲ is the echo power of the t݅h path. The signal ௜݊(ݐ) is a
noise signal with power ,݅ and a power spectral density N(f):
ܰ( )݂ = ቐ0݂ < −ܤ/2ଵ
஻
− ܤ/2 < ݂< ܤ/20݂ > ܤ/2 (73)
where ܤ is the noise bandwidth. From the multipath channel model
in Fig. 17, the wing reflection, the fuselage reflection and the
ground-echo are the main components of the multipath signal.
Fig. 17. AMC model structure.
Fig. 18 shows the geometric reflection model. The incoming wave
is emitted from point ,ܶ ܴ is the receiver location and ܵ is the
reflection point. ܸ is a defined point on the reflecting surface and
n stands for a unit vector normal to the surface.
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Fig. 18. Geometric reflection model.
In ray-tracing the reflection point ܵand the defined point ܸ should
satisfy the equation: (ܵ− ܸ) × ݊ = 0 (74)
and the line equation connecting ܶ and ܴ௜௠ ௔௚௘:
ܵ= ܶ+ ݐ× ൫ܴ ௜௠ ௔௚௘− ܶ൯ (75)
where ݐis a parameter between 0 and 1. Combining Eqs. (74) and
(75),ܵis given by:
ܵ= ܶ+ ௡×௏ି௡×்
௡×൫ோ೔೘ ೌ೒೐ି்൯൫ܴ ௜௠ ௔௚௘− ܶ൯ (76)
The corresponding extra path length,ܮ௠ ௌ, due to specular
reflection, is then:
ܮ௠ ௌ = |ܶ− |ܵ + |ܴ − |ܵ − |ܶ− ܴ| (77)
In our wing reflection model, the wing is assumed to be flat. By
Gaussian Doppler spectrum theory, the power of the wing echo
spectrum is assumed to be [52]:
ܲீ ௥(ௗ஻) = 20 ∗ ݋݈݃ ൬ ଵඥଶగఙమ ∗ ݁ି ೑మమ഑మ൰ (78)
where the deviation ߪ = 3.8 Hz. The wing reflection signal delay
can be calculated from:
߬௪௜௡௚(ݐ) = ଶ∗௅∗௦௜௡(ா)஼బ (79)
where L is the antenna height from the wing, ܧ is the elevation
angle (degrees) and ܥ଴ is the speed of light. The fuselage is
assumed to be a cylinder and the power of the fuselage echo
spectrum is given by [52]:
௣ܲ௥௢௖(݀ܤ) = 20 ∗ ݋݈݃ ଵ଴[ ଵ݇ ∗ (݁௞మ∗|௙| ) − ܵܰ ܴ − ଷ݇] (80)
where ଵ݇, ଶ݇ and ଷ݇ are the fuselage geometric coefficients.
Previous research showed that the fuselage reflection
characteristics change very little by increasing the fuselage radius
[51]. Ground reflection becomes important only during the landing
phase, when the aircraft is in close proximity of the terrain.
Assuming a Gaussian distributed ground reflection amplitude with
zero mean, the ground-echo power is given by:
ܲீ ௥(ௗ஻) = 20 ∗ logଵ଴൬ ଵඥଶగఙమ ∗ ݁ି ೑మమ഑మ൰ (81)
where, in this case, the deviation ߪ = 3.8 Hz. Assuming that the
terrain is flat:
௚߬௥௢௨௡ௗ(ݐ) = ଶ∗௛∗௦௜௡(ா)஼బ (82)
where ℎ is the aircraft altitude and ܧ is the elevation angle.
Obviously, this basic ground-echo model can be expanded to take
into account various terrain and man-made building geometries.
As discussed in [42], GNSS receivers can effectively reject most
of the multipath signal if the differential delay ∆τ > 1.5 μs for the
C/A code and 0.15 μs for the P(Y) code. As a consequence, the
region of potential ground-echo multipath problems for the C/A
code is:
ℎ ∗ ݅ݏ (݊ܧ) < (1.5ߤݏ) ∗ ܥ଴ = 448.5݉ (83)
Simulation and flight test activities performed on various aircraft
have showed that the fuselage reflections are normally the main
contributors to the airframe multipath [53, 54]. In most conditions,
the effects of signals reflected from the aircraft wings are
comparatively smaller [50, 51]. In particular, it has been found that
the airframe multipath ranging error budget can be minimised by
placing the GNSS antenna 5 (or more) centimetres above the
highest point on the aircraft fuselage. Furthermore, it has been
observed that the effect of ground-echo signals translate into a
sudden increase of the multipath ranging error of up to two orders
of magnitude with respect to the airframe multipath errors alone.
During a low-level military aircraft flight trial, it was found that the
ground-multipath ranging error reached a value of about 140
metres when the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 300 feet AGL
over flat terrain with a roll angle exceeding 45 degrees [44, 45]. It
must be pointed out, however, that such particular flight conditions
are only likely to be encountered in military aircraft and some
unmanned aircraft applications. Due to the flight profile
requirements and manoeuvring constraints of typical airliners, the
ground multipath contributions can be normally neglected in these
cases. According to the Standard Multipath Error Model (SMEM)
research [55] and experimental validation activities performed in
the US on various types of civil airliners [56], the airframe
multipath ranging error, s௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛, associated to a satellite
observation can be calculated directly as a function of the satellite
elevation angle:
s݉ݑ ݈݅ݐ݌ܽ ݐℎ = 0.13 + 0.53݁ቀ− ܧ10ቁ (84)
This model was endorsed by the ICAO GNSS panel and included
in the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) and for the Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS) by the Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) [36, 41, 56, 57].
3.7. Receiver Tracking Errors
A dedicated analysis of the GNSS receiver tracking performance is
required to analyse the dynamic stress errors, signal fading (ܥ/ܰ଴
reduction) and interferences (ܬ/ܵ increase). When the GNSS code
and/or carrier tracking errors exceed certain thresholds, the
receiver loses lock to the satellites. Since both the code and carrier
tracking loops are nonlinear, especially near the threshold regions,
only Monte Carlo simulations of the GNSS receiver in different
dynamics and SNR conditions can determine the receiver tracking
performance [58]. Nevertheless, some conservative rule-of-thumbs
approximating the measurement errors of the GNSS tracking loops
can be employed for this analysis. Numerous sources of
measurement errors affect the carrier and code tracking loops. It is
important to analyse the dominant error sources in each type of
tracking loop. Considering a typical avionics GNSS receiver
employing a two-quadrant arctangent discriminator, the Phase
Lock Loop (PLL) threshold is given by [1]:3ߪ௉௅௅ = 3ߪ௝+ ߠ௘ ≤ 45° (85)
where ߪ௝ is the 1-sigma phase jitter from all sources except
dynamic stress error and ߠ௘ is the dynamic stress error in the PLL
tracking loop. Expanding the above equation, the 1-sigma
threshold for the PLL tracking loop becomes [1]:
ߪ௉௅௅ = ඥߪ௧௉௅௅ଶ + ߪజଶ + ߠ஺ଶ + ఏ೐ଷ ≤ 15° (86)
where ߪ௧௉௅௅ is the 1-sigma thermal noise, ߪజ is the variance-
induced oscillator phase noise and ߠ஺ is the Allan-variance jitter.
The PLL thermal noise is often thought to be the only carrier
tracking error, since the other sources of PLL jitter may be either
transient or negligible. The PLL thermal noise jitter is computed as
follows:
ߪ௧௉௅௅ = ଷ଺଴ଶగ ට ஻೙௖/௡బ (1 + ଵଶ்௖/௡బ) (degrees) (87)
where ܤ௡ is the carrier loop noise bandwidth (Hz), /ܿ ଴݊ is the
carrier to noise power ratio ( /ܿ ଴݊ = 10(஼/ேబ)/ଵ଴ for C/N଴
expressed in dB-Hz) and T is the predetection integration time
(seconds). ܤ௡ and ܥ/ܰ଴ can be derived from the SNR model
described earlier in this section. Determination of the vibration-
induced oscillator phase noise is a complex analysis problem. In
some cases, the expected vibration environment is so severe that
the reference oscillator must be mounted using vibration isolators
in order for the GPS receiver to successfully operate in PLL. The
equation for vibration induced oscillator jitter is:
ߪజ = ଷ଺଴௙ಽଶగ ට׬ జܵଶ( ௠݂ ) ௉(௙೘ )௙೘మ ݀ ௠݂௙೘ ೌೣ௙೘ ೔೙ (degrees) (88)
where ௅݂ is the L-band frequency (Hz), జܵ( ௠݂ )is the oscialltor
vibration sensitivity of ∆ /݂ ௅݂ per g as a function of ௠݂ , which is
the random vibration modulation frequency (Hz), ܲ( ௠݂ ) is the
power curve of the random vibration as a function of ௠݂ (gଶ/Hz)
and g is the gravity acceleration. Usually the oscillator vibration
sensitivity,ܵజ( ௠݂ ) is not variable over the range of the random
vibration modulation frequency, then the above equation can be
simplified to:
ߪజ = ଷ଺଴௙ಽௌഔଶగ ට׬ ௉(௙೘ )௙೘మ ݀ ௠݂௙೘ ೌೣ௙೘ ೔೙ (degrees) (89)
The equations used to determine Allan deviation phase noise are
empirical. They are stated in terms of what the requirements are for
the short-term stability of the reference oscillator as determined by
the Allan variance method of stability measurement. The equation
for second-order loop short-term Allan deviation is:
ߠ஺ଶ = 144 ఙಲ (ఛ)∗௙ಽ஻೙ (rad) (90)
The equation for third–order loop short-term Allan deviation for
PLL is:
ߠ஺ଷ = 160 ఙಲ (ఛ)∗௙ಽ஻೙ (rad) (91)
where ߪ஺( )߬ is the Allan deviation-induced jitter (degrees), ௅݂ is
the L-band input frequency (Hz), ߬is the short-term stability gate
time for Allan variance measurement (seconds) and ܤ௡ is the noise
bandwidth. Usually ߪ஺( )߬ can be determined for the oscillator and
it changes very little with gate time߬. For example, assuming the
loop filter as a third-order with a noise bandwidth B୬ = 18 Hz and
the gate time τ = 1/B୬ = 56 ms, the Allan deviation is found to
be σ୅(τ) = 10ିଵ଴. The dynamic stress error depends on the loop
bandwidth and order. In a third-order loop, the dynamic stress error
is [1, 54]:
ߠ௘ଷ = ௗయோ/ௗ௧యఠబయ = ௗయோ/ௗ௧యቀ ಳ೙
బ.ళఴరఱቁయ = 0.4828 ೏యೃ೏೟య஻೙య (degrees) (92)
where ܴ is the LOS range to the satellite, ݀ଶܴ/݀ݐଶ is the
maximum LOS acceleration dynamics (°/sଶ), w଴ is the loop filter
natural radian frequency and B୬is the noise bandwidth. For the L1
frequency: the term ݀ଷܴ/݀ݐଷ = (98/sଷ) × (360°/cycle) ×(1575.42 × 10଺ cycles/s)/ܿ= 185398°/sଷ. Frequency jitter due
to thermal noise and dynamic stress error are the main errors in a
GNSS receiver Frequency Lock Loop (FLL). The receiver
tracking threshold is such that the 3-sigma jitter must not exceed
one-fourth of the frequency pull-in range of the FLL discriminator.
Therefore, the FLL tracking threshold is [1, 54]:3ߪி௅௅ = 3ߪ௧ி௅௅ + ௘݂ ≤ 1/4ܶ(Hz) (93)
where 3ߪ௧ி௅௅ is the 3-sigma thermal noise frequency jitter and fୣ is
the dynamic stress error in the FLL tracking loop. The above
equation shows that the dynamic stress frequency error is a 3-sigma
effect and is additive to the thermal noise frequency jitter. The
reference oscillator vibration and Allan deviation–induced
frequency jitter are small-order effects on the FLL and are
considered negligible. The 1-sigma frequency jitter threshold is
1/(12T) = 0.0833/T Hz. The FLL tracking loop jitter due to thermal
noise is:
ߪ௧ி௅௅ = ଵଶగ்ටସி஻೙஼/ேబ ቂ1 + ଵ்௖/௡బቃ (Hz) (94)
where ܨ is 1 at highܥ/ܰ଴ and 2 near the threshold. ߪ௧ி௅௅ is
independent of C/A or P(Y) code modulation and loop order. Since
the FLL tracking loop involves one more integrator that the PLL
tracking loop of the same order, the dynamic stress error is [54]:
௘݂ = ௗௗ௧ቀ ଵଷ଺଴ఠబ೙ ௗ೙ோௗ௧೙ቁ= ଵଷ଺଴ఠబ೙ ௗ೙శభோௗ௧೙శభ (Hz) (95)
Regarding the code tracking loop, a conservative rule-of-thumb for
the Delay Lock Loop (DLL) tracking threshold is that the 3-sigma
value of the jitter due to all sources of loop stress must not exceed
the correlator spacing ( )݀, expressed in chips. Therefore [54]:3ߪ஽௅௅ = 3ߪ௧஽௅௅ + ܴ௘ ≤ ݀(chips) (96)
where σ୲ୈ୐୐is the 1-sigma thermal noise code tracking jitter, Re is
the dynamic stress error in the DLL tracking loop. The DLL
thermal noise code tracking jitter is given by:
ߪ௧஽௅௅ = ටସிభௗమ஻೙௖/௡బ ቂ2(1 − ݀) + ସிమௗ்௖/௡బቃ (Hz) (97)
where Fଵis the DLL discriminator correlator factor (1 for time
shared tau-dithered early/late correlator and 0.5 for dedicated early
and late correlators), ݀ is the correlator spacing between early,
prompt and late, ܤ௡ is the code loop noise bandwidth and ܨଶ is the
DLL dicriminator type factor (1 for early/late type discriminator
and 0.5 for dot product type discriminator). The DLL tracking loop
dynamic stress error is given by:
ܴ௘ = ೏ೃ೙೏೟೙ఠబ೙ (chips) (98)
where dR୬/ dt୬ is expressed in chips/secn. The PLL, FLL and DLL
error equations described above allow determining the C/N଴
corresponding to the tracking threshold of the receiver. A generic
criterion applicable to GNSS augmentation systems is:(ܥ/ܰ଴)்௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ = ݉ ܽݔ[(ܥ/ܰ଴)௉௅௅, (ܥ/ܰ଴)ி௅௅, (ܥ/ܰ଴)஽௅௅](99)
where (ܥ/ܰ଴)௉௅௅ is the minimum carrier-to-noise ratio for PLL
carrier tracking, (ܥ/ܰ଴)ி௅௅is the is the minimum carrier-to-noise
ratio for FLL carrier tracking and (ܥ/ܰ଴)஽௅௅is the minimum
carrier-to-noise ratio for DLL code tracking.
4. GNSS Augmentation
In aviation applications, GNSS alone does not guarantee the level
of performance required in several flight phases and operational
tasks. In particular, GNSS fails to deliver sufficient accuracy and
integrity levels for mission safety-critical operations such as
precision approach/auto-landing, avionics flight test and flight
inspection. Therefore, appropriate augmentation strategies must be
implemented to accomplish these challenging tasks using GNSS as
the primary source of navigation data. Furthermore, when GNSS is
employed as primary means of navigation, some form of
augmentation is necessary to satisfy accuracy, integrity,
availability and continuity requirements.
4.1. Differential GNSS
Differential GNSS (DGNSS) techniques can be used to address
accuracy requirements. Specifically, in the case of GPS,
differential techniques have been developed which can provide
accuracies comparable with current landing systems. A variety of
Local Area DGNSS (LAD) and Wide Area DGNSS (WAD)
networks have been proposed over the past twenty years and some
LAD/WAD systems have achieved the levels of maturity required
to enter the market. Due to the existence of a copious literature on
GPS/GNSS basic principles and applications, these will not be
covered in this thesis. DGNSS was developed to meet the needs of
positioning and distance-measuring applications that required
higher accuracies than stand-alone GNSS could deliver. DGNSS
involves the use of a control or reference receiver at a known
location to measure the systematic GNSS errors; and, by taking
advantage of the spatial correlation of the errors, the errors can then
be removed from the measurement taken by moving or remote
receivers located in the same general vicinity. There have been a
wide variety of implementations described for affecting such a
DGNSS system. The intent is to characterise various DGNSS
systems and to compare their strengths and weaknesses. Two
general categories of DGNSS systems can be identified: those that
rely primarily upon the code measurements and those that rely
primarily upon the carrier phase measurements. Using carrier
phase, high accuracy can be obtained (centimetre level), but the
solution suffers from integer ambiguity and cycle slips. Whenever
a cycle slip occurs, it must be corrected for, and the integer
ambiguity must be re-calculated. The pseudorange solution is more
robust but less accurate (2 to 5 m). As it is not affected by cycle
slips, there is no need for re-initialisation. A typical DGNSS
architecture is shown in is shown in Fig. 19.
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Fig. 19. Typical DGNSS system architecture.
The system consists of a Reference Receiver (RR) located at a
known location that has been previously surveyed, and one or more
DGNSS User Receivers (URs). The RR antenna, differential
correction processing system, and data link equipment (if used) are
collectively called the Reference Station (RS). Both the UR and
the RR data can be collected and stored for later processing, or sent
to the desired location in real time via the data link. DGNSS is
based on the principle that receivers in the same vicinity will
simultaneously experience common errors on a particular satellite
ranging signal. In general, the UR (mobile receiver) uses
measurements from the RR to remove the common errors. In order
to accomplish this, the UR must simultaneously use a subset or the
same set of satellites as the reference station. The DGNSS
positioning equations are formulated so that the common errors
cancel. The common errors include signal path delays through the
atmosphere, and satellite clock and ephemeris errors. For PPS
users, the common satellite errors are residual system errors that
are normally present in the PVT solution. For SPS users, the
common satellite errors also include the intentionally added errors
from SA. Errors that are unique to each receiver, such as receiver
measurement noise and multipath, cannot be removed without
additional recursive processing (by the reference receiver, user
receiver, or both) to provide an averaged, smoothed, or filtered
solution. Various DGNSS techniques are employed depending on
the accuracy desired, where the data processing is to be performed,
and whether real-time results are required. If real-time results are
required then a data link is also required. For applications without
a real-time requirement, the data can be collected and processed
later. The accuracy requirements usually dictate which
measurements are used and what algorithms are employed. In the
case of Differential GPS (DGPS), accuracy is independent of
whether SPS or PPS is being used, although real-time PPS DGPS
can have a lower data rate than SPS DGPS because the rate of
change of the nominal system errors is slower than the rate of
change of SA. However, the user and the Reference Station must
be using the same service (either PPS or SPS). The clock and
frequency biases for a particular satellite will appear the same to
all users since these parameters are unaffected by signal
propagation or distance from the satellite. The pseudorange and
delta-range (Doppler) measurements will be different for different
users because they will be at different locations and have different
relative velocities with respect to the satellite, but the satellite clock
and frequency bias will be common error components of those
measurements. The signal propagation delay is truly a common
error for receivers in the same location, but as the distance between
receivers’ increases, this error gradually de-correlates and becomes
independent. The satellite ephemeris has errors in all three
dimensions. Therefore, part of the error will appear as a common
range error and part will remain a residual ephemeris error. The
residual portion is normally small and its impact remains small for
similar observation angles to the satellite. The first accepted
standard for SPS DGPS was developed by the Radio Technical
Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) Special Committee-
104 [59-61]. The data interchange format for NATO users of
DGPS is documented in STANAG 4392. The SPS reversionary
mode specified in STANAG 4392 is compatible with the RTCM
SC-104 standards. The standards are primarily intended for real-
time operational use and cover a wide range of DGPS measurement
types. Most SPS DGPS receivers are compatible with the RTCM
SC-104 differential message formats. DGPS standards for
aeronautical use were originally developed by the RTCA allow
Special Category-I (SCAT-I) precision approach using range-code
differential. These standards were contained in RCTA document
DO-217 and intended only for limited use until an international
standard could be developed for precision approach [62]. More
recently, the two separate standards were developed by RTCA for
GPS WAAS/LAAS. These standards define the minimum
operational performance requirements for different WAAS/LAAS
implementation types allowing WAAS operations down to CAT-I
[63] and LAAS operations down to CAT-IIIb [64, 65]. There are
two primary variations of the differential measurements and
equations. One is based on ranging-code measurements and the
other is based on carrier-phase measurements. There are also
several ways to implement the data link function. DGNSS systems
can be designed to serve a limited area from a single reference
station, or can use a network of reference stations and special
algorithms to extend the validity of the DGNSS technique over a
wide area. The result is that there is a large variety of possible
DGNSS system implementations using combinations of these
design features.
4.1.1. Ranging-Code DGNSS
Ranging-code differential techniques use the pseudorange
measurements of the RS to calculate pseudorange or position
corrections for the UR. The RS calculates pseudorange corrections
for each visible satellite by subtracting the “true” range determined
by the surveyed position and the known orbit parameters from the
measured pseudorange. The UR then selects the appropriate
correction for each satellite that it is tracking, and subtracts the
correction from the pseudorange that it has measured. The mobile
receiver must only use those satellites for which corrections have
been received. If the RS provides position corrections rather than
pseudorange corrections, the corrections are simply determined by
subtracting the measured position from the surveyed position. The
advantage of using position corrections is obviously the simplicity
of the calculations. The disadvantage is that the reference receiver
and the user receiver must use the exact same set of satellites. This
can be accomplished by coordinating the choice of satellite
between the RR and the UR, or by having the RS compute a
position correction for each possible combination of satellites. For
these reasons, it is usually more flexible and efficient to provide
pseudorange corrections rather than position corrections. RTCA,
NATO STANAG and RTCM standards are all based on
pseudorange rather than position corrections. The pseudorange or
position corrections are time tagged with the time that the
measurements were taken. In real-time systems, the rate of change
of the corrections is also calculated. This allows the user to
propagate the corrections to the time that they are actually applied
to the user position solution. This reduces the impact of data
latency on the accuracy of the system but does not eliminate it
entirely. SPS corrections become fully uncorrelated with the user
measurements after about 2 minutes. Corrections used after two
minutes may produce solutions which are less accurate than stand-
alone SPS GPS. PPS corrections can remain correlated with the
user measurements for 10 minutes or more under benign (slowly
changing) ionospheric conditions. There are two ways of
pseudorange data processing: post-mission and real-time
processing. The advantage of the post-mission solution over the
real-time one is that it is more accurate because the user can easily
detect blunders and analyse the residuals of the solution. On the
other hand the main disadvantage of the post-mission solution is
that the results are not available immediately for navigation. The
typical algorithm of the ranging-code DGNSS post-processed
solution used in flight test and inspection tasks is the double
difference pseudorange.
Fig. 20 shows the possible pseudorange measurements between
two receivers (k and l) and two satellites (p and q). If pseudoranges
1 and 2 from Fig. 22 are differenced, then the satellite clock error
and satellite orbit errors will be removed. If SA is active (not the
present case), it will be removed completely only if the signals
utilised in each receiver are transmitted exactly at the same time.
The residual error from SA is not a problem for post-processed
positioning, where it is easy to ensure that the differencing is done
between pseudoranges observed at the same time. Any
atmospheric errors will also be reduced significantly with single
differencing. The basic mathematical model for single difference
pseudorange observation is the following:
௞ܲ
௣
− ௜ܲ
௣ = ߩ௞௣ − ߩ௟௣ − (݀ݐ௞ − ݀ݐ௜)ܿ+ ௞݀,௣ − ௜݀,௣+ ௞݀,௣௣ − ௟݀,௣௣ + Δߝ௣ (104)
where ௜ܲ
௣ is the pseudorange measurement,ߩ௟
௣denotes the
geometric distance between the stations and satellite, ݀ݐ௜ denotes
the receiver’s clock offsets, ௜݀,௣ denotes the receiver’s hardware
code delays,݀ ௟,௣௣ denotes the multipath of the codes, Δߝ௣ denotes
the measurement noise and ܿ is the velocity of light.
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Fig. 20. Pseudorange Differencing.
Equation (104) represents the single difference pseudorange
observable between receivers. There are four unknowns in the
above equation assuming that the co-ordinates of station k are
known and that the difference in clock drifts is one unknown.
Hence, four satellites are required to provide four single difference
equations in order to solve for the unknowns. Single differences
with code observations are frequently used in relative (differential)
navigation. Using all pseudoranges shown in Fig. 22, differences
are formed between receivers and satellites. Double differences
are constructed by taking two between-receiver single differences
and differencing these between two satellites. This procedure
removes all satellite dependent, receiver dependent and most of the
atmospheric errors (if the distance between the two receivers is not
too large). The derived equation is:
௞ܲ
௣
− ௞ܲ
௤
− ௟ܲ
௣
− ௟ܲ
௤ = ߩ௞௣ − ߩ௞௤ − ߩ௟௣ − ߩ௟௤ + ௜݀,௣௝ (105)
where ௜݀,௣௝ denotes the total effect of multipath. There are three
unknowns in the above equation (the co-ordinates of station l) and
a minimum of four satellites is required to form a minimum of three
double difference equations in order to solve for the unknowns.
Using the propagation of errors law, it is shown that the double
difference observables are twice as noisy as the pure pseudoranges:
ߪ஽஽ = ඥߪ௉ଶ + ߪ௉ଶ + ߪ௉ଶ + ߪ௉ଶ = 2ߪ௉ (106)
but they are more accurate, because most of the errors are removed.
It is to be note that multipath remains, because it cannot be
modelled and it is independent for each receiver.
4.1.2. Carrier-phase DGNSS
Carrier-phase DGNSS techniques use the difference between the
carrier phases measured at the RR and UR. A double-differencing
technique is used to remove the satellite and receiver clock errors.
The first difference is the difference between the phase
measurement at the UR and the RR for a single satellite. This
eliminates the satellite clock error which is common to both
measurements. This process is then repeated for a second satellite.
A second difference is then formed by subtracting the first
difference for the first satellite from the first difference for the
second satellite. This eliminates both receiver clock errors which
are common to the first difference equations. This process is
repeated for two pairs of satellites resulting in three double-
differenced measurements that can be solved for the difference
between the reference station and user receiver locations. This is
inherently a relative positioning technique; therefore, the user
receiver must know the reference station location to determine its
absolute position.
The single difference observable is the instantaneous phase
difference between two receivers and one satellite. It is also
possible to define single differences between two satellites and one
receiver. Using the basic definition of carrier-phase observable
presented above, the phase difference between the two receivers A
and B, and satellite i݅s given by:
Φ஺஻
௜ ( )߬ = Φ஻௜( )߬ −Φ஺௜( )߬ (107)
and can be expressed as:
Φ஺஻
௜ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁ∙ ߩ஺஻
௜ (ݐ) +Φ஺஻௜ ( )߬ − ܰ஺஻௜ (108)
where Φ஺஻( )߬ = Φ஺( )߬ −Φ஻( )߬, ܰ஺஻௜ = ܰ஻௜ - ܰ஺௜ and
ߩ஺஻
௜ (ݐ) = ߩ஺௜(ݐ) - ߩ஻௜(ݐ)
Hence, with four satellites ,݅ ,݆ ݇ and :݈
Φ஺஻
௜ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁ∙ ߩ஺஻
௜ (ݐ) +Φ஺஻௜ ( )߬ − ܰ஺஻௜ (109)
Φ஺஻
௝ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁ∙ ߩ஺஻
௝ (ݐ) +Φ஺஻௝ ( )߬ − ܰ஺஻௝ (110)
Φ஺஻
௞ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁ∙ ߩ஺஻
௞ (ݐ) +Φ஺஻௞ ( )߬ − ܰ஺஻௞ (111)
Φ஺஻
௟ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁ∙ ߩ஺஻
௟ (ݐ) +Φ஺஻௟ ( )߬ − ܰ஺஻௟ (112)
The double difference is formed from subtracting two single
differences measured to two satellites ݅and .݆ The basic double
difference equation is:
Φ஺஻
௜௝ ( )߬ = Φ஺஻௝ ( )߬ −Φ஺஻௜ ( )߬ (113)
which simplifies to:
Φ஺஻
௜௝ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁߩ஺஻
௜௝ (ݐ) − ܰ஺஻௜௝ (114)
where ܰ஺஻
௜௝= ܰ஺஻
௝ - ܰ஺஻௜ , and the only unknowns being the double-
difference phase ambiguity ܰ஺஻
௜௝ and the receiver co-ordinates. The
local clock error is differenced out. Two receivers and four
satellites ,݅ ,݆ ݇ and ݈will give 3 double difference equations
containing the co-ordinates of the receiver A ( ஺ܺ, ஺ܻ, ஺ܼ) and B
(ܺ஻ , ஻ܻ, ஻ܼ), and the unknown integer ambiguities ܰ஺஻
௜௝ , ܰ஺஻௜௞ , and
ܰ஺஻
௜௟ :
Φ஺஻
௜௝ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁߩ஺஻
௜௝ (ݐ) − ܰ஺஻௜௝ (115)
Φ஺஻
௜௞ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁߩ஺஻
௜௞ (ݐ) − ܰ஺஻௜௞ (116)
Φ஺஻
௜௟ ( )߬ = ቀ௙
௖
ቁߩ஺஻
௜௟ (ݐ) − ܰ஺஻௜௟ (117)
Therefore, the double difference observation equation can be
written as [6]:
߲Φ
߲ ஺ܺ
݀ ஺ܺ + ߲Φ߲ ஺ܻ ݀ ஺ܻ + ߲Φ߲ ஺ܼ ݀ ஺ܼ + ߲Φ߲ܺ஻ ݀ܺ஻ + ߲Φ߲ ஻ܻ ݀ ஻ܻ + ߲Φ߲ ஻ܼ ݀ ஻ܼ+ ߲Φ
߲ܰଵ
݀ܰଵ + ߲Φ߲ܰଶ݀ܰଶ + ߲Φ߲ܰଷ݀ܰଷ + ߲Φ߲ܥ ݀ܥ+⋯ =(Φ୓ −Φୡ) + ݒ (118)
where ( ஺ܺ , ஺ܻ, ஺ܼ) are the co-ordinates of receiver A, (ܺ஻ , ஻ܻ , ஻ܼ)
are the co-ordinates of receiver B, (ܰଵ,ܰଶ,ܰଷ) are the integer
ambiguities, ܥ is correction term, (Φ୓ −Φୡ) is the observed
minus the computed observable and ݒ is the residual. From
equation (113), the unknown receiver co-ordinates can be
computed. It is necessary, however, to determine the carrier phase
integer ambiguities (i.e. the integer number of complete
wavelengths between the receiver and satellites). In surveying
applications, this integer ambiguity can be resolved by starting with
the mobile receiver antenna within a wavelength of the reference
receiver antenna. Both receivers start with the same integer
ambiguity, so the difference is zero and drops out of the double-
difference equations. Thereafter, the phase shift that the mobile
receiver observes (whole cycles) is the integer phase difference
between the two receivers. An alternative is to place the mobile
receiver at a surveyed location. In this case the initial difference is
not necessarily zero but it is readily calculated. For aviation
applications where it is not possible to bring the reference/mobile
antennas together or to position the aircraft at a surveyed location,
the reference and mobile receivers must solve for the ambiguities
independently as part of an initialisation process. For these
applications, it is essential to be able to solve for integer ambiguity
at an unknown location and while in motion. In this case, solving
for the integer ambiguity usually consists of eliminating incorrect
solutions until the correct solution is found. A good initial estimate
of position (such as from ranging-code differential) helps to keep
the initial number of candidate solutions small. Redundant
measurements over time and/or from extra satellite signals are used
to isolate the correct solution. This version of the carrier-phase
DGNSS technique is typically called Real-Time Kinematic (RTK)
GNSS. If carrier track or phase lock on a satellite is interrupted
(cycle slip) and the integer count is lost, then the initialisation
process must be repeated for that satellite. Causes of cycle slips can
range from physical obstruction of the antenna to sudden
accelerations of the aircraft. Output data flow may also be
interrupted if the receiver is not collecting redundant measurements
form extra satellites to maintain the position solution. If a precise
position solution is maintained, re-initialisation for the lost satellite
can be very rapid. Developing a robust and rapid method of
initialisation and re-initialisation is the primary challenge facing
designers of RTK systems that have to deal with safety critical
applications such as aircraft precision approach. A description of
techniques for solving ambiguities both in real-time and post-
processing applications, together with information about cycle
slips repair techniques can be found in the literature [66-78].
4.2. Data Link Implementations
DGNSS can be implemented in several different ways depending
on the type of data link used. The simplest way is no data link at
all. For non-real-time applications, the measurements can be
stored in the receiver or on suitable media and processed at a later
time. In most cases to achieve surveying accuracies, the data must
be post-processed using precise ephemeris data that is only
available after the survey data has been collected. Similarly, for
some test applications the cost and effort to maintain a real-time
data link may be unnecessary. Nevertheless, low-precision real-
time outputs can be useful to confirm that a test is progressing
properly even if the accuracy of the results will be enhanced later.
Differential corrections or measurements can be uplinked in real-
time from the reference station to the users. This is the most
common technique where a large number of users must be served
in real-time. For military purposes and proprietary commercial
services, the uplink can be encrypted to restrict the use of the
DGNSS signals to a selected group of users. Differential
corrections can be transmitted to the user at different frequencies.
With the exception of satellite data links there is generally a trade-
off between the range of the system and the update rate of the
corrections. As an example Table 10 lists a number of frequency
bands, the range, and the rate at which the corrections could be
updated using the standard RTCM SC-104 format [59-61].
Table 10. Possible DGNSS data link frequencies.
Frequency Range [Km] Update Rate[sec]
LF (30 - 300 kHz) > 700 < 20
MF (300 kHz - 3 MHz) < 500 5 – 10
HF ( 3 MHz - 25 MHz) < 200 5
VHF (30 MHz - 300
MHz) < 100 < 5
L Band (1 GHz - 2
GHz) Line of Sight Few Seconds
An uplink can be a separate transmitter/receiver system or the
DGNSS signals can be superimposed on a GPS-link L-band
ranging signal. The uplink acts as a pseudo-satellite or “pseudolite”
and delivers the ranging signal and DGNSS data via the RF section
of the user receiver, much in the same way the GPS navigation
message is transmitted. The advantages are that the additional
ranging signal(s) can increase the availability of the position
solution and decrease carrier-phase initialisation time. However,
the RS and UR’s become more complex, and the system has a very
short range (a few kilometres at the most). This is not only because
of the line of sight restriction, but also the power must be kept low
in order to avoid interference with the real satellite signals (i.e., the
pseudolite can become a GPS jammer if it overpowers the GPS
satellite signals). A downlink option is also possible from the users
to the RS or other central collection point. In this case the
differential solutions are all calculated at a central location. This is
often the case for test range applications where precise vehicle
tracking is desired but the information is not used aboard the
vehicle. The downlink data can be position data plus the satellite
tracked, or pseudorange and deltarange measurements, or it can be
the raw GPS signals translated to an intermediate frequency. The
translator method can often be the least expensive with respect to
user equipment, and therefore is often used in munitions testing
where the user equipment may be expendable.
4.2.1. DGNSS Accuracy
Controlled tests and recent extensive operational use of DGNSS,
have repeatedly demonstrated that DGNSS (pseudorange) provides
accuracies in the order of 3 to 10 metres. This figure is largely
irrespective of receiver type, whether or not SA is in use, and over
distances of up to 100 NM from the reference station [45, 79]. With
Kinematic DGNSS (KDG) positioning systems, requiring the
resolution of the carrier phase integer ambiguities whilst on the
move, centimetre level accuracy can be achieved [6, 80-83]. Most
current applications of DGNSS use L1 C/A code pseudorange as
the only observable, with achieved accuracies of 1 to 5 m in real-
time. Other applications use dual frequency pseudoranges (e.g.,
C/A and P code from GPS) or combinations of pseudorange and
carrier phase observables. Various techniques have been developed
that achieve increased accuracy at the expense of increased
complexity. A possible classification scheme of these techniques is
presented in Table 11.
Precise DGNSS (PDG) can achieve accuracies below 1 m using
dual-frequency psudorange measurements and Very Precise
DGNSS (VPDG), taking advantage of both dual frequency code
and carrier phase observables, is capable of On-The-Fly (OTF)
ambiguity resolution [69, 70]. At the moment, Ultra-Precise
DGNSS (UPDG) using carrier phase observables with integer
ambiguities resolved is only utilised in flight testing, flight
inspection and other non-real-time aviation applications. In the
absence of Selective Availability (SA), the major sources of error
for stand-alone ranging-code GNSS are:
 Ephemeris Error;
 Ionospheric Propagation Delay;
 Tropospheric Propagation Delay;
 Satellite Clock Drift;
 Receiver Noise and clock drift;
 Multipath.

Table 11. Classification of DGNSS techniques.
Name Description RMS
DGNSS Single frequency pseudorange (e.g.,GPS C/A code) 1 - 5 m
PDG Dual frequency pseudorange (e.g., GPSP code) 0.1 - 1 m
VPDG Addition of dual band carrier phase 5 - 30 cm
UPDG Above with integer ambiguitiesresolved < 2 cm
Table 12 lists the error budgets from the above sources giving an
estimation of the possible improvements provided by L1 ranging-
code DGNSS [82]. The error from multipath is site dependent and
the value in Table 12 is only an example. The receiver clock drift
is not mentioned in Table 12, because it is usually treated as an
extra parameter and corrected in the standard solution.
Furthermore, it does not significantly add to differential errors.
Multipath and receiver noise errors cannot be corrected by
DGNSS. It is worth to mention that the errors introduced by
Selective Availability (SA), which is currently off, would be
corrected by DGNSS techniques. For users near the reference
station, the respective signal paths to the satellite are close enough
together that the compensation of Ionospheric and Tropospheric
Delays (ITD) is almost complete. As the user to RS separation is
increased, the different ionospheric and tropospheric paths to the
satellites can be far enough apart that the ionospheric and
tropospheric delays are no longer common errors. Thus, as the
distance between the RS and user receiver increases the
effectiveness of the atmospheric delay corrections decreases.
Table 12. Error sources in DGNSS.
Error Source Stand Alone GNSS[m]
L1 C/A Code
DGNSS [m]
Ephemeris 5 - 20 0 – 1
Ionosphere 15 - 20 2 – 3
Troposphere 3 - 4 1
Satellite Clock 3 0
Multipath 2 2
Receiver Noise 2 2
The ephemeris error is effectively compensated unless it has quite
a large out-of-range component (e.g., 1000 metres or more due to
an error in a satellite navigation message). Even then, the error will
be small if the distance between the reference receiver and user
receiver is small. Finally, the satellite clock error is compensated
as long as both reference and user receivers employ the same
satellite clock correction data. As already mentioned, the
correlation of the errors experienced at the RS and the user location
is largely dependent on the distance between them. As the
separation of the user from the RS increases, so does the probability
of significant differing ionospheric and tropospheric conditions at
the two sites. Similarly, the increasing separation also means that
a different geometrical component of the ephemeris error is seen
by the RR and UR. This is commonly referred to as “Spatial
Decorrelation” of the ephemeris and atmospheric errors. In general,
the errors are likely to remain highly correlated for users within
350 km of the RS. However, if the distance is greater than 250 km
the user will obtain better results using correction models for
ionospheric and tropospheric delay [45, 79]. Additionally, practical
DGNSS systems are typically limited by the data link to an
effective range of around 170 km. Table 13 shows the error budget
determined for a SPS DGPS system with increasing distances from
the RR [45].
Table 13. DGNSS L1 pseudorange errors with increasing distance
from RS.
Error Sources 0 NM 100 NM 500
NM
1000 NM
Space Segment:
Clock Errors (ft) 0 0 0 0
Control Segment:
Ephemeris Errors
(ft)
0 0.3 1.5 3
Propagation Errors:
Ionosphere (ft)
Troposphere (ft)
0
0
7.2
6
16
6
21
6
TOTAL (RMS) 0 9.4 17 22
User Segment:
Receiver Noise (ft)
Multipath (ft)
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
UERE (ft RMS) 3 9.8 17.4 22.2
Since the RR noise and multipath errors are included in the
differential corrections and become part of the user’s error budget
(root-sum-squared with the user receiver noise and multipath
errors), the receiver noise and multipath error components in the
non-differential receiver can be lower than the correspondent error
components experienced in the DGNSS implementation. Another
type of error introduced in real-time DGNSS positioning systems
is the data link’s “age of the corrections”. This error is introduced
due to the latency of the transmitted corrections (i.e., the
transmitted corrections of epoch ݐ଴ arrive at the moving receiver at
epoch. These corrections are not the correct ones, because they
were calculated under different conditions. Hence, the co-
ordinates of the UR would be slightly offset.
DGNSS systems that compensate for accuracy degradations over
short distances (typically up to the RS-UR Line-of-Sight (LOS)
employing V/UHF datalinks) are referred to as Local Area DGNSS
(LAD). DGNSS systems covering large geographic areas are
referred to as Wide Area DGNSS (WAD) systems. They usually
employ a network of reference receivers that are coordinated to
provide DGNSS data over a wide coverage area. Such systems
typically are designed to broadcast the DGNSS data via satellite,
although a network of ground transmission sites is also feasible. A
user receiver typically must employ special algorithms to derive
the ionospheric and tropospheric corrections that are appropriate
for its location from the observations taken at the various reference
sites.
Various countries including the United States, Canada, Europe,
Japan, China, India and Australia have developed LAD/WAD
systems. Some of these systems transmit DGNSS data from
geostationary satellites for use by commercial navigation users,
including the aviation community. Some commercial DGNSS
services also broadcast data from multiple reference stations via
satellite. However, several such systems remain a group of LAD
rather than WAD systems. This is because the reference stations
are not integrated into a network allowing the user accuracy to
degrade with distance from the individual reference sites.
4.3. Real Time Kinematics (RTK) and Precise Point Positioning
For aviation applications where it is not possible to bring the
reference/mobile antennas together or to position the aircraft at a
surveyed location, the reference and mobile receivers must solve
for the ambiguities independently as part of an initialisation
process. For these applications, it is essential to be able to solve for
integer ambiguity at an unknown location and while in motion. In
this case, solving for the integer ambiguity usually consists of
eliminating incorrect solutions until the correct solution is found.
A good initial estimate of position (such as from ranging-code
differential) helps to keep the initial number of candidate solutions
small. Redundant measurements over time and/or from extra
satellite signals are used to isolate the correct solution. This version
of the carrier-phase DGNSS technique is typically called Real-
Time Kinematic (RTK) GNSS. If carrier track or phase lock on a
satellite is interrupted (cycle slip) and the integer count is lost, then
the initialisation process must be repeated for that satellite. Causes
of cycle slips can range from physical obstruction of the antenna to
sudden accelerations of the aircraft. Output data flow may also be
interrupted if the receiver is not collecting redundant measurements
form extra satellites to maintain the position solution. If a precise
position solution is maintained, re-initialisation for the lost satellite
can be very rapid. Developing a robust and rapid method of
initialisation and re-initialisation is the primary challenge facing
designers of RTK systems that have to deal with safety critical
applications such as aircraft precision approach.
Although centimetre-level GNSS accuracy is increasingly relevant
for a number of aviation and other Safety-of-Life (SoL)
applications, the possible adoption of RTK techniques in the
aviation context is still being researched and no RTK systems are
contemplated by the current ICAO standards for air navigation.
From an operational perspective, the main inconvenience of the
RTK technique is that it requires a reference station relatively close
to the user so that the differential ionospheric delay is negligible.
High-accuracy single-baseline RTK solutions are generally limited
to a distance of about 20 km [84], although test activities have
shown that acceptable results can be achieved over up to 50 km in
times of low ionospheric activity [85].
A way of partially overcoming such inconvenience is the Network
RTK (NRTK) technique, which uses a network of ground reference
stations to mitigate atmospheric dependent effects over long
distances. The NRTK solution is generally based on between three
and six of the closest reference stations with respect to the user and
allows much greater inter-station distances (up to 70-90 km) while
maintaining a comparable level of accuracy [85].
The Wide Area RTK (WARTK) concept was introduced in the late
1990s to overcome the need of a very dense network of reference
stations. WARTK techniques provide accurate ionospheric
corrections that are used as additional information and allow
increasing the RTK service area. In this way, the system needs
reference stations separated by about 500–900 kilometres [86].
Precise Point Positioning (PPP) is a further carrier-phase GNSS
technique that departs from the basic RTK implementation and
uses differencing between satellites rather than differencing
between receivers. Clearly, in order to be implemented, PPP
requires the availability of precise reference GNSS orbits and
clocks in real-time. Combining the precise satellite positions and
clocks with a dual-frequency GNSS receiver (to remove the first
order effect of the ionosphere), PPP is able to provide position
solutions at centimetre level [87].
PPP differs from double-difference RTK/NRTK positioning in the
sense that it does not require access to observations from one or
more close reference stations accurately-surveyed. PPP just
requires data from a relatively sparse station network (reference
stations thousands of kilometres apart would suffice). This makes
PPP a very attractive alternative to RTK especially in long-distance
aviation applications where RTK/NRTK coverage would be
impractical. However, PPP techniques are still not very mature and
typically require a longer convergence time (20-30 minutes) to
achieve centimetre-level performance [87]. Another possibility is
to use local ionospheric corrections in PPP. This approach would
reduce convergence time to about 30 seconds and contribute to an
augmented integrity. However, they would also require a density
of reference networks similar to that of NRTK [88].
4.4. Multi-Constellation GNSS
The various GNSSs (GPS, GLONASS, BDS, GALILEO, etc.)
operate at different frequencies, they employ various signal
processing techniques and adopt different multiple access schemes.
Most of them employ or are planned to progressively transition to
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) for operations at the L-
band frequency of 1575.42 MHz (L1). This signal, originally
introduced by GPS for Standard Positioning Service (SPS) users,
will guarantee interoperability between the various GNSS
constellations with substantial benefits to the existing vast
community of GPS users, including aviation. Signal-in-Space
(SIS) interoperability is also being actively pursued on other
frequencies, with a focus on those that are currently allocated to
Safety-of-Life (SOL) services. From a user’s perspective, the
advantage to having access to multiple GNSS systems is increased
accuracy, continuity, availability and integrity. Having access to
multiple satellite constellations is very beneficial in aviation
applications, where the aircraft-satellite relative dynamics can lead
to signal tracking issues and/or line-of-sight obstructions. Even
when interoperability at SIS level cannot be guaranteed, the
introduction of multi-constellation receivers can bring significant
improvements in GNSS performance. The literature on this subject
is vast and it is beyond the scope of this paper to address in details
the various signal and data processing techniques implemented in
GNSS systems.
The purpose of GNSS modernisation is to provide more robust
navigation/positioning services in terms of accuracy, integrity,
continuity and availability by broadcasting more ranging/timing
signals. In particular, availability will be improved with the
employment of multi-constellation GNSS. At the moment (July
2017), more than 70 GNSS satellites are already in view. It is
expected that about 120 satellites will be available once the various
GNSS systems are fully operational [89-93]. The GNSS
constellations and their supported signals are summarised in Table
14.
Currently, there are 31 GPS satellites on-orbit in the Medium Earth
Orbit (MEO). The GPS signals can be summarised as follows:
 L1 (1575.42 MHz): It is a combination of navigation message,
coarse-acquisition (C/A) code and encrypted precision P(Y)
code (C/A-code is a 1023 bit Pseudo Random Noise (PRN)
code with a clock rate of 1.023 MHz and P-Code is a very long
PRN code (7 days) with a clock rate of 10.23 MHz);
 L2 (1227.60 MHz): It is a P(Y) code. The L2C code is newly
added on the Block IIR-M and newer satellites. The L2C code
is designed to meet emerging commercial/scientific needs and
provides higher accuracy through better ionospheric
corrections;
 L3 (1381.05 MHz): It is used by the defence support program
to support signal detection of missile launches, nuclear
detonations, and other high-energy infrared events;
 L4 (1379.913 MHz): It is used for studying additional
ionospheric correction;
 L5 (1176.45 MHz): It is used as a civilian SoL signal. This
frequency falls into an internationally protected range for
aeronautical navigation, promising little or no interference
under all circumstances.
SPS provides civil users with a less accurate positioning capability
than PPS using single frequency L1 and C/A code only. PPS is
available primarily to the military and other authorized users of the
US (and its allies) equipped with PPS receivers. The PPS uses L1
and L2 C/A and P-codes. GPS modernisation comprises a series of
improvements provided by GPS Block IIR-M, GPS Block IIF, GPS
III, and GPS III Space Vehicle 11+. The M-code signals are
modulated on L1 and L2. The addition of L5 makes GPS a more
robust radionavigation service for many aviation applications, as
well as all ground-based users. The new L2C signals, called as L2
civil-moderate (L2 CM) code and L2 civil-long (L2 CL) code, are
modulated on the L2 signals transmitted by Block IIR-M, IIF, and
subsequent blocks of GPS satellite vehicles. The M-code is a new
military signal, modulated on both L1 and L2 signals.
The L1C signal was developed by the US and Europe as a common
civil signal for GPS and GALILEO. Other GNSS systems such as
BDS and QZSS are also adopting signals similar to L1C. The first
L1C signal with be available with the launch of GPS III block
satellites. Backward compatibility will be guaranteed by allowing
the L1C signal to broadcast in the same frequency as the L1 C/A
signal.
Out of the 30 planned GALILEO satellites, 13 are currently
operational, 2 are under commissioning and 3 act as testbed (not
available for operational use). GALILEO signals are used to
provide 5 distinct services including Open Service (OS), Safety-of-
Life Service (SoLS), Commercial Service (CS), Public Regulated
Service (PRS) and Search and Rescue Support Service (SAR). The
SOLS, in particular, support a number of aviation, marine and
surface transport applications. The SOLS guarantees a level of
accuracy and integrity that OS does not offer and it offers
worldwide coverage with high accuracy integrity.
GALILEO carriers can be classified as E5a (1176.450 MHz), E5b
(1207.140 MHz) and E5ab (full band), which are wide band data
and pilot signals; E6 (1278.75 MHz) and E2-L1-E1 (1575.42
MHz). The GALILEO navigation signals can be classified as
follows:
 L1F: It supports OS (unencrypted);
 L1P: It supports PRS (encrypted);
 E6C: It supports CS (encrypted);
 E6P: It supports PRS (encrypted);
 E5a: It supports OS (unencrypted);
 E5b: It supports OS (unencrypted).
Since the GALILEO E2-L1-E1 and E5a signal frequencies are the
same as of L1 and L5 GPS signals, both these systems support their
treatment as a systems of systems [94].
The GLONASS system has 23 satellites in operational condition.
In addition to these M type satellites, there are already two
modernised GLONASS-K satellites in operation. The more
advanced GLONASS-KM satellites will be able to provide legacy
FDMA signals supporting Open FDMA (OF) and Secured FDMA
(SF) services on L1 and L2, as well as, CDMA signals on L1, L2
and L3 providing Open CDMA (OC) and Secured CDMA (SC)
services. It could also transmit CDMA signals on the GPS L5
frequency (1176.45 MHz). Advanced features include inter-
satellite links, laser time transfer capability and/or improved clocks
[95]. Furthermore, GNSS integrity information could also be
broadcast in the third civil signal in addition to global differential
ephemeris and time corrections supporting Open CDMA
Modernized (OCM) services. BDS (Big Dipper/COMPASS), the
Chinese navigation satellite system, provides a regional navigation
services using a two-way timing/ranging technique. BeiDou-2
(BDS-2) is expected to be a constellation of 35 satellites offering
backward compatibility with BeiDou-1 and 30 non-geostationary
satellites. These include 27 in MEO and 3 in Inclined
Geosynchronous Orbit (IGSO) and 5 in Geostationary Earth orbit
(GEO) that will offer complete coverage of the globe. The future
fully operational BDS is expected to support two kinds of general
services including Radio Determination Satellite Service (RDSS)
and Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS). The RDSS will
support computation of the user position by a ground station using
the round trip time of signals exchanged via GEO satellite while
the RNSS will support GPS- and GALILEO-like services and is
also designed to achieve similar performances. The QZSS provides
a regional navigation service/augmentation system and is set to
begin operations in 2018 with 3 IGSO satellites and 1 GEO
satellite. Specific signals such as L1 sub-meter class Augmentation
with Integrity Function (SAIF) and L6 L-band Experimental (LEX)
will be transmitted in addition to the support for L1 C/A, L2C, L5
and L1C signals. The planned Block II satellites will support the
Centimetre Level Augmentation Service and Positioning
Technology Verification Service [96, 97]. The Indian Regional
Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), also referred to as NavIC
(Navigation with Indian Constellation) comprises of seven
satellites with 4 in IGSO and 3 in GEO. Two kinds of services are
supported namely Standard Positioning Service (SPS) and
Restricted Service (RS). Both services are carried on L5 (1176.45
MHz) and S band (2492.08 MHz). The navigation signals are
expected to be transmitted in the S-band (2–4 GHz).
The new and modernised GNSS constellations, along with the
newly introduced signals are expected to be compatible with other
GNSS systems. Compatibility, in this context, refers to the ability
of global and regional navigation satellite systems and
augmentations to be used separately or together without causing
unacceptable interference or other harm to an individual system or
service [98]. To support computability among the various GNSS
systems, ITU provides a framework for discussions on
radiofrequency compatibility. Interoperability is another
consideration to be taken into account, which refers to the ability
of global and regional navigation satellite systems and
augmentations to be used together so as to support services with
better capabilities than would be achieved by relying solely on the
open signals of one system [98]. Common modulation schemes,
centre frequency, signal and power levels, as well as geodetic
reference frames and system time steerage standards are defined to
support interoperability.
Table 14. GNSS constellations.
Constellation
(Global/
Regional)
Block and
Orbit Satellites Signals
GPS
IIR (MEO) 12 L1 C/A, L1/L2
P(Y)
IIR-M
(MEO)
7 L1 C/A, L1/L2
P(Y), L2C, L1/L2
M
IIF (MEO) 12 L1 C/A, L1/L2
P(Y), L2C, L1/L2
M, L5
III (MEO) Yet to be
launched
L1 C/A, L1C,
L1/L2 P(Y), L2C,
L1/L2 M, L5
GALILEO
IOV (MEO) 3 E1, E5a/b/ab, E6
FOC (MEO) 10 E1, E5a/b/ab, E6
GLONASS
MEO Out of
service
L1/L2 SF and L1
OF
M (MEO) 23 L1/L2 OF and SF
K1 (MEO) 2 L1/L2 OF and SF,
L3 OC
K2 (MEO) Yet to be
launched
L1/L2 OF and SF,
L1 OC, L1 SC, L2
SC, L3 OC
KM (MEO) Yet to be
launched
L1/L2 OF and SF,
L1/L2/L3 OC and
SC, L1/L3/L5
OCM
BeiDou-1
MEO 4
(experimental
and retired)
B1
BeiDou-2
MEO 6 B1-2, B2, B3
IGSO 8 B1-2, B2, B3
GEO 6 B1-2, B2, B3
BeiDou-3
MEO 3 B1-2, B1, B2,
B3ab
IGSO 2 B1-2, B1, B2,
B3ab
QZSS
I (GEO and
IGSO)
2 L1 C/A, L1C, L1,
L2C, L5, L6,
LEX, SAIF
IRNSS
IGSO 4 L5/S SPS and RS
GEO 3 L5/S SPS and RS
4.5. GNSS Integration with Other Sensors
All GNSS techniques (either stand-alone or differential) suffer
from some shortcomings. The most important are:
 The data rate of a GNSS receiver is too low and the latency
is too large to satisfy the requirements for high performance
aircraft trajectory analysis, in particular with respect to the
synchronisation with external events. In addition, there might
be a requirement for high-rate and small latency trajectory
data to provide real-time guidance information to the pilot
(e.g., during fly-over-noise measurements). With the need to
process radio frequency signals and the complex processing
required to formulate a position or velocity solution, GPS
data rates are usually at 1 Hz, or at best 10 Hz (an update rate
of at least 20 Hz is required for real-time aviation
applications) [99];
 Influences of high accelerations on the GPS receiver clock,
the code tracking loop and carrier phase loop may become
significant;
 Signal ‘loss-of-lock’ and ‘cycle slips’ may occur very
frequently due to aircraft manoeuvres or other causes;
 SA degrades the positioning accuracy over long distances;
 High DGNSS accuracy is limited by the distance between the
reference station and the user because of the problem of
ionosphere in integer ambiguity resolution on-the-fly [100].
Especially, in the aviation context, there is little one can do to
ensure the continuity of the signal propagation from the satellite to
the receiver during high dynamic manoeuvres. The benefits of
integrating GNSS with other sensors are significant and diverse.
Both absolute measurements such as Position, Velocity and
Attitude (PVA), which can be directly measured as well as relative
measurements between the air platform and the environment, can
be considered for integration. Direct measurements can be obtained
by employing GNSS, Inertial Navigation System (INS), digital
maps, etc. In case of small UAS, GNSS measurements can be
integrated with other navigation sensors/systems including Inertial
Navigation System (INS), Vision-based Navigation Sensors
(VBN), Celestial Navigation Sensors (CNS), Aircraft Dynamics
Model (ADM) virtual sensor, etc. [101]. The variety of sensors for
integration is even more expandable for aircraft operating in an
urban setting when Signals-of-Opportunity (SoO)-based sources
(cellular signal base transceiver stations, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi)
networks, etc.) are available [102]. Basically, each navigation
system has some shortcomings. The shortcomings of GNSS were
discussed above and in the case of INS; it is subject to an ever
growing drift in position accuracy caused by various instrument
error sources that cannot be eliminated in manufacturing,
assembly, calibration or initial system alignment. Furthermore,
high quality inertial systems (i.e., platform systems) tend to be
complex and expensive devices with significant risk of component
failure. By employing these sensors in concert with some adequate
data-fusion algorithms, the integrated navigation system can solve
the majority of these problems. As an example, the integration of
GNSS and INS measurements might solve most of the above
mentioned shortcomings: the basic update rate of an INS is 50
samples per second or higher and an INS is a totally self-contained
system. The combination of GNSS and INS will therefore provide
the required update rate, data continuity and integrity.
Technical considerations for integration of GNSS and other sensors
include the choice of system architecture, the data-fusion
algorithm, and the characterisation and modelling of the
measurements produced by the sensors. Integration of other
sensors with GNSS can be carried out in many different ways
depending on the application (i.e., online/off-line evaluation,
accuracy requirements). Various options exist for integration and
in general, two main categories can be identified depending on the
application: post-processing and real-time algorithms. The
complexity of the algorithm is obviously related to both system
accuracy requirements and computer load capacity.
The level of integration and the particular mechanisation of the
data-fusion algorithm are dependent on:
 The task of the integration process;
 The accuracy limits;
 The robustness and the stand alone capacity of each
subsystem;
 The computation complexity.
For GNSS and INS data fusion, the basic concepts of system
integration can be divided into:
 Open Loop GNSS aided System (OLGS);
 Closed Loop GNSS aided System (CLGS);
 Fully Integrated GNSS System (FIGS).
The simplest way to combine GNSS and INS is a reset-only
mechanisation in which GNSS periodically resets the INS solution
(Fig. 21). In this open-loop strategy, the INS is not re-calibrated by
GNSS data, so the underlying error sources in the INS still drive its
navigation errors as soon as GNSS resets are interrupted. However,
for short GNSS interruptions or for high quality INS, the error
growth may be small enough to meet mission requirements. This is
why platform inertial systems have to be used with OLGS systems
operating in a high dynamic environment (e.g., military aircraft).
The advantage of the open loop implementation is that, in case of
inaccurate measurements, only the data-fusion algorithm is
influenced and not the inertial system calculation itself. As the
sensors of a platform system are separated from the body of the
aircraft by gimbals, they are operating normally at their reference
point zero. The attitude angles are measured by the angles of the
gimbals. The integration algorithm can run internal or external to
the INS, but the errors of the inertial system have to be carefully
modelled.
The main advantage of GNSS aiding the INS in a closed-loop
mechanisation is that the INS is continuously calibrated by the
data-fusion algorithm, using the GNSS data. Therefore strapdown
sensors can be used in a CLGS implementation (Fig. 21). In
contrary to platform systems, sensors of strapdown INS are not
uncoupled from the aircraft body. They are operating in a
dynamically more disturbed environment as there are vibrations,
angular accelerations, angular oscillations which result in an
additional negative influence to the system performance. In
addition sensors are not operating at a reference point zero.
Therefore the errors of the system will increase very rapidly and
problems of numerical inaccuracy in an open loop implementation
may soon increase. This is why it is advantageous to loop back the
estimated sensor errors to the strapdown calculations in order to
compensate for the actual system errors. Consequently, the errors
of the INS will be kept low and linear error models can be used.
When GNSS data is lost due to dynamics or satellite shadowing,
the INS can continue the overall solution, but now as a highly
precise unit by virtue of its recent calibration. However, this system
implementation can be unstable.
The system integration of best accuracy will be of course the full
integration of GNSS and other sensors, which require a data-fusion
implementation at a raw/uncorrelated measurements level
(Fig. 21). As the KF theory asks for uncorrelated measurements
[103], it is optimal to use either the raw GPS measurements (i.e.,
the range and phase measurements to at least four satellites, the
ephemeris to calculate the satellite positions and the parameters to
correct for the ionospheric and troposphere errors), or GNSS
position (and velocity) data uncorrelated between update intervals
[105]. In the first case, the receiver clock errors (time offset and
frequency) can be estimated as a part of the filter model. This
approach has very complex measurement equations, but requires
only one KF mechanisation. Moreover, its filtering can be most
optimal since both GNSS errors and INS errors can be included
without the instability problems typical of cascade KFs.
The other classification commonly in practise to define the
integration techniques is given by:
 Loose integration: It refers to fusion of navigation solutions.
Processed GNSS PVT measurements are used in this type of
integration.
 Tight integration: It refers to the fusion of navigation
measurements. GNSS code and carrier range and phase
measurements are used in this type of integration.
 Deep/ultratight integration: It refers to the integration at the
signal processing level, which employs raw GNSS
radiofrequency signals.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 21. GNSS integration architectures: a. OLGS, b. CLGS and c. FIGS [107].
The most important distinction to be made is between cascaded and
non-cascaded approaches, which correspond, as mentioned before,
to aided (OLGS and CLGS) or fully integrated (FIGS)
architectures respectively. In the cascaded case two filters
generally play the role. The first filter is a GNSS filter which
produces outputs (i.e., position and velocity) which are correlated
between measurement times. This output is then used as input for
the second filter which is the INS KF. As time correlation of this
measurement input does not comply with the assumptions
underlying the standard KF [103], it must be accounted for in the
right way [106]. This complicates the KF design (i.e., the potential
instability of cascaded filters makes the design of the integration
KF a very cautious task). However, from a hardware
implementation point of view aided INS (in both OLGS and CLGS
configurations) results in the simplest solution. In the non-cascaded
case there is just a single KF and is generally based on an INS error
model and supplemented by a GNSS error model. The GNSS
measurements, uncorrelated between measurement times, are
differenced with the raw INS data to give measurements of the INS
errors, also uncorrelated between measurements times.
State-of-the-art data-fusion algorithms such as the traditional KF,
Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and the more advanced Unscented
Kalman Filter (UKF)/multi-hypotheses UKF can be employed for
the integration process. In general, a KF can be used to estimate the
errors, which affect the solution computed in an INS or in a GNSS,
as well as in the combination of both navigation sensors. A KF is a
recurrent, optimal estimator used in many engineering applications
whenever the estimation of the state of a dynamic system is
required. An analytic description of KFs and other integration
algorithms can be found in the literature [103, 104]. The
KF algorithm is optimal under three limiting conditions: the system
model is linear, the noise is white and Gaussian with known
autocorrelation function and the initial state is known. Moreover,
the computing burden grows considerably with increasing number
of states modelled. Matrix formulation methods of various types
have been developed to improve numerical stability and accuracy
(e.g., square root and stabilised formulations), to minimise the
computational complexity by taking advantage of the diagonal
characteristics of the covariance matrix (U-D factorisation
formulation where U and D are upper triangular and diagonal
matrix respectively), and to estimate state when the state functions
are non-linear (e.g. EKF). The EKF measurement model is defined
as:
ݖ௞ = ܪ௞ ∗ ݔ௞ + ݒ௞ (119)
where ݖ௞ is the measurement vector, ܪ௞ is the design matrix, ݔ௞ is
the state vector, ݒ௞ is the measurement noise and k is the kth epoch
of time,ݐ௞. The state vector at epoch k+1 is given by:
ݔ௞ାଵ = Ф୩ ∗ ݔ௞ + ܩ௞ ∗ ݓ௞ (120)
where Ф୩ is the state transition matrix from epoch k to k+1, ܩ௞ is
the shaping matrix and ݓ௞ is the process noise. The algorithm is
composed of two steps: prediction and correction. The prediction
algorithm of the EKF estimates the state vector and computes the
corresponding covariance matrix ௞ܲ from the current epoch to the
next one using the state transition matrix characterizing the process
model described by:
ܲ௞ାଵ
ି = Ф୩ାଵ ௞ܲ
ାФ௞ାଵ
் + ܳ௞ (121)
where ௞ܲାଵି is a predicted value computed and ௞ܲା is the updated
value obtained after the correction process. The process noise at a
certain epoch k is characterized by the covariance matrix, ܳ௞. The
updating equations correct the predicted state vector and the
corresponding covariance matrix using the collected measurements
is given by:
ݔ௞ାଵ
ା = ܭ௞ାଵݑ௞ାଵ (122)
௞ܲାଵ
ା = ௞ܲାଵି − ܭ௞ାଵܪ௞ାଵ ௞ܲାଵି (123)
where ܭ௞ାଵ is the Kalman gain matrix at epoch, k+1 and ݑ௞ାଵis
the innovation vector at epoch, k+1.
Post-processing integration of GNSS and INS measurements can
be carried out by means of the Rauch-Tung-Striebel algorithm,
which consists of a KF and a backward smoother. The forward
filter can take into account previous measurements only. The
smoothed estimate utilises all measurements. It is evident that
backward smoothing can only be done off-line. The filter estimates
the state vector together with the error covariance matrix. The state
vector contains the error components of the inertial navigation
system. The smoothed trajectories and also accurate velocities are
obtained by adding the state vector to the measurements delivered
by the INS. The equations of the Rauch-Tung-Striebel algorithm
can be found in [103]. Alternatives include the Bryson–Frazier two
filter smoother, Monte Carlo smoother, etc. The filtering algorithm
most commonly implemented in real-time systems is the Bierman’s
U-D Factorised KF. The U-D algorithm is efficient and provides
significant advantages in numerical stability and precision [103].
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) could be employed to relax one
or more of the conditions under which the KF is optimal and/or
reduce the computing requirements of the KF. However, the
development of an integration algorithm completely based only on
neural technology (e.g., hopfield networks) will lead to a complex
design and unreliable integration functions. Furthermore, this
solution is even more demanding than the KF in terms of
computing requirements [108]. Hence, a hybrid network in which
the ANN is used to learn the corrections to be applied to the state
prediction performed by a rule-based module appears to be the best
candidate for future navigation sensor integration. Techniques for
on-line training would allow for real-time adaptation to the specific
operating conditions, but further research is required in this field.
In a hybrid architecture, an ANN is used in combination with a
rule-based system (i.e., a complete KF or part of it), in order to
improve the availability of the overall system. A hybrid network
provides performances comparable with the KF, but with improved
adaptability to non-linearities and unpredicted changes in
system/environment parameters. Compared with the KF, the
hybrid architecture features the high parallelism of the neural
structure allowing for faster operation and higher robustness to
hardware failures. The use of ANN to correct the state variables
prediction operated by the rule-based module avoids computing the
Kalman gain, thus considerably reducing the computing burden.
Stability may be guaranteed if the output of the network is in the
form of correction to a nominal gain matrix that provides a stable
solution for all system parameters. The implementation of such a
filter, however, would be sensitive to network topology and
training strategy. An adequate testing activity would therefore be
required. In addition to ANN approaches, such as the Radial Basis
Function (RBF) neural networks, Adaptive Neuron-Fuzzy
Inference System (ANFIS) have been developed to enhance
GNSS/INS integration for its improved ability to handle the
problem at hand and to include an expert knowledge base of a fuzzy
system and adaptive membership functions characterising the
relationship between the inputs and outputs.
4.6. GNSS Integrity Augmentation
According to the US Federal Radionavigation Plan, “integrity is a
measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the
information supplied by a navigation system. Integrity includes the
ability of the system to provide timely warnings to users when the
system should not be used for navigation.” This definition is very
comprehensive but, unfortunately, it is too generic and this is why
many research efforts were undertaken in the past to better specify
the GNSS integrity performance metrics. Previous research has
effectively developed and applied statistical criteria to inflate the
navigation error bounds in specific flight phases. So, while
accuracy is typically specified at 95% (2σ) confidence level, 
integrity requirements normally refer to percentiles of 99.999%
(6σ) or higher depending on the particular phase of 
flight/application [109]. The intention behind this is to keep the
probability of hazardous events (that could possibly put at risk
human lives) extremely low. From a system performance
perspective, integrity is intended as a real-time decision criterion
for using or not using the system. For this reason, it has been a
common practice to associate integrity with a mechanism, or set of
mechanisms (barriers) that is part of the integrity assurance chain
but at the same time is completely independent of the other parts of
the system for which integrity is to be assured.
Consequently, the concepts of Alert Limit, Integrity Risk,
Protection Level and Time to Alert were introduced and are
currently reflected in the applicable ICAO SARPs and in the RTCA
standards for WAAS and LAAS. These integrity performance
metrics are:
 Alert Limit (AL): The alert limit for a given parameter
measurement is the error tolerance not to be exceeded without
issuing an alert.
 Time to Alert (TTA): The maximum allowable time elapsed
from the onset of the navigation system being out of tolerance
until the equipment enunciates the alert.
 Integrity Risk (IR): Probability that, at any moment, the
position error exceeds the AL.
 Protection Level (PL): Statistical bound error computed so as
to guarantee that the probability of the absolute position error
exceeding said number is smaller than or equal to the target
integrity risk.
As discussed above, integrity is the ability of a system to provide
timely warnings to users when the system should not be used for
navigation [110]. In general, it is essential to guarantee that, with a
specified probability P, either the horizontal/vertical radial position
error does not exceed the pre-specified thresholds (HAL/VAL), or
an alarm is raised within a specified TTA interval when the
horizontal/vertical radial position errors exceed the thresholds. To
detect that the error is exceeding a threshold, a monitor function
has to be installed within the navigation system. This is also the
case within GNSS systems in the form of the ground segment.
However, for GNSS systems, TTA is typically in the order of
several hours, that is even too long for the cruise where a TTA of
60 seconds is required (an autoland system for zero meter vertical
visibility must not exceed a TTA of 2 seconds). Various methods
have been proposed and practically implemented for stand-alone
GNSS integrity monitoring. A growing family of such
implementations, already very popular in aviation applications,
includes the so called Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM) techniques. Regarding DGNSS, it should be underlined
that it does more than increasing GNSS positioning accuracy; it
also contributes to enhancing GNSS integrity by compensating for
anomalies in the satellite ranging signals and navigation data
message. The range and range rate corrections provided in the
ranging-code DGNSS correction message can compensate for
ramp and step type anomalies in the individual satellite signals,
until the corrections exceed the maximum values or rates allowed
in the correction format. If these limits are exceeded, the user can
be warned not to use a particular satellite by placing “do-not-use”
bit patterns in the corrections for that satellite (as defined in
STANAG 4392 or RTCA/RTCM message formats) or by omitting
the corrections for that satellite.
As mentioned before, step anomalies will normally cause carrier-
phase DGNSS receivers to lose lock on the carrier phase, causing
the reference and user receivers to reinitialise. UR noise,
processing anomalies, and multipath at the user GPS antenna
cannot be corrected by a DGNSS system. These errors are included
in the overall DGNSS error budget. Errors in determining or
transmitting the satellite corrections may be passed on to the
differential user if integrity checks are not provided within the RS.
These errors can include inaccuracies in the RS antenna location
that bias the corrections, systematic multipath due to poor antenna
sighting (usually in low elevation angle satellites), algorithmic
errors, receiver inter-channel bias errors, receiver clock errors and
communication errors. For these reasons, typical WAD and LAD
RS designs also include integrity checking provisions to guarantee
the validity of the corrections before and after broadcast.
In the aviation context, various strategies have been developed for
increasing the levels of integrity of DGNSS based
navigation/landing systems. These include both Space Based
Augmentation Systems (SBAS) and Ground Based Augmentation
Systems (GBAS) to assist aircraft operations in all flight phases
(Fig. 22).
SBAS
GBAS
Fig. 22. GBAS and SBAS services. Adapted from [111].
These systems are effectively WAD and LAD systems that employ,
respectively, DGNSS vector correction (SBAS) and scalar
(pseudorange) correction techniques (GBAS). Some information
about SBAS and GBAS relevant to this thesis are provided in the
following sections of this chapter. However, before examining the
characteristics of GNSS integrity augmentation systems, it is useful
to recall the definitions relative to Failure Detection and Exclusion
(FDE).
Fig. 23 shows the different conditions associated with FDE. The
various FDE events are defined as follows [41]:
 Alert: An alert is defined to be an indication that is provided
by the GPS equipment when the positioning performance
achieved by the equipment does not meet the integrity
requirements.
 Positioning failure: A positioning failure is defined to occur
whenever the difference between the true position and the
indicated position exceeds the applicable alert limit.
 False detection: A false detection is defined as the detection
of a positioning failure when a positioning failure has not
occurred.
 Missed detection: A missed detection is defined to occur
when a positioning failure is not detected.
 Failed exclusion: A failed exclusion is defined to occur when
true positioning failure is detected and the detection condition
cannot be eliminated within the time-to-alert. A failed
exclusion would cause an alert.
 Wrong exclusion: A wrong exclusion is defined to occur
when detection occurs, and a positioning failure exists but is
undetected after exclusion, resulting in a missed alert.
 False alert: A false alert is defined as the indication of a
positioning failure when a positioning failure has not
occurred. A false alert is the result of a false detection.
 Missed alert: A missed alert is defined to be a positioning
failure which is not enunciated as an alert within the time-to-
alert. Both missed detection and wrong exclusion can cause
missed alerts.
Fig. 23. FDE Events [36].
As discussed above, GNSS satisfies the horizontal and vertical
integrity requirements for the intended operation when HPL and
VPL are below the specified HAL and VAL. This situation is
depicted in Fig. 24.
VAL
VPL
HAL
HPL
Fig. 24. Protection levels and alert limits.
The horizontal plane in Fig. 24 is locally tangent to the navigation
system geodetic reference (e.g., WGS84 ellipsoid in GPS). The
vertical axis is locally perpendicular to the same reference.
Whenever HPL or VPL exceed HAL or VAL, the integrity required
to support the intended operation is not provided and an alert must
be issued by the GNSS equipment within the specified TTA. In
some unfavourable occasions, the NSE exceeds the HPL/VPL
values. In these cases, it is said that an integrity event has occurred
and that the system is providing unreliable information, classified
as Misleading Information (MI) or Hazardously Misleading
Information (HMI). The difference between MI and HMI is
highlighted in Fig 25.
As discussed, availability is the probability that the navigation
system is operational during a specific flight phase (i.e., the
accuracy and integrity provided by the system meet the
requirements for the desired operation). Therefore, the navigation
system is considered available for use in a specific flight operation
if the PLs it is providing are inferior to the corresponding specified
ALs for that same operation.
The circumferences shown in Fig. 25 have their centres at the
estimated aircraft position and their radii are the system PLs
(green) and the operation ALs (red). The aircraft shape represents
the actual position, so the navigation system error is the distance
from the centre of the circumferences to this shape. According to
the previous definitions, situations B, C and F represent integrity
events. In particular, case B is a MI event and cases C/F are HMI
events. The desirable situation is represented by case A. Particular
attention should be given to situations B and especially C, which is
the most feared situation, as the system does not alert the user for
the unavailability of the system and, depending on the on-going
flight operational task; this may lead to a SoL risk.
Alert Limit
Protection Level
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Fig. 25. Protection levels and alert limits.
4.6.1. Space Based Augmentation Systems
SBAS is a form of WAD that augments core satellite constellations
by providing ranging, integrity and correction information via
geostationary satellites. An SBAS typically comprises of [112]:
 a network of ground reference stations that monitor satellite
signals;
 master stations that collect and process reference station data
and generate SBAS messages;
 uplink stations that send the messages to geostationary
satellites;
 transponders on these satellites that broadcast the SBAS
messages.
By providing differential corrections, extra ranging signals via
geostationary satellites and integrity information for each
navigation satellite, SBAS delivers much higher levels of service
than the core satellite constellations. In certain configurations,
SBAS can support approach procedures with vertical guidance
(APV). There are two levels of APV: APV I and APV II. Both
use the same lateral obstacle surfaces as localizers; however APV
II may have lower minima due to better vertical performance.
There will nonetheless be only one APV approach to a runway end,
based on the level of service that SBAS can support at an
aerodrome. The two APV approach types are identical from the
perspective of avionics and pilot procedures. In many cases, SBAS
will support lower minima than that associated with non-precision
approaches, resulting in higher airport usability. Almost all SBAS
approaches will feature vertical guidance, resulting in a significant
increase in safety. APV minima (down to a Decision Height (DH)
of 75 m (250 ft) approximately) will be higher than Category I
minima, but APV approaches would not require the same ground
infrastructure, so this increase in safety will be affordable at most
airports. SBAS availability levels will allow operators to take
advantage of SBAS instrument approach minima when designating
an alternate airport. Notably, SBAS approach does not require any
SBAS infrastructure at an airport. SBAS can support all en-route
and terminal RNAV operations. Significantly, SBAS offers
affordable RNAV capability for a wide cross section of users. This
will allow a reorganization of the airspace for maximum efficiency
and capacity, allowing aircraft to follow the most efficient flight
path between airports. High availability of service will permit to
decommission traditional NAVAIDs, resulting in lower costs.
There are four SBASs now in service including:
 the North American Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS);
 the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
(EGNOS);
 the Indian GPS and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO)
Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) System;
 the Japanese Multi-functional Transport Satellite (MTSAT)
Satellite-based Augmentation System (MSAS).
Other SBAS currently under study or developments include the
Russian System for Differential Correction and Monitoring
(SDCM), the South/Central American and Caribbean SACCSA
(Soluciόn de Aumentaciόn para Caribe, Centro y Sudamérica), the 
Chinese Satellite Navigation Augmentation System (SNAS), the
Malaysian Augmentation System (MAS) and various programs
in the African and Indian Ocean (AFI) region. The approximate
coverage areas of the various SBAS are shown in Fig. 26.
Although Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and various other
nations in the southern portion of the Asia-Pacific region have not
announced SBAS development programs, the extension of systems
such as MSAS, GAGAN and SNAS could provide SBAS coverage
in these areas. Within the coverage area of SBAS, ICAO member
states may establish service areas where SBAS supports approved
operations. Other States can take advantage of the signals available
in the coverage area by fielding SBAS components integrated with
an existing SBAS or by authorizing the use of SBAS signals. The
first option offers some degree of control and improved
performance. The second option lacks any degree of control, and
the degree of improved performance depends on the proximity of
the host SBAS to the service area. In either case, the State, which
has established an SBAS service area, should assume responsibility
for the SBAS signals within that service area. This requires the
provision of NOTAM information services.
If ABAS-only operations are approved within the coverage area of
SBAS, SBAS avionics will also support ABAS operations.
Although the architectures of the various existing SBASs are
different, they broadcast the standard message format on the same
frequency (GPS L1) and so are interoperable from the user’s
perspective.
It is anticipated that these SBAS networks will expand beyond
their initial service areas. Other SBAS networks may also be
developed and become operational. When SBAS coverage areas
overlap, it is possible for an SBAS operator to monitor and send
integrity and correction messages for the geostationary satellites of
another SBAS, thus improving availability by adding ranging
sources.
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Fig. 26. Current and possible future SBAS coverage. Adapted from [113].
As the American WAAS has been developed in line with ICAO
SARPs and RTCA MOPS, the GBAS technology considered is this
paper is based on the RTCA WAAS standard [41], which is also
aligned with the ICAO SARPs for SBAS [114].
The aim of WAAS is to provide augmentation signals to correct
some of the main GNSS errors and providing the following
services:
 Position correction (ECEF coordinates);
 Ionospheric grid correction;
 Long term ephemeris error correction;
 Short term and long term satellite clock error correction;
 Integrity information.
WAAS consists of a ground, space and user segment (Fig. 27). A
ground segment is composed by a network of ground reference
stations and uplink stations. The reference stations, which are
called Ranging and Integrity Monitoring Station (RIMS), are
responsible for the analysis of GNSS signals and for producing
ranging corrections and integrity signals. The uplink stations are
responsible for sending regular corrections/integrity signal updates
to the space segment. The space segment is made by different
satellites in geostationary orbits and broadcast the ranging
corrections and integrity signals to the WAAS users. The user
segment (i.e., users equipped with WAAS enabled GNSS
receivers) uses the information broadcast from GNSS satellites to
compute PVT and WAAS signals broadcast from the space
segment to improve position accuracy (applying ionospheric
corrections) and integrity of the navigation solution.
This correction evaluation, together with the correction of other
parameters such as ephemeris error and clock error, allow WAAS
to provide to the user a position accuracy of about 7.6 meters or
better both for lateral and vertical measurements [41]. This permits
WAAS to achieve, under certain conditions, accuracy levels
compatible with CAT-I precision approach requirements.
As the CAT-I capability required significant efforts for
certification, a new Precision Approach sub-mode was defined
called Approach Operations with Vertical Guidance (APV), giving
an intermediate precision approach between NPA (Non- Precision
Approach) and CAT-I. This is further divided in APV-I and APV-
II.
Fig. 27. WAAS Architecture and Operational Environment [63].
Ionospheric delay is one of the major error sources of pseudorange.
The WAAS ionospheric delay corrections are broadcast as vertical
delay estimates at specified ionospheric grid points (IGPs),
applicable to a signal on L1. The WAAS Reference Stations
(WRSs) measure the slant ionospheric delays to all satellites in
view. These measurements must be translated into a form that can
be applied by the user because the user will have a different line of
sight to the satellite than the WRSs. WAAS uses a two-
dimensional grid model to represent the vertical ionospheric delay
distribution [47]. Ten different bands are used to allow a regular
spacing of IGPs. The 1808 possible IGP locations in bands 0-8 are
illustrated in Fig. 28 (there are 384 additional IGP locations in
bands 9-10 not shown). In the bands 0-8, the IGPs are spaced 5
apart from each other both in longitude and latitude for latitudes up
to N55 and S55. Above 55 and up to 75 in latitude the IGPs are
spaced 10 from each other both in longitude and in latitude. At
S85 and N85 (around the poles), the IGPs are spaced 90. In the
bands 9-10, the IGP grid at 60 has 5 longitudinal spacing,
increasing to 10 spacing at 65, 70 and 75, and finally becoming
30 at N85 and S85 round the poles. To accommodate an even
distribution of bands, IGPs at 85 are offset by 40 in the 0-8 bands
and 10 in the 9-10 bands. The IGPs error data are transmitted in
Message 26 and denoted in terms of GIVEI (Grid Ionospheric
Vertical Error Indicator), which corresponds to specific values of
Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE) and GIVE variance
(ߪଶ௜ǡீ ூ௏ா). The GIVEIi, GIVEi and theߪଶ௜ǡீ ூ௏ா are listed in Table
15.
Fig. 28. WAAS IGPs for bands 0-8 [41].
The GIVE is used to calculate the User Ionospheric Vertical Error
(UIVE) and the User Ionospheric Range Error (UIRE). The UIVE
and UIRE are, respectively, the confidence bounds on the user
vertical and range errors due to the ionosphere. Both the UIVE and
UIRE are referred to the Ionospheric Pierce Point (IPP) location.
The IPP is defined as the intersection of the line segment from the
receiver to the satellite and an ellipsoid with constant height of 350
km above the WGS-84 ellipsoid. Fig. 29 shows the relationship
between user location and IPP location [41].
Table 15. Evaluation of GIVEIi [41].
GIVEIi GIVEi [m] ࣌૛࢏,ࡳࡵࢂࡱ [m2]
0 0.3 0.0084
1 0.6 0.0333
2 0.9 0.0749
3 1.20 0.1331
4 1.5 0.2079
5 1.8 0.2994
6 2.1 0.4075
7 2.4 0.5322
8 2.7 0.6735
9 3.0 0.8315
10 3.6 1.1974
11 4.5 1.8709
12 6.0 3.3260
13 15.0 20.7870
14 45.0 187.0826
15 Not Monitored Not Monitored
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Fig. 29. Ionospheric Pierce Point Geometry [41].
The latitude of the IPP is given by:
߶௣௣ = sinିଵ൫߶௨ ߰௣௣ ൅ ߶௨߰௣௣ܣ൯ሾሿ(119)
where ߶௨ is the user location latitude, ܣ is the azimuth angle of
the satellite from the user’s location (߶௨ǡߣ௨) measured clockwise
from north and ߰௣௣ is the Earth’s central angle between the user
position and the projection of the pierce point.
If ߶௨> 70° and ܽݐ ݊߰௣௣ ݋ܿݏܣ ൐ ܽݐ (݊ߨȀʹ െ ߶௨) or ߶௨< −70°
and ܽݐ ݊߰௣௣ ݋ܿݏሺܣ ൅ ߨሻ൐ ܽݐ (݊ߨȀʹ ൅ ߶௨), the longitude of the
IPP is given by:
ߣ௣௣ = λ௨ ൅ ݅ݏ݊
ିଵ൬
ୱ୧୬ట೛೛
ୡ୭ୱథ೛೛
ܣ൰ሾሿ (120)
Otherwise:
ߣ௣௣ = λ௨ ൅ ݅ݏ݊
ିଵ൬
ୱ୧୬ట೛೛
ୡ୭ୱథ೛೛
ܣ൰ሾሿ (121)
ψ୮୮ is given by:
߰௣௣ = గଶെ ܧ െ ݅ݏ݊ିଵቀ ோ೐ோ೐ା௛಺ܧቁሾሿ (122)
where ܧ is the elevation angle of the satellite form the user’s
location measured with respected to the local tangent plane, ܴ௘ is
the approximate Earth radius (assumed to be 6378.163 km) and ℎூ
is the height of the maximum electron density (assumed to be 350
km). Fig. 30 shows the principles adopted for interpolation of the
IPPs. The variance of UIVE can be calculated using one of the
following formulas:
σ௎ூ௏ா
ଶ = ∑ ܹ௡ሺݔ௣௣ǡݕ௣௣ሻήߪ௡ǡ௜௢௡௢௚௥௜ௗଶସ௡ୀଵ (123)
σ௎ூ௏ா
ଶ = ∑ ܹ௡ሺݔ௣௣ǡݕ௣௣ሻήߪ௡ǡ௜௢௡௢௚௥௜ௗଶଷ௡ୀଵ (124)
where ߪ௡ǡ௜௢௡௢௚௥௜ௗଶ is the model variance of inospheric vertical
delays at an IGP. As indicated in the WAAS MOPS, a dedicated
model can be used to calculate both fast and long-term correction
degradation components (for inclusion in Message Types 7
and 10).
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Fig. 30. Principle of Interpolation of the IPPs [41].
If the degradation model is not implemented, the basic WAAS
ionospheric model is used by taking ߪ௡,௜௢௡௢௚௥௜ௗଶ = ீߪ ூ௏ாଶ . For the
ith satellite, the variance of UIRE is then calculated as follows:
σ௜,௎ூோாଶ = ܨ௣௣ଶ ∙ σ௜,௎ூ௏ாଶ (125)
where ܨ௣௣ is the obliquity factor given by:
ܨ௣௣ = ൤1 − ቀோ೐ୡ୭ୱாோ೐ା௛಺ቁଶ൨ିభమ (126)
Real-time data from can be obtained from the FAA website for
WAAS and from the ESA website for EGNOS [113]. The FAA
also created a comprehensive portal containing real-time data on
other GBAS systems including not only WAAS and EGNOS, but
also MSAS and GAGAN [115]. The airborne receiver error is
denoted as σ୧,ୟ୧୰. This error is defined in the WAAS MOPS based
on the equipment operation classes. There are four operation
classes defined in the WAAS MOPS [41]. A description of these
classes is provided in Table 16.
The fast corrections and long term corrections are two important
messages transmitted by SBAS. The long term corrections contain
information on the slowly varying satellite orbit and clock errors.
The fast corrections provide additional information on the fast
varying clock errors. Long term corrections consist of position and
clock offset values only (EGNOS) or they also contain velocity and
clock drift corrections (WAAS).
The User Differential Range Error (UDRE) message provides
information that allows the user to derive a bound on the projection
of the satellite orbit and satellite clock errors onto the line of sight
of the worst case user. The UDRE is transmitted as an indicator
(UDREI).
Table 16. SBAS Operational Classes [41].
Class Description
Class 1
Equipment that supports oceanic and domestic en route,
terminal, approach (LANV), and departure operation.
When in oceanic and domestic en route, terminal,
LNAV, and departure operations, this class of equipment
can apply the long-term and fast SBAS differential
corrections when they are available.
Class 2
Equipment that supports oceanic and domestic en route,
terminal, approach (LANV, LNAV/VNAV), and
departure operation. When in LNAV/VNAV, this class
of equipment applies the long-term, fast and ionospheric
corrections. When in oceanic and domestic en route,
terminal, approach (LNAV), and departure operations,
this class of equipment can apply the long-term and fast
SBAS differential corrections when they are available.
Class 3
Equipment that supports oceanic and domestic en route,
terminal, approach (LANV, LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV),
and departure operation. When in LPV, LP, or
LNAV/VNAV, this class of equipment applies the long-
term, fast and ionospheric corrections. When in oceanic
and domestic en route, terminal, approach (LNAV), and
departure operations, this class of equipment can apply
the long-term and fast SBAS differential corrections
when they are available.
Class 4
Equipment that supports only the final approach segment
operation. This class of equipment is intended to serve as
an ILS alternative that supports LP and LPV operation
with degradation (fail-down) from LPC to lateral only
(LNAV). Class 4 equipment is only applicable to
functional Class Delta, and equipment that meets Class
Delta-4 is also likely to meet the requirements for Class
Beta-1, 2, or -3.
In terms of WAAS integrity features, Message Types 27 and 28 are
particularly important. Type 27 Messages may be transmitted to
correct the σUDRE in selected areas. Each Type 27 Message 
specifies δUDRE correction factors to be applied to integrity
monitoring algorithms of users when inside or outside of a set of
geographic regions defined in that message. δUDRE indicators are
associated with the δUDRE values listed in Table 17 that multiply
the model standard deviation defined using the UDREI parameters
in the WASS Types 2-6 and Type 24 Messages.
As an alternative to Message 27, a service provider might broadcast
Message Type 28 (not both) to update the correction confidence as
a function of user location. Message Type 28 provides increased
availability inside the service volume and increased integrity
outside. The covariance matrix is a function of satellite location,
reference station observational geometry, and reference station
measurement confidence. Consequently it is a slowly changing
function of time. Each covariance matrix only needs to be updated
on the same order as the long-term corrections. Each message is
capable of containing relative covariance matrices for two
satellites. This maintains the real-time six-second updates of
integrity and scales the matrix to keep it within a reasonable
dynamic range.
Assuming a Message Type 28 data is used and that fast and long
term corrections are applied to the satellites without the correction
degradation model (i.e., an active type 7 or 10 message data is not
available), then the residual fast and long term error is defined as
[41]
ߪ௜,௙௟௧ଶ = [൫ߪ௜,௎஽ோா൯∙ (ܷߜ ܦܴܧ) + 8]ଶ [m] (132)
The residual tropospheric error is denoted as σ୧,୲୰୭୮୭. It is modelled
as a random parameter with a standard deviation of σ୧,୲୰୭୮୭ as
specified in the MOPS [41].
Table 17. δUDRE Indicators and values in Message Type 27.
ࢾࢁࡰࡾࡱ Indicator ࢾࢁࡰࡾࡱ
0 1
1 1.1
2 1.25
3 1.5
4 2
5 3
6 4
7 5
8 6
9 8
10 10
11 20
12 30
13 40
14 50
15 100
Cholesky factorization is used to reliably compress the information
in the covariance matrix (ܥ). This factorization produces 4x4 an
upper triangular matrix (ܴ), which can be used to reconstruct the
relative covariance matrix as follows:
ܥ = ்ܴܴ (127)
Cholesky factorization guarantees that the received covariance
matrix remains positive-definite despite quantization errors.
Because R is upper triangular, it contains only 10 non-zero
elements for each satellite. These 10 elements are divided by a
scale factor to determine the matrix E, which is broadcast in
Message Type 28:
ܧ = ோ
ట
=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
ܧଵ,ଵ ܧଵ,ଶ ܧଵ,ଷ ܧଵ,ସ0 ܧଶ,ଶ ܧଶ,ଷ ܧଶ,ସ0 0 ܧଷ,ଷ ܧଷ,ସ0 0 0 ܧସ,ସ⎦⎥⎥
⎤
(128)
where y = 2(௦௖௔௟௘௘௫௣௢௡௘௡௧ି ହ). The covariance matrix is then
reconstructed and used to modify the broadcast σUDRE values as 
a function of user position. The location-specific modifier is given
by:
δUDRE = ඥ(்ܫ ∙ ܥ ∙ ܫ) + ߝ஼ (129)
where ܫis the 4D line of sight vector from the user to the satellite
in the WGS-84 coordinate frame, whose first three components are
the unit vector from the user to the satellite and the fourth
component is a one. The additional term ߝ஼ is to compensate for
the errors introduced by quantization. If degradation data is
available, the ߝ஼ value is derived from the covariance data
broadcast in a Type 10 message (ܥ௖௢௩௔௥௜௔௡௖௘) as follows:
ߝ஼ =ܥ௖௢௩௔௥௜௔௡௖௘ ∙ y (130)
If ܥ௖௢௩௔௥௜௔௡௖௘ from Message Type 10 is not available, ߝ஼ is set to
zero, but there is an 8 meter degradation applied as defined in the
WAAS MOPS [41]. The WAAS fast corrections and long-term
corrections are designed to provide the most recent information to
the user [41]. However, it is always possible that the user fails to
receive one of the messages. In order to guarantee integrity even
when some messages are not received, the user performing
approach operations (e.g, LNAV/VNAV, LP or LPV) must apply
models of the degradation of this information. In other flight
phases, the use of these models is optional and a global degradation
factor can be used instead as specified in the WAAS MOPS [41].
The residual error associated with the fast and long-term
corrections is characterized by the variance (ߪ௙௟௧ଶ ) of a model
distribution. This term is computed as:
ߪ௙௟௧
ଶ =
൜
(σ୙ୈୖ୉ ∙ δUDRE) + ε୤ୡ+ ε୰୰ୡ+ ε୪୲ୡ+ ε ୰ୣ, if RSS୙ୈୖ୉ = 0(σ୙ୈୖ୉ ∙ δUDRE)ଶ+ ε୤ୡଶ + ε୰୰ୡଶ + ε୪୲ୡଶ + ε ୰ୣଶ , if RSS୙ୈୖ୉ = 1 (131)
where:RSS୙ୈୖ୉is the root-sum-square flag in Message Type 10;
σ୙ୈୖ୉ is the model parameter from Message Types 2-6, 24;
δUDRE is the user location factor (from Message Types 28 or 27,
otherwise δUDRE = 1);
ε୤ୡ is the degradation parameter for fast correction data;
ε୰୰ୡ is the degradation parameter for range rate correction data;
ε୪୲ୡ is the degradation parameter for long term correction or GEO
nav-message data;
ε ୰ୣ is the degradation parameter for en route through NPA
operations.
The total error σ୧ଶ is given by [41]:
ߪ௜
ଶ = ߪ௜,௙௟௧ଶ + ߪ௜,௎ூோாଶ + ߪ௜,௔௜௥ଶ + ߪ௜,௧௥௢௣௢ଶ (132)
For Class 1 equipment:
ߪ௜,௔௜௥ଶ = 25mଶ (133)
For Class 2, 3 and 4 equipment:
ߪ௜,௔௜௥ = (ߪ௡௢௜௦௘,ீேௌௌଶ [ ]݅ + ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛ଶ [ ]݅ + ߪௗ௜௩௚ଶ [ ]݅)ଵ ଶ⁄ (134)
The projection matrix (S) is defined as [41]:
S = ൦ݏ௘௔௦௧,ଵݏ௘௔௦௧,ଶ ⋯ݏ௘௔௦௧,ேs௡௢௥௧௛,ଵ s௡௢௥௧௛,ଶ …ݏ௡௢௥௛௧,ேs௎ ,ଵ s௎ ,ଶ ⋯ s௎ ,ே
ݏ௧,ଵݏ௧,ଶ …ݏ௧,ே ൪= (ܩ் ∙ ܹ ∙ ܩ)ିଵ ∙ ܩ் ∙ ܹ (135)
where ܩ is the observation matrix, ܹ is the weighted matrix,
ݏ௘௔௦௧,௜ is the partial derivative of position error in the east direction
with respect to the pseudorange error on the ith satellite, ݏ௡௢௥௧௛,௜ is
the partial derivative of position error in the north direction with
respect to the pseudorange error on the ith satellite, ݏ௎ ,௜is the
partial derivative of position error in the vertical direction with
respect to the pseudorange error on the ith satellite and s୙ ,୧is the
partial derivative of time error with respect to pseudorange error on
the ith satellite. The weighted matrix W is defined as:
ܹ = ൦ ݓଵ 0 ⋯ 00 wଶ … 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 …ݓே൪ (136)
ݓ௜= 1 ߪ௜ଶ⁄ (137)
and the observation matrix G consists of N rows of LOS vectors
from each satellite augmented by a “1” for the clock. Thus, the ith
row corresponds to the ith satellites in view and can be written in
terms of the azimuth angle ܣݖ௜ and elevation angle ߠ௜. The ith row
of the G matrix is:G୧= [−cosߠ௜sinܣݖ௜ − cosߠ௜cosܣݖ௜ − sinߠ௜ 1] (138)
The SBAS Vertical Protection Level (VPLSBAS) is calculated
using the equation:
ܸܲܮௌ஻஺ௌ ൌ ܭ௏ ௎݀ (139)
where:
௎݀
ଶ = ∑ ݏ௎ǡ௜ଶ ߪ௜ଶ୒୧ୀ଴ (140)
The value of K୚ used for computing VPL is: K୚=5.33. The SBAS
Horizontal Protection Level (ܪܲܮௌ஻஺ௌ) is calculated using the
equations:
ܪܲܮௌ஻஺ௌ =
ቊ
ܭுǡே௉஺ ή ௠݀ ௔௝௢௥, for en route through LNAV
ܭுǡ௉஺ ή ௠݀ ௔௝௢௥, for LNAV VNAV⁄ , LP, LPV approach (141)
where:
௠݀ ௔௝௢௥ ≡ ඨ
ௗ೐ೌೞ೟
మ ାௗ೙೚ೝ೟೓
మ
ଶ
+ ට(ௗ೐ೌೞ೟మ ିௗ೙೚ೝ೟೓మ
ଶ
)ଶ൅ ா݀ேଶ (142)
௘݀௔௦௧
ଶ = ∑ ݏ௘௔௦௧ǡ௜ଶ ߪ௜ଶ୒୧ୀ଴ ݒ (143)
௡݀௢௥௧௛
ଶ = ∑ ݏ௡௢௥௛௧ǡ௜ଶ ߪ௜ଶ୒୧ୀ଴ (144)
ா݀ே
ଶ = ∑ ݏ௘௔௦௧ǡ௜ݏ௡௢௥௧௛ǡ௜ߪ௜ଶ୒୧ୀ଴ (145)
The values Kୌǡ୒୔୅ is 6.18 for en route through LNAV and 6.0 for
LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV. More detailed information about WAAS
can be found in the applicable MOPS standard [41].
4.6.2. Ground Based Augmentation Systems
The current GNSS constellations are unable to provide accuracy,
availability, continuity and integrity to achieve the stringent
accuracy and integrity requirements set by ICAO for precision
approach. GBAS employs LADGNSS techniques to augment
accuracy and ad-hoc features to augment integrity beyond the
levels that can be achieved with SBAS. Employing all provisions
included in the current RTCA standards [36, 40], GBAS could
provide augmentation to the core constellations to support
precision approach up to Category IIIb. However, to date, ICAO
has only issued Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
for GBAS operating over single frequency and single constellation
up to CAT I operations [38]. SARPs for CAT II/III have been
already developed by the ICAO Navigation System Panel (NSP)
but not yet included in Annex 10, waiting for further developments
to take place in the aviation industry. As shown in Fig. 31, GBAS
utilises three segments: satellites constellation, ground stations and
aircraft receiver. The GBAS ground station is formed by reference
receivers with their antennas installed in precisely surveyed
locations. The information generated in the receiver is sent to a
processor that computes the corrections for each navigation
satellite in view and broadcasts these differential corrections,
besides integrity parameters and precision approach pathpoints
data, using a VHF Data Broacast (VDB). The information
broadcast is received by aircraft in VHF coverage that also receive
information from the navigation satellites. Then, it uses the
differential corrections on the information received directly from
the navigation satellites to calculate the precise position. The
precise position is used, along with pathpoints data, to supply
deviation signals to drive appropriate aircraft systems supporting
precision approach operations.
Fig. 31. GBAS architecture [115].
Although the operating principle, Signal-in-Space and
performance characteristics of GBAS are completely different
from ILS, the GBAS approach guidance inidications provided to
the pilot are similar to the localizer and glide path indications
provided by an ILS. However, compared to ILS precision
approach systems, GBAS presents several distinct benefits. These
include:
 Reduction of critical and sensitive areas typical of ILS;
 Possibility to perform curved approaches;
 Positioning service for RNAV operations in the Terminal
Manoeuvring Area (TMA);
 Provision of service in several runways in the same airport;
 Provision of several approach glide angles and displaced
threshold;
 Guided missed approach service;
 Adjacent airports served by a single GBAS (within VDB
coverage).
According to [115], GBAS is intended to support all types of
approach, landing, departure and surface operations and may
support en-route and terminal operations The SARPs were
developed, to date, to support Category I precision approach,
approach with vertical guidance and GBAS positioning service.
The GBAS ground station performs the following functions:
 Provide locally relevant pseudo-range corrections;
 Provide GBAS-related data;
 Provide final approach segment data when supporting
precision approach;
 Provide ranging source availability data;
 Provide integrity monitoring for GNSS ranging sources.
VDB radio frequencies used in GBAS are selected in the band of
108 to 117.975 (just below the ATM band). The lowest assignable
frequency is 108.025 MHz and the highest assignable frequency is
117.950 MHz, with a channel spacing of 25 kHz. A Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) technique is used with a fixed frame
structure. The data broadcast is assigned one to eight slots. GBAS
data is transmitted as 3-bit symbols, modulating the data broadcast
carrier by Differential 8 Phase Shift Keying (D8PSK), at a rate of
10 500 symbols per second. GBAS can provide a VHF data
broadcast with either horizontal (GBAS/H) or elliptical (GBAS/E)
polarization. The navigation data transmitted by GBAS includes
the following information:
 Pseudo-range corrections, reference time and integrity data;
 GBAS-related data;
 Final approach segment data when supporting precision
approach;
 Predicted ranging source availability data.
LAAS (US) is a system capable to provide local augmentation for
the GNSS signals and it is the first candidate to support all types of
approach and landing procedures up to Category III, as well as
surface operations. All existing GBAS systems refer to the same
LAAS standards developed by RTCA [36, 40]. The typical LAAS
facility consists of three elements: the first is the ground segment,
usually installed on the airport field, the second is the airborne
segment, represented by the data link receiver as well as a system
capable of applying the augmentation parameters for landing
guidance, the third is the space segment, which is actually made by
the GPS/GLONASS constellations and will also include the future
GALILEO/BEIDOU constellations when the required levels of
maturity will be achieved. WAAS essentially provides two
different services: the first is the precision approach service by
giving deviation guidance, both lateral and vertical, for the Final
Approach Segment (FAS) to the runway; the second is the
differentially-corrected positioning service transmitting to the
airborne systems the correction message for augmented GNSS
accuracy. The specific data link to be used for communications
between aircraft and ground stations is not completely specified by
the current standards, while there are constraints in terms of
bandwidth, link budget and data rate [65]. For approach and
landing services, the LAAS performance is classified in terms of
GBAS Service Level (GSL). A GSL defines a specific level of
required accuracy, integrity and continuity. The GSL classification
and the GSL performance requirements are listed in Tables 18 and
19. Currently, GBAS/LAAS installations around the world have
been certified for GSL-C only. However, several research and
development efforts are on-going towards demonstrating and
producing adequate evidence of compliance for GLS-D/E/F
installations. LAAS can also support airport surface operations by
enabling several functions associated with the specific aircraft
equipment such as an electronic moving map and database:
Enhanced pilot situational awareness of aircraft position: the
position information will allow the pilot to identify the correct taxi
route and to monitor his position along the route; this situational
awareness is improved in all visibility conditions, particularly for
complex airports. Nowadays to support the low visibility surface
movement operations is a very costly task; with LAAS, ADS-B and
emerging cockpit displays technologies, these operations could be
conducted in the same way of those supported with lights,
markings and follow-me operators.
Traffic surveillance: this function can support air traffic control and
crew with traffic surveillance of other aircraft both in good and low
visibility condition.
Runway incursion and conflict detection alerting: the availability
of accurate LAAS aircraft position information enables automated
systems to detect runway incursions and other conflicts providing
suitable alerts. Various error sources affect the system accuracy,
integrity and continuity and these are nowadays an active area of
research. Some of these errors are:
 Hardware/software faults in ground equipment or satellites
such as the clock error;
 Multipath effects occurring on aircraft or ground receiver
antennas;
 Errors in the ephemeris information;
 Residual ionospheric and tropospheric errors;
 Degradation of the satellite signal at the source;
 Interference/jamming issues.
Table 18. GBAS Service Level Performance and Service Levels (adapted from [36]).
GSL Accuracy Integrity Continuity Operations Supported
95%
Lat.
NSE
95%
Vert.
NSE
Prob. (Loss of
Integrity)
Time
to
Alert
LAL VAL Prob. (Loss of
Continuity)
A 16 m 20 m 1-2×10-7/150 sec 10 sec 40 m 50 m 1-8×10-6/15 sec Approach operations with vertical
guidance (performance of APV-I
designation)
B 16 m 8 m 1-2×10-7/150 sec 6 sec 40 m 20 m 1-8×10-6/15 s Approach operations with vertical
guidance (performance of APV-II
designation)
C 16 m 4 m 1-2×10-7/150 sec 6 sec 40 m 10 m 1-8×10-6/15 s Precision approach to lowest CAT I
minima
D 5 m 2.9 m 10-9/15 s (vert.);
30 s (lat.)
2 sec 17 m 10 m 1-8×10-6/15 s Precision approach to lowest CAT
IIIb minima, when augmented with
other airborne equipment
E 5 m 2.9 m 10-9/15 s (vert.);
30 s (lat.)
2 sec 17 m 10 m 1-4×10-6/15 s Precision approach to lowest CAT
II/IIIa minima
F 5 m 2.9 m 10-9/15 s (vert.);
30 s (lat.)
2 sec 17 m 10 m 1-2×10-6/15 s (vert.); 30
s (lat.)
Precision approach to lowest CAT
IIIb minima
The LAAS service volume (Fig. 32) is defined as the region where
the system is required to meet the accuracy, integrity and continuity
requirements for a specific GSL class.
For each runway supported by the system, the minimum service
volume to support Category I, Category II or APV (vertical
guidance) approaches is defined as follow:
Laterally: beginning at 450 feet each side of the Landing Threshold
Point/Fictitious Threshold Point (LTP/FTP) and projecting out
±35° either side of the final approach path to a distance of 20 NM
from the LTP/FTP.
Vertically: within the lateral region, up to the maximum of 7° or
1.75 times the Glide Path Angle (GPA) above the horizon with the
origin at the Glide Path Intercept Point (GPIP), up to a maximum
of 10,000 feet AGL and down to 0.9° above the horizon with the
origin in the GPIP, to a minimum height of one half the DH.
LTP/FTP: Landing/Fictitious Threshold Point
GPIP: Glide Path Intersection Point
FPAP: Flight PathAlignment Point
Plan view
LTP/FTP
± 450 ft
± 35º
15 NM ±10º
20 NM
10.000 ftProfile view
GPIP
Greater than 7º
or 1.75
FPAP
0.3-0.45
FPAP
Fig. 32. Minimum category I, II and APV service volume
(adapted from [65]).
Table 19. GBAS Service Levels (adapted from [36]).
GSL Operations Supported by GSL
A Approach operations with vertical guidance (performance
of APV-I designation)
B Approach operations with vertical guidance (performance
of APV-II designation)
C Precision approach to lowest CAT I minima
D Precision approach to lowest CAT IIIb minima, when
augmented wih other airborne equipment
E Precision approach to lowest CAT II/IIIa minima
F Precision approach to lowest CAT IIIb minima
The minimum service volume to support Category III precision
approach or autoland with any minima is the same as the minimum
Category II service volume, with the addition of the volume within
±450 feet from the runway centreline extending from the threshold
to the runway end, from 8 feet above the surface up to 100 feet.
There are different metrics for the GBAS performance; one of these
is the SIS performance. This is defined in terms of accuracy,
integrity, continuity and availability of the service [65]; this
performance refers to the output of the “fault-free” airborne user
equipment. The interaction between airborne and ground systems
is defined by a separation of responsibilities:
The ground system is responsible for monitoring the satellites
signal quality and availability, computing the differential
corrections and detecting and mitigating the faults originated in the
ground station or in the space segment.
The airborne equipment computes the pseudorange values and
evaluates the performance level monitoring, detecting and
mitigating any fault conditions due to the other avionics equipment.
For a precision approach, the avionics GBAS receiver only uses
satellites for which corrections are available
Avionics GBAS receivers have to comply with the requirements
outlined in ICAO Annex 10, vol. 1 [38] and the specifications of
RTCA/DO-253C [36]. GBAS avionics receivers must have the
capability to receive navigation satellites signal and the VDB
information, with respective antennas, and a way to select the
approach and an indication of course and glide path. Like ILS and
Microwave Landing System (MLS), GBAS has to provide lateral
and vertical guidance relative to the defined final approach course
and glide path. The GBAS receiver employs a channelling scheme
that selects the VDB frequency. Approach procedure data are
uplinked via the VDB and each separate procedure requires a
different channel assignment. In terms of aircraft system
integration, GBAS avionics standards have been developed to
mimic the ILS in order to minimize the impact of installing GBAS
on the existing avionics. Typically, display scaling and deviation
outputs are the same utilized for ILS, so that maximum
interoperability is achieve at the Human-Machine Interface (HMI)
level, allowing the avionics landing systems to provide final
approach course and glide path guidance both at airports equipped
with ILS and GLS. For TMA area navigation, including segmented
and curved approaches, the GBAS avionics receiver provides
accurate position, velocity and time data that can be used as an
input to an on-board navigation computer. In line with ICAO
SARPs and the strategy for the introduction and application of non-
visual aids to approach and landing, which permit a mix of systems
providing precision approach service, the avation industry has
developed multi-mode receivers that support precision approach
operations based on ILS, MLS and GNSS (GBAS and SBAS). Also
for GBAS, integrity monitoring is accomplished by the avionics
continually comparing Horizontal/Lateral and Vertical Protection
Levels (HPL/LPL and VPL), derived from the augmentation signal
and satellite pseudorange measurements, against the alert limit for
the current phase of flight. When either the vertical or the
horizontal limit is exceeded, an alert is given to the pilot [116].
Additionally, the LAAS MOPS [36] also contemplate the
possibility of introducing avionics-based augmentation
functionalities by defining the continuity of protection levels in
terms of Predicted Lateral and Vertical Protection Levels (PLPL
and PVPL). The standard states that on-board avionics systems
could support PLPL and PVPL calculations to generate appropriate
caution flags. However, it does not recommend any specific form
of ABAS and does not indicate the required performance of such
on-board equipment to supplement LAAS operations. Research in
this field has concentrated on possible RAIM aiding rather than
proper ABAS developments. Some techniques have been
developed that include the possible aiding of barometric altimeter,
with a special focus on vertical guidance integrity monitoring and
augmentation [117-121] and, more recently, the possible inclusion
of predictive features has also been studied especially for
mission/route planning applications. However, the main
limitations of such techniques is in the inability to model GNSS
errors due to aircraft dynamics, including antenna obscuration,
Doppler shift and multipath contributions due to the aircraft
structure and the surrounding environment (the latter being
important when the aircraft flies at low altitudes). This is why a
new form of ABAS specifically tailored for real-time integrity
monitoring and augmentation in mission-critical and safety-critical
aviation applications is needed [53, 54] and is discussed later in
this section.
There are two conditions in the protection level calculations. One
is the H0 hypothesis, the other is H1 hypothesis. The H0 hypothesis
refers to no faults are present in the range measurements (including
both the signal and the receiver measurements) used in the ground
station to compute the differential corrections. The H1 hypothesis
refers to the presence of a fault in one or more range measurements
that is caused by one of the reference receivers used in the ground
station. The H0 Hypothesis total error model is:
ߪ௜
ଶ = ߪ௣௥೒೙೏,௜ଶ + ߪ௧௥௢௣௢,௜ଶ + ߪ௔௜௥,௜ଶ + ߪ௜௢௡௢,௜ଶ (146)
where σୟ୧୰,୧ଶ is the total aircraft contribution to the corrected
pseudorange error for the ith satellite. This is given by:
ߪ௔௜௥,௜ଶ = ߪ௥௘௖௘௜௩௘௥ଶ (ߠ௜) + ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛ଶ (ߠ௜) (147)
The residual tropospheric and ionospheric errors are due to the
position difference of reference receiver and aircraft. According to
the LAAS MASPS, the tropospheric error is defined as [40]:
ߪ௧௥௢௣௢(ߠ) = ߪேℎ଴ ଵ଴షలඥ଴.଴଴ଶା௦௜௡మ(ఏ) (1 − ݁ି೩೓೓బ) (148)
where σ୒ =troposphere refractivity uncertainty transmitted in the
GBAS Message Type 2, θ is the elevation angle for the ith ranging
source. It is expressed in the ENU frame, Δh is the difference in
altitude between airborne and ground subsystems (reference
receivers), in meters and h଴ is the tropospheric scale height
(transmitted in GBAS Message Type 2).The residual ionospheric
error is defined as [40]:
ߪ௜௢௡௢ = ܨ௣௣ߪ௩௘௥௧_௜௢௡௢_௚௥௔ௗ௜௘௡௧(ݔ௔௜௥ + 2 ߬ݒ௔௜௥) (149)
where F୮୮ is the obliquity defined in equation (25). The reference
receiver error model is used to generate the total error which
contributing the corrected pseudorange for a GPS satellite caused
by the reference receiver noise. The standard deviation of the
reference receiver error is [40]:
ߪ௣௥_೒೙೏,ீ௉ௌ(ߠ௜) = ට (௔బା௔భ௘షഇ೔ ഇబ⁄ )మெ + ( ଶܽ)ଶ (150)
where M is the number of ground reference receiver subsystems
and θ୧is the elevation angle for the ith ranging source. The
airborne receiver error is a function of the satellite elevation angle
above the local level plane. It is defined as [40]:
ߪ௥௘௖௘௜௩௘௥(ߠ௜) = ଴ܽ + ଵܽ݁ି(ఏ೔ ఏబ⁄ ) (151)
where θ୧ is the elevation angle for the ith ranging source and the
parameters a଴, aଵ and θ଴ are defined in [40] for various Airborne
Accuracy Designators (AAD). It is to be noted that also the aircraft
multipath error is a function of the satellite elevation angle. The
Airframe Multipath Designator (AMD) is a letter that indicates the
airframe multipath error contribution to the corrected pseudorange
for a GPS satellite. There are two types of AMD in the LAAS
MASPS, denoted as A and B [40]. The aircraft multipath error for
AMD type A is:
ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛
஺ [i] = ൫0.13 + 0.53 (݁ିఏ೔ ଵ଴⁄ )൯[m] (152)
For AMD type B:
ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛
஻ [i] = ଴.ଵଷା଴.ହଷ௘൫షഇ೔ భబ⁄ ൯
ଶ
[m] (153)
The multipath model for AMD type A (ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛஺ ) was obtained
during an FAA sponsored research program, which was aimed at
investigating and quantifying the total effect of multipath from the
airframe and from ground multipath during approach and landing
operations [55]. The FAA sponsored program included the
development of an electromagnetic modelling capability to predict
amplitude, time delay and phase characteristic of airframe
multipath. The final empirical model is the result of extensive
flight test data analysis conducted with large commercial airliner
platforms (i.e., B777-300ER and B737-NG) as described in [122].
As stated in the LAAS MASPS [40], the multipath model for AMD
type B (ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛஻ ) is still under development [40]. Sinceߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛஺
is expected to produce conservative multipath error estimations, it
is acceptable to use ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛஺ in all cases until more reliable
ߪ௠ ௨௟௧௜௣௔௧௛
஻ models are developed. The H1 hypothesis total error
model is given by:
ߪ௜,ுଵଶ = ܯ௜ܯ௜− 1ߪ௣௦௘௨ௗ௢௥௔௡௚௘೒೙೏,௜ଶ + ߪ௧௥௢௣௢௦௣௘௛௘௥௘,௜ଶ+ߪ௔௜௥,௜ଶ + ߪ௜௢௡௢௦௣௘௥௘,௜ଶ (154)
where ܯ௜ is the number of reference receivers used to compute the
pseudorange corrections for the ith satellite. SBAS/GBAS
projection matrix (S) matrix is obtained from the observation
matrix (G) and weighted matrix (W), and its elements determine
the protection levels of GBAS. The S matrix for GBAS has the
same formats already defined for SBAS. The fault-free vertical
protection level (ܸܲܮு଴) can be calculated using the equation [24]:
ܸܲܮு଴ = ܭ௙௙௠ ௗට∑ ݏଶ஺௣௥_ೡ೐ೝ೟,௜ߪ௜ଶே௜ୀଵ (155)
where s୅୮୰_౬౛౨౪,୧ is the projection of the vertical component and
translation of the along track errors into the vertical for the ith
satellite. This is given by:
ݏ஺௣௥_ೡ೐ೝ೟,௜= ݏ௩,௜+ ݏ௫,௜∗ tan ீߠ ௌ (156)
where ீߠ ௌ is the glide path angle for the final approach path and ܰ
is the number of ranging sources used in the position solution. The
H1 hypothesis vertical protection level (VPLୌଵ) can be calculated
using the equations:
ܸܲܮுଵ = ܯܣܺ{ܸܲܮ௝} (157)
ܸܲܮ௝ = หܤ௝,௩௘௥௧ห+ ܭ௠ ௗߪ௩௘௥௧,ுଵ (158)
where j is the ground reference receiver index, K୫ ୢ is found in
Table 7-9 and the other terms are:B௝,௩௘௥௧ = ∑ ݏ௩௘௥௧,௜ܤ௜,௝ே௜ୀଵ (159)
ߪ௩௘௥௧,ுଵଶ = ∑ ݏ௩௘௥௧,௜ଶ ߪ௜,ுଵଶே௜ୀଵ (160)
The fault-free lateral protection level (LPLୌ଴) is calculated using
the equation (RTCA, 2004):
ܲܮ ܮு଴ = ܭ௙௙௠ ௗට∑ ݏଶ஺௣௥_೗ೌ ೟,௜ߪ௜ଶே௜ୀଵ (161)
where s୅୮୰_ ౗ౢ౪,୧ is the projection of the vertical component and
translation of the along track errors into the vertical for ith satellite
(also denoted s୪ୟ୲,୧). The H1 hypothesis lateral protection level
(LPLH1) can be calculated using the following equations from the
LAAS MASPS [40]:
ܲܮ ܮுଵ = ܯܣܺ{ܲܮ ܮ௝} (162)
ܲܮ ܮ௝ = หܤ௝,௟௔௧ห+ ܭ௠ ௗߪ௟௔௧,ுଵ (163)
where:
ܤ௝,௟௔௧ = ∑ ݏ௟௔௧,௜ܤ௜,௝ே௜ୀଵ (164)
ߪ௟௔௧,ுଵଶ = ∑ ݏ௟௔௧,௜ଶ ߪ௜,ுଵଶே௜ୀଵ (165)
The subscript ݆is the ground subsystem reference receiver index
and the multiplier K୫ ୢ can be found in [40]. If the GBAS provides
GSL E or F services, then the predicted protection level must be
calculated to enable continuity of the GBAS SIS. The Predicted
Vertical Protection Level (PVPL) and Predicted Lateral Protection
Level (PLPL) are defined in MASPS as [40]:
ܸܲܲܮ= ܯܣܺ{ܸܲܲܮு଴,ܸܲܲܮுଵ} (166)
ܲܲܮ ܮ= ܯܣܺ{ܲܲܮ ܮு଴, PLPLୌଵ} (167)
ܸܲܲܮு଴ = ܭ௙௙௠ ௗට∑ ݏଶ௩௘௥௧,௜ߪ௜ଶே௜ୀଵ (168)
ܸܲܲܮுଵ = ܭ௙௙ௗߪ஻,௩௘௥௧+ ܭ௠ ௗߪ௩௘௥௧,ுଵ (169)
ܲܲܮ ܮு଴ = ܭ௙௙௠ ௗට∑ ݏଶ௟௔௧,௜ߪ௜ଶே௜ୀଵ (170)
ܲܲܮ ܮுଵ = ܭ௙௙ௗߪ஻,௟௔௧+ ܭ௠ ௗߪ௟௔௧,ுଵ (171)
where ܭ௙௙ௗ is the multiplier which determines the probability of
fault-free detection given M reference receivers.
ߪ஻,௩௘௥௧ଶ = ∑ ݏ௩௘௥௧,௜ଶ ఙ೛ೝ_೒೙೏,೔మ(ெ ೔ି ଵ)ே௜ୀଵ (172)
ߪ஻,௟௔௧ଶ = ∑ ݏ௟௔௧,௜ଶ ఙ೛ೝ_೒೙೏,೔మ(ெ ೔ି ଵ)ே௜ୀଵ (173)
The VAL defines the threshold values of VPL and PVPL (i.e., the
GBAS signal is not to be used to navigate the aircraft when the
VPL exceeds the VAL/PVAL).
4.6.3. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
Various methods have been proposed and developed for stand-
alone GNSS integrity monitoring. One of the popular
implementations for aviation application is the RAIM technique.
RAIM has its foundations in statistical detection theory, wherein
redundant GNSS measurements are used to form a test-statistic
from which a fault can be inferred. RAIM is based on the reasoning
that the quality of a user’s position solution can be evaluated at the
receiver. This supports detection of system-level faults. RAIM was
introduced in the latter part of the 1980s when autonomous means
of GNSS failure detection started to be investigated [42]. A fault is
identified based on a self-consistency check among the available
measurements. Traditionally, RAIM and its performance have
mostly been associated with the integrity-monitoring tasks in
aviation and other safety-critical applications, where relatively
good line-of-sight signal reception conditions prevail, and there are
often strict rules of well-defined integrity modes. The goal in these
traditional RAIM operating environments was to eliminate large
measurement errors due to, for example, satellite clock or
ephemeris failures, which can be caused by failures in the satellite
or in the control segment. These errors are very rare, with a typical
rate of one error per 18 to 24 months in the GPS system [121].
Fault Detection-based RAIM (FD-RAIM) techniques provide the
following basic information: the presence of a failure and which
satellite(s) have failed. FD-RAIM algorithms rely on users being
able to access more satellites than the minimum number required
for a navigation solution, in order to estimate the integrity of the
signal from these redundant measurements. Typically, RAIM
requires 5 satellites for performing fault detection (sometimes 4
satellites when baro-aiding is used). However, in order to perform
fault detection and exclusion, 6 satellites are needed. Considering,
for example, the GPS constellation providing only a single
frequency catering to SPS, RAIM cannot meet Category I
requirements for precision approach applications, although RAIM-
enabled receivers can be used as a navigation aid for less
demanding phases of flight. Hence, the aim is to evaluate the likely
performance of RAIM algorithms in a future multi-GNSS
environment in which users have access to signals from more than
one system simultaneously. This over-determination of the
navigation position solution from the large number of received
ranging measurements potentially allows users to apply RAIM to a
level appropriate for precision approach tasks. Hence the detection
probability will increase dramatically, due to both the increased
size of the available satellites and the improved accuracy of the
signals compared with traditional GPS-only signals.
Fault Detection and Exclusion-based RAIM (FDE-RAIM) FDE
requires six satellites and like FD-RAIM, may use barometric
aiding as an additional information source. With six or more visible
satellites FDE-RAIM detects a faulty satellite, removes it from the
navigational solution and continues to provide FDE/FD with the
remaining visible satellites. FDE is required for oceanic RNAV
approvals and is being mandated in aviation standards (TSO-C145a
and C146a).
Another concept often used within the RAIM context is a “RAIM
hole”, which refers to the period of time when there are insufficient
visible GNSS satellites to provide an integrity check at any given
location. RAIM holes can be predicted using a number of
techniques. The most common are:
 spatial (grid-based) and temporal sampling intervals based
techniques when available computation capability is low;
 precise computation techniques for estimating satellite
coverage boundaries, the intersection points and analysis of
the topology of the regions of intersection when available
computation capability is high.
While the adoption of RAIM techniques can significantly improve
the situation, the inherent reactive nature of traditional RAIM
techniques do not allow an immediate implementation of predictive
features beyond the extrapolations that can be made from GNSS
signals and ephemeris data. The introduction of ABAS, SBAS and
GBAS systems has allowed for an extended range of integrity
monitoring and augmentation features (also providing substantial
accuracy and, in some cases, availability improvements), which
can be exploited synergically in the various aircraft flight phases.
However all these integrity augmentation systems have not been
successful so far in introducing predictive integrity monitoring and
augmentation features suitable for the most demanding flight tasks
(i.e., precision approach in CAT-III and autoland certification).
Conventionally, pseudorange-based and carrier-phase RAIM
(PRAIM and CRAIM) are employed in the standard positioning
algorithms to ensure that a level of trust can be placed on the
solution. PRAIM consists of two processes namely detection (of a
potential failure) and derivation of the required protection level.
The detection process requires the construction of a test-statistic
using the measurement residuals followed by the determination of
a threshold value that provides an indication of the presence of a
failure. The derivation of the protection level is based on an
estimate of the upper bound of the positioning error that might
result from an undetected error. Both HPL and VPL are employed
in order to confirm if an intended operation can be supported by
the available GNSS. PRAIM has achieved a level of success in civil
aviation applications and is being applied at various flight phases
(e.g., steady flight). But, when performing high dynamics
manoeuvres, integer ambiguity resolution process has to be
performed and in this case, the ambiguity residuals also contribute
to the measurement residuals. Hence, to verify if the position
estimates can be trusted, a high confidence in the resolution of the
ambiguities is required. This necessitates the development of
reliable and efficient carrier phase integer ambiguity validation
techniques as an integral part of CRAIM.
In addition to the conventional RAIM techniques (PRAIM and
CRAIM), extended RAIM (e-RAIM) procedures support detection
of faults in the dynamic model and isolate them from the
measurement model and vice versa. Most e-RAIM algorithms are
derived from the Least Square (LS) estimators of the state
parameters in a Gauss-Markov KF.
Recently, Advanced RAIM (A-RAIM) and Relative RAIM
(R-RAIM ) were proposed as two parallel candidates for future
generation integrity monitoring architectures to test the service
availability of LPV-200 for worldwide coverage with modernized
GNSS and augmentation systems [123, 124]. With double civilian
frequencies being transmitted, the ionospheric error can be
measured and removed, thus improving the overall system
performance. The major difference between these two techniques is
in the positioning method. Code-only measurements are used in A-
RAIM while both code and time-differenced carrier phase
measurements are used in R-RAIM to ensure higher precision
without the necessity of an integer ambiguity resolution algorithm
[125-127].
R-RAIM can be further divided into range domain R-RAIM and the
position domain R-RAIM based on the location where observations
from two time epochs are combined together. This distinction
results in in different error and projection matrices. With advantages
in R-RAIM, the trade-off is more complicated errors and projection
matrices, and therefore a more complicated process to transfer these
errors with given risks in RAIM.
The efficiency of RAIM is closely dependent on the receiver-
satellite geometry and this implies that RAIM may not always be
available. Many preliminary investigations on RAIM have been
performed [128-131] and the inference is that the stand alone
GNSS constellation does not provide the required RAIM
availability and GNSS must be augmented if it is to be used as a
primary navigation means for en route to non-precision phases of
flight. The non GNSS measurements which are helpful to improve
the RAIM availability include barometric altitude, receiver clock
coasting, geostationary satellite range, etc.
The integrity performance (in terms of detection and protection
limit) provided by RAIM is a complex function of:
 the number of visible satellites that can be accessed at any
given time;
 the receiver-satellite geometry;
 the probability density function of the error distribution in the
received pseudorange signals from each satellite;
 the availability of each broadcast signal, which refers to the
percentage of time that each satellite broadcasts a ranging
signal;
 integration with other sensors/aids (VOR/DME, baro,
inertial).
RAIM performance for receivers using a GPS-only constellation
has been thoroughly analysed and some recommendations have
been provided in the RTCA MOPS [36]. Also, some work has been
performed to characterise RAIM performance against the
identified factors [132, 133].
RAIM does not impose extensive hardware modifications to the
receiver and it is a feasible and effective way to detect and mitigate
single spoofing signals. Some recent studies have been performed
to explore the potential of RAIM to deal with radiofrequency
interference. A recursive RAIM technique is being employed for
detecting and mitigating more than one spoofing signal without
other independent information [1344].
Until September 27, 2009, a RAIM prediction was not expected to
be performed for an RNAV route conducted where Air Traffic
Control (ATC) provides RADAR monitoring or RNAV
departure/arrival procedure that has an associated RADAR
required note charted. After this date, operators filing RNAV 2
routes (Q and T), RNAV 1 STARs, and RNAV 1 DP’s will need to
perform a RAIM prediction as part of their pre-flight planning.
ICAO Annex 10 and ICAO PBN manual require the ANSPs to
provide timely warnings of GNSS RAIM outages. A pre-flight
GNSS RAIM prediction analysis is required by the FAA for flights
intending to use RNAV/RNP routes as well as departure and arrival
procedures while using GPS as the sole navigation source.
Therefore, RAIM prediction results are dispatched to pilots, flight
dispatchers, Air Traffic Controllers (ATCo) and airspace planners.
The use of appropriate RAIM prediction services is considered as
a prerequisite for these GNSS approvals. Pilots and ATCo need
such information to ensure proper flight planning during possible
service unavailability. Since RAIM not only aims at detecting
faults but also at evaluating the integrity risk, both the detector
and the estimator influence the RAIM performance.
In a multi-constellation environment, RAIM can exploit redundant
measurements to achieve self-contained FD/FDE at the user
receiver. With the modernisation of GPS, the full deployment of
GLONASS and the emergence of GALILEO, BDS, QZSS and
IRNSS, an increased number of redundant ranging signals become
available, which has recently drawn a renewed interest in RAIM.
In particular, RAIM can help alleviating the requirements on
ground monitoring. For example, recent research has been
focussing on A-RAIM employing multi-GNSS for vertical
guidance of an aircraft [135].
RAIM Methods
A number of different RAIM algorithms have been developed over
the years. Some are primarily design tools that predict whether or
not RAIM will be available for a given position at a given time,
whilst others are implemented within receivers to perform FD/FDE
procedures.
Some techniques use a filtering or averaging technique such as the
position comparison method. However, the majority of RAIM
techniques use a so-called “snapshot” approach in which only
measurement data from a single epoch is used to check the
consistency of the solution. Such techniques include the range
comparison method, the residual analysis method, and the parity
method [136-139]. With these methods, only current redundant
measurements are used in the self-consistency check. On the other
hand, both past and present measurements can also be used along
with a priori assumptions with regard to vehicle motion, to provide
a decision.
The snapshot approach has gained more acceptance than the other
in recent times because it has the advantage of not having to make
any questionable assumptions about how the system got to its
present state. It matters only that the system is in a particular state,
and the RAIM decision as to failure or no-failure is based on
current observations only [140]. These RAIM methods provide the
same level of integrity, i.e. fundamentally these methods are
identical, although conceptually they appear quite different and
often represented by single Least Squares Residuals (LSR) [139].
Some RAIM techniques have also been designed to use data
collected and filtered over multiple epochs. This generates
predicted measurements (receiver-satellite ranges) with which to
compare each new measurement. Although such techniques
promise very high performance, especially when combined with
additional sensors such as inertial navigation system, they are
difficult to model and analyse in the general case.
The basic measurement relationship for RAIM is described by an
over-determined system of linear equations of the form and is given
by:
ݕ= ܩݔ௧௥௨௘ + Є (174)
where ݕ is the difference between the actual measured range (or
pseudorange) and the predicted range based on the nominal user
position and the clock bias (ݕ is an n×1 vector); n is the number of
redundant measurements; ݔ௧௥௨௘ are three components of true
position deviation from the nominal position plus the user clock
bias deviation (ݔ௧௥௨௘ is a 4×1 vector); Є is the measurement error
vector caused by the usual receiver noise, vagaries in propagation,
imprecise knowledge of satellite position and satellite clock error,
SA (if present), and, possibly, unexpected errors caused by a
satellite malfunction (Є is an n×1 vector); and ܩ is the usual linear
connection matrix obtained by linearizing about the nominal user
position and clock bias (ܩ is an n×4 matrix).
Both the RAIM detector and the estimator have been investigated
in the literature. With regard to fault detection, two RAIM
algorithms have been widely implemented over the past 25 years:
chi-squared (χ2) RAIM (also called parity-based or residual- based 
RAIM) and Solution Separation (SS) RAIM [132, 133].
Fundamental differences between the two algorithms have been
pointed out in [141], but it remains unclear whether SS or χ2 RAIM 
provides the lowest integrity risk. In parallel, with regard to
estimation, researchers have explored the potential of replacing the
conventional Least-Squares (LS) process with a Non-Least-
Squares (NLS) estimator to lower the integrity risk in exchange for
a slight increase in nominal positioning error. The resulting
methods show promising reductions in integrity risk but they are
computationally expensive for real-time aviation implementations.
The LS residual method uses all the measurements ݕොto calculate a
LS estimate of the n-component GNSS position and clock offset or
other companion quantityݔ using:
ݔො= (ܪ்ܪ)ିଵܪ்ݕො (175)
where the subscript ( .)̂ denotes an estimate, ܪ is the meaurmeent
matrix. The least-squares solution is then used to predict the six
range measurements:
ݕො= ܪݔො (176)
The residual between the prediction and the measurements
indicates any inconsistency that may arise due to the mentioned
measurement errors and is given by:
ݓ = ݕ− ݕො= [ܫ− ܪ(ܪ்ܪ)ିଵܪ்]ݕ (177)
The observable in this integrity monitoring method is the sum of
the squares of the residuals, which is always a positive scalar and
is given by:
ܵܵ ܧ = ݓ ்ݓ (178)
If all elements of ߳are zero-mean Gaussian distributions, then the
Square Sum Error (ܵܵ ܧ) has a non-normalized chi-square
distribution with (݊− 4 ) degrees of freedom. In order to have a
linear relationship between a satellite error and the induced test-
statistic, an assumption is to assess ඥܵܵ ܧ (݊− 4)⁄ . Apart from the
ܵܵ ܧ technique, an alternative method that employs a linear
transformation to the measurement ݕ is given by:
൥
ݔො
⋯
݌
൩= ൥(ܪ்ܪ)ିଵܪ்⋯
ܲ
൩[ݕ] (179)
The parity vector ݌ is the result of multiplying ݕ by an (݊− 4) ×
݊matrix ܲ, which is derived from a singular value decomposition
or a ܴܳ factorization of the observation matrix ܪ , which makes the
rows of ܲ mutually orthogonal and unity in magnitude. If the
measurement error vector ߳has independent random elements that
are zero-mean and normally distributed, then the following
equations hold true:
݌= ܲݓ (180)
݌= ܲ߳ (181)
݌்݌= ݓ ்ݓ = ܵܵ ܧ (182)
It implies that the magnitudes of ݌ and ݓ are the same inspite of
their different dimensionalities. Integrity alerts can therefore be set
using either ܵܵ ܧ or ݌ as a test statistic. Under the assumption that
the measurement noise is Gaussian with zero-mean and standard
deviation ߪఢ, the quantity ‖ݓ‖ଶ ߪఢଶ⁄ is a chi-square distributed
random variable with (݊− 4) degrees of freedom (a minimum of
four satellites are required, and the degrees of freedom are equal to
the number of redundant measurements). This is represented
mathematically as:
‖௪ ‖మ
ఙച
మ ~߯ ଶ(݊− 4) (183)
The threshold value ܴ is set for the test-statistic to achieve any
desired probability of False Alarm (FA) under Normal Conditions
(NC) and is given by:
ܲ(ܨܣ|ܰܥ) = ܲ(‖ݓ‖ > ܴ|ܰܥ) =
ଵ
ଶ(೙షర) మ⁄ ୻(೙షర
మ
)∫ ݏ(೙షరమ ିଵ)݁షೞమ݀ݏஶோమ ఙചమ⁄ (184)
where the integral is the incomplete gamma function. Given the
number of visible satellites݊ , and (ܨܣ|ܰܥ) , the threshold ܴ can
be solved for. A protection radius or HAL ܽ is set based on the
RNP.
By the number of alternative hypotheses, there are two types of
RAIM algorithms for both A-RAIM and R-RAIM: the classic
RAIM method with single alternative hypothesis and the Multi
Hypothesis Solution Separation (MHSS) RAIM method [142]. The
classic RAIM method is typically used in Range Domain R-RAIM
(RD-RAIM), while MHSS is used in A-RAIM. Typically, A-
RAIM is adopted as the preferential method and Position Domain
R-RAIM (PD-RAIM) is employed in case A-RAIM is not available
[125].
4.6.4. Aircraft Based Augmentation Systems
In addition to the existing SBAS, GBAS and RAIM techniques,
GNSS augmentation may take the form of additional information
being provided by other on-board avionics systems. As these
systems normally operate via separate principles than the GNSS,
they are not subject to the same sources of error or interference. A
system such as this is referred to as an Aircraft Based
Augmentation System or ABAS. ABAS is different from RAIM,
in which the aircraft characteristics (flight dynamics, body shape,
antenna location, EMC/EMI, etc.) are typically not considered and
various kinds of consistency check are accomplished using the
GNSS signals to detect and exclude faulty/unreliable satellites.
The additional sensors used in ABAS may include Inertial
Navigation Systems (INS), VOR-DME/TACAN, Radar, Vision
Based Sensors, etc. Unlike SBAS and GBAS technology,
published research on ABAS is limited and mainly concentrates on
additional information being blended into the position calculation
to increase accuracy and/or continuity of the integrated navigation
solutions. In recent years, significant efforts were made for
developing ABAS architectures capable of generating integrity
signals suitable for safety-critical GNSS applications (e.g., aircraft
precision approach and landing), which led to the development of
an Avionics Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system.
Implementing a Flight Path Guidance (FPG) module, an ABIA
system can provide steering information to the pilot and,
additionally, electronic commands to the aircraft/UAS Flight
Control System (FCS), allowing for real-time and continuous
integrity monitoring, avoidance of safety/mission-critical flight
conditions and rapid recovery of the RNP in case of GNSS data
degradation or loss. The architecture of an advanced ABIA system
is presented in Fig. 33.
Fig. 33. ABIA system architecture.
This system addresses both the predictive and reactive nature of
GNSS integrity augmentation. To comprehend this concept, some
key definitions of alerts and TTA’s applicable to the ABIA system
are presented below [53]:
 Caution Integrity Flag (CIF): a predictive annunciation that the
GNSS data delivered to the avionics system is going to exceed
the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) thresholds
specified for the current and planned flight operational tasks
(GNSS alert status).
 Warning Integrity Flag (WIF): a reactive annunciation that the
GNSS data delivered to the avionics system has exceeded the
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) thresholds specified
for the current flight operational task (GNSS fault status).
 ABIA Time-to-Caution (TTC): the minimum time allowed for
the caution flag to be provided to the user before the onset of a
GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition.
 ABIA Time-to-Warning (TTW): the maximum time allowed
from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition
is detected to the moment that the ABIA system provides a
warning flag to the user.
Based on the above definitions, two separate models for the time
responses associated to the Prediction-Avoidance (PA) and
Reaction-Correction (RC) functions performed by the ABIA
system are defined (Fig. 39). The PA time response is given by:
∆T୔୅ = ∆T୔୰ୣ ୢ୧ୡ୲+ ∆Tେିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲+ ∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ (185)
where:
∆T୔୰ୣ ୢ୧ୡ୲=Time required to predict a critical condition;
∆Tେିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲=Time required to communicate the predicted failure to
the FPG module;
∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ =Time required to perform the avoidance manoeuvre.
In this case, ∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ ≤ TTC.
If the available avoidance time ∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ is not sufficient to perform
an adequate avoidance manoeuvre (i.e., ∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ > TTC), the
aircraft will inevitably encroach on critical conditions causing
GNSS data losses or unacceptable degradations. In this case, the
RC time response applies:
∆Tୖେ = ∆Tୈ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲+ ∆T୛ ିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲+ ∆Tେ୭୰୰ୣ ୡ୲ (186)
where:
∆Tୈ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲=Time required to detect a critical condition;
∆T୛ ିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲=Time required to communicate the failure to the FPG
module;
∆Tେ୭୰୰ୣ ୡ୲=Time required to perform the correction manoeuvre.
In general, the condition to be satisfied is expressed as:
∆Tୈ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲+ ∆T୛ ିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲≤ TTW (187)
The RC time response is substantially equivalent to what current
GBAS and SBAS systems are capable of achieving. A comparison
between Fig. 34 (a) and Fig. 34 (b) allows to immediately visualise
the benefits introduced by the ABIA PA function. Further progress
is possible adopting a suitable algorithm in an Integrity Flag
Module (IFG) module capable of initiating an early correction
manoeuvre as soon as the condition ∆T୅୴୭୧ୢ ≤ TTC is violated. In 
this case, the direct Prediction-Correction (PC) time response
would be:
∆T୔େ = ∆T୔୰ୣ ୢ୧ୡ୲+ ∆Tେିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲+ ∆T୉୰ୟ୪୷େ୭୰୰ୣ ୡ୲ (188)
This concept is illustrated in Fig. 35. By comparing with Fig. 34, it
is evident that the ABIA system would be able to reduce the time
required to recover from critical conditions if the following
inequality is verified:
∆T୉୰ୟ୪୷େ୭୰୰ୣ ୡ୲< TTC + ∆Tୈ ୲ୣୣ ୡ୲+ ∆Tେିୖ ୮ୣ୭୰୲+ ∆Tେ୭୰୰ୣ ୡ୲ (189)
(a) (b)
Fig. 34. ABIA PA and RC functions.
Fig. 35. ABIA PC function.
Targeting an ABIA implementation, a dedicated analysis is
required in order to determine the flight envelope limitations
associated with the use of GNSS. In particular, the following
models have to be introduced [53, 54]:
 The Antenna Obscuration Matrixes (AOM) in azimuth and
elevation, constructed as a function of attitude (Euler) angles
in all relevant aircraft configurations;
 The GNSS Carrier-to-Noise and Jamming-to-Signal Models
(CJM), accounting for the relevant transmitter/receiver
characteristics, propagation losses and RF interference;
 The Multipath Signal Model (MSM) including fuselage,
wing and ground path fading components and the associated
range errors;
 The Doppler Shift Model (DSM) and associated critical
conditions causing GNSS tracking issues.
Using appropriate aircraft dynamics models, the manoeuvring
envelope of the aircraft can be determined in all required flight
conditions. Using the AOM, CJM, MSM and DSM models,
together with the GNSS receiver tracking models and the
manoeuvring requirements of specific flight tasks (e.g.,
test/training missions or standard airport approach procedures), it
is possible to identify the conditions that are potentially critical for
the on-board GNSS system and set appropriate thresholds for the
ABIA CIFs and WIFs, thereby generating timely alerts when the
aircraft is performing critical manoeuvres prone to induce GNSS
signal degradations or losses.
5. Towards a Space-Ground-Aircraft Augmentation
Network
Current SBAS and GBAS technologies are not able to meet the
stringent GNSS data integrity requirements imposed by
airworthiness regulations in some of the most demanding
operational tasks (e.g. UAS sense-and-avoid). GBAS provides
precision position services limited to use in the approach phase
only. SBAS provides a precision position service in all flight
phases, but GBAS provides better accuracy in the approach phase.
On the other hand, the ABAS/ABIA system approach is
particularly well suited to distinctively increase the levels of
integrity and accuracy (as well as continuity in multi-sensor data
fusion architectures) of GNSS in a variety of mission- and safety-
critical applications. Synergies between these three GNSS
augmentation systems (Fig. 36) can be studied to develop a Space-
Ground-Aircraft Augmentation Network (SGAAN) that can be
used for a number of safety-critical aviation applications
(Fig. 37).
 Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS)
 Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS)
 Avionics Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS)
ACCURACY
INTEGRITY
AVAILABILTY
CONTINUITY
Fig. 36. Synergies between SBAS, GBAS and ABAS.
Fig. 37. Space-ground-aircraft augmentation network.
Once the reliability of the mathematical algorithms for
ABAS/SBAS/GBAS is established, dedicated IFG modules can be
implemented for alerting the pilot/UAS remote pilot when the
critical conditions for GNSS signal losses are likely to occur
(Fig.38).
The ABAS IFG is designed to provide caution and warning alerts
in real-time (i.e., in accordance with the specified TTC and TTW
requirements in all relevant flight phases). IFG module inputs are
from the GNSS Receiver and aircraft flight dynamics. A GNSS
Constellation Simulator (GCS) can suppors the GNSS satellite
visibility, signal and geometry analysis, while an Aircraft
Dynamics Simulator (ADS) can be used to generate the nominal
flight path trajectory and attitude (Euler) angles. Additionally, an
Aircraft 3-Dimensional Model (A3DM) in CATIA (Computer
Aided Three-dimensional Interactive Application) and a Terrain
and Objects Database (TOD) are also required to run the MPS.
Using a Digital Terrain Elevation Database (DTED), it is possible
to obtain a detailed map of the terrain beneath the aircraft.
Providing the aircraft trajectory inputs from the ADS module,
terrain elevation data can be automatically extracted and fed to the
TOM module where they are integrated with the database of man-
made objects (e.g., buildings). The Doppler Analysis Module
(DAM) calculates the Doppler shift by processing ADS and GCS
inputs. The Multipath Analysis Module (MAM) processes the
A3DM, TEM, GCS and ADS inputs to determine multipath
contributions from the aircraft (wings/fuselage) and from the
terrain/objects close to the aircraft. The Obscuration Matrix
Module (OMM) receives inputs from the A3DM, GCS and ADS,
and computes the GNSS antenna(e) obscuration matrixes for all
aircraft manoeuvres. The C/N0 and J/S Analysis Module (SAM)
calculates the nominal link budget of the direct GNSS signals
received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric propagation
disturbances, as well as the applicable RF interference signal
levels. The definition of suitable ABAS integrity thresholds is
heavily dependent on the aircraft dynamics and geometric
characteristics. Further details can be found in the references [53,
54, 148-150]
The IFGs for SBAS and GBAS introduce the system functionalities
required to compute the VPL and HPL and to compare them with
the designated VAL and HAL (Fig. 38). As discussed, only the
LAAS MOPS introduces the concept of predictive integrity flags
(PVPL and PLPL). However, the standard does not provide
detailed guidance on how these features can be implemented in
practice to exploit potential synergies with ABAS. Additionally,
PVAL/PLPL features are not present in the WAAS MOPS [41].
VAL and HAL defined in the WAAS MOPS and are listed in Table
20. The SBAS VAL is the threshold used to generate integrity flags
based on the SBAS VPL. Similarly, the SBAS HAL is the
threshold used to generate integrity flags based on the SBAS HPL.
For oceanic, en route, terminal, or Lateral Navigation/Vertical
Navigation (LNAV/VNAV) approaches, the VAL is not defined
by the WAAS MOPS and ICAO SARPs [38, 39]. LNAV/VNAV
approaches use lateral guidance (556 m lateral limit) from GNSS
and/or GBAS and vertical guidance provided by either barometric
altimeter or GBAS. Aircraft that do not use GBAS for the vertical
guidance portion must have VNAV-capable altimeters, which are
typically integrated with modern flight directors and/or Flight
Management Systems (FMS).
Table 20. SBAS vertical and horizontal alert limits [41].
Navigation Mode Vertical AlertLimit (VAL)
Horizontal Alert
Limit (HAL)
Oceanic/Remote NA 7408 m
En Route NA 3704 m
Terminal NA 1852 m
LNAV or
LNAV/VNAV
Approach
NA 556 m
LNAV/VNAV
Approach (after
FAWP)
50 m 556 m
LPV or LP Approach 50 m 40 m
LPV II 35 m 40 m
Fig. 38. SGAAN integrity Augmentation architecture.
Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) enables the
aircraft descent to 200-250 feet above the runway and can only be
flown with a Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS)
receiver. LPV approaches are operationally equivalent to the
legacy Instrument Landing System (ILS) but are more economical
because no navigation infrastructure has to be installed in
proximity of the runway. Localizer Performance (LP) is a Non-
Precision Approach (NPA) procedure that uses the high precision
of LPV for lateral guidance and barometric altimeter for vertical
guidance. LP approaches can only be flown by aircraft equipped
with WAAS/EGNOS receivers. The minimum descent altitude for
the LP approach is expected to be approximately 300 feet above
the runway. The VAL values are listed in Table 21.
Table 21. Vertical Alert Limit [40].
Intended
GSL
Height above
LTP/FTP (feet)
Alert Limit (meters)
A --- FASVAL
B --- FASVAL
C H≤200 FASVAL 
200<H≤1340 0.02925*H(ft)+ FASVAL-5.85 
H>1340 FASVAL+33.35
D,E,F H≤100 FASVAL 
100<H≤200 FASVAL 
200<H≤1340 0.02925*H(ft)+ FASVAL-5.85 
H>1340 FASVAL+33.35
Similarly, the Lateral Alert Limit (LAL) defines the threshold
values of LPL and PLPL. The LAL values are listed in Table 22.
The Final Approach Segment Vertical and Lateral Alert Limits
(FASVAL and FASLAL) are listed in Table 23.
Table 22. Lateral Alert Limit [40].
Intended
GSL
Distance from
LTP/FTP (meters)
Alert Limit (meters)
A,B --- FASLAL
C Along the runway and
for D≤873 
FASLAL
873<D≤7500 0.0044*D(m)+ FASLAL-3.85 
D>7500 FASLAL+29.15
D,E,F Along the runway and
for D≤291 
FASLAL
291<D≤873 0.03952*D(m)+ FASLAL-
11.5
873<D≤7500 0.0044*D(m)+ 
FASLAL+19.15
D>7500 FASLAL+52.15
Table 23. FASVAL and FASLAL.
GSL FASVAL FASLAL
A,B,C ≤10 m ≤40 m 
A,B,C,D ≤10 m ≤17 m 
A,B,C,D,E ≤10 m ≤17 m 
A,B,C,D,E,F ≤10 m ≤17 m 
Based on these alert limits and limitations, the criteria for
producing SBAS/GBAS CIFs and WIFs can be set and are listed
below:
 When VPLSBAS exceeds VAL or HPLSBAS exceeds HAL, the
WIF is generated;
 When PVPLGBAS exceeds VAL or PLPLGBAS exceeds LAL,
the CIF is generated;
 When VPLGBAS exceeds VAL or HPLGBAS exceeds HAL, the
WIF is generated.
The performance of SBAS and GBAS can be enhanced by adding
ABIA models to the existing standards [36, 40, 41]. As both SBAS
and GBAS use redundant GNSS satellite observations to support
FDE within the GNSS receiver (i.e., implementing a form of
RAIM), some additional integrity flag criteria can be introduced.
In a WAAS/RAIM integration scheme, the minimum number of
satellites required for FDE is 6. At present, no information is
available regarding the provision of RAIM features within LAAS-
enabled GNSS receivers. Therefore, the inclusion of a basic form
of RAIM within such receiver (i.e., at least 5 satellites are required
for FDE) can be assumed. Based on these assumptions, the number
of satellites in view can be used to set additional integrity
thresholds for SBAS and GBAS [143, 144]. Additionally, new
augmentation strategies including Ground-based Regional
Augmentation System (GRAS), which is a combination of SBAS
and GBAS concepts to enhance GNSS performance, can be used
within the SGAAN network. Such network could improve the
newly introduced APV procedures (supported by GNSS and/or
baro-VNAV) and provide continuous lateral/vertical guidance
without the need for a terrestrial radio navigation aid. Recent
studies have shown that ABAS systems would work synergically
with SBAS and GBAS, enhancing integrity levels in all flight
phases, from initial climb to final approach [144]. Therefore, the
integration of ABAS/ABIA with SBAS and GBAS is a clear
opportunity for future research towards the development of
SGAAN suitable for manned and unmanned aircraft applications
and for a variety of mission-critical and safety-critical aviation
applications, including flight test, precision approach and
automatic landing.
6. GNSS for Trusted Autonomous Operations
Current UAS technologies are perceived to have a lack of trust
relative to the human-machine teaming aspects. The trust in
human-machine teaming becomes even more important in GNSS
denied/challenging environments and in providing effective
decision-making in such safety-critical tasks.
In modern UAS applications, GNSS supports the development of
low-cost and high performance (and relatively low cost and low-
volume/weight) navigation and guidance systems. Additionally,
when used in conjunction with suitable data link technologies,
GNSS-based navigation systems facilitates the provision of
Automated Dependent Surveillance (ADS) functionalities for
cooperative UAS SAA. In non-cooperative SAA, the adoption of
GNSS can also provide the key positioning and, in some cases,
attitude data (using multiple antennas) required for automated
collision avoidance. A key limitation of GNSS for both cooperative
(ADS) and non-cooperative applications is represented by the
achievable levels of integrity. Therefore, the implementation of
integrity augmentation functionalities could support the
development of the IAS suitable for both cooperative and non-
cooperative scenarios.
6.1. GNSS Augmentation for UAS SAA
One of the key challenges encountered by the aviation community
for integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace is the
provision of a Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) capability meeting the
stringent integrity requirements set by international standards and
national certification authorities. Cooperative and non-cooperative
SAA are implemented to address UAS safe integration into the
non-segregated airspace. The SAA capability can be defined as the
automatic detection of possible conflicts (i.e., collision threats) by
the UAV platform and the implementation of avoidance
manoeuvres to prevent the identified collision threats. As part of
our research, the possible synergies attainable with the adoption of
different detection, tracking and trajectory generation algorithms
were studied. Additionally, the error propagation from different
sources and the impacts of host and intruders dynamics on the
ultimate SAA solution were investigated. The system detection
range and Filed-of-View/Field-of-Regard (FOV/FOR) have to be
adequate to ensure separation from the intruder to prevent a
probable near mid-air collision. A number of cooperative and non-
cooperative sensors/systems have been studied recently.
Cooperative systems typically include Traffic Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS)/Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS)
and Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). The
inclusion of ADS-B in association with GNSS-based navigation
systems redefines the paradigm of Cooperative SAA (C-SAA) in
the CNS/ATM context by allowing the share of accurate GNSS
trajectory information. Optical, thermal, LIDAR, MMW Radar and
acoustic sensors can be used as part of Non-Cooperative SAA (NC-
SAA) architectures. As an example, a combined C-
SAA/NC-SAA architecture is depicted in Fig. 39 with an
identification of primary (solid line) and auxiliary sensors (dashed
line) for cooperative and non-cooperative SAA tasks. Additionally,
ATM primary surveillance radar and Air Traffic Controller
(ATCo) digital instructions using Controller to Pilot Data Link
Communications (CPDLC) are considered. The sequential steps
involved in the SAA process for executing an efficient Tracking,
Deciding and Avoiding (TDA) loop are also illustrated in Fig. 39.
Criticality analysis is carried out to prioritize (i.e., to determine if
a collision risk threshold is exceeded for all tracked intruders) and
to determine the action commands. If an avoidance action is
required, the SAA system generates an optimal avoidance
trajectory using a fast-converging guidance algorithm such as
differential geometry [145-147].
PMO techniques would have the benefit of providing a
mathematical optimum. However, they can be used instead of
DCO only if the SAA time horizon allows (i.e., only if the time to
conflict is much greater than the computational time required to
obtain an optimal trajectory). This could be the case, for example,
in properly developed air traffic separation maintenance systems.
Error analysis is performed to determine the overall uncertainty
volume in the airspace surrounding the intruder tracks based on the
cooperative/non-cooperative unified method described in [146].
This is accomplished by considering both the navigation and the
tracking errors affecting the measurements and translating them to
unified range and bearing uncertainty descriptors. As discussed in
the previous section, the SGAAN research demonstrated the
potential of this new technology to enhance GNSS integrity
performance in a variety of mission- and safety-critical
applications including experimental flight test/flight inspection,
precision approach and automatic landing (also in synergy with
GBAS and SBAS) [148]. Therefore, an ABIA system concept was
developed for UAS applications (Fig. 40).
Fig. 39. SAA system architecture. Adapted from [146].
Fig. 40. ABIA system architecture for UAS applications [148].
As in a manned aircraft version, this system performs a continuous
monitoring of GNSS integrity levels in flight by analysing the
relationships between aircraft manoeuvres and GNSS accuracy
degradations or signal losses (Doppler shift, multipath, antenna
obscuration, signal-to-noise ratio, jamming, etc.). In case of any
detected or predicted integrity threshold violation, the ABIA
system provides suitable warning or caution signals to the UAV
AFCS and to the remote Ground Control Station (GCS), thereby
allowing timely correction manoeuvres to be performed. This
increased level of integrity could provide a pathway to support
unrestricted access of UAS to all classes of airspace. A possible
ABIA/SAA integration architecture is illustrated in Fig. 41.
Position, Velocity, and Attitude/Rates (PVA) measurements are
obtained by using the various navigation sensors/systems on-board
the aircraft (i.e., implementing multi-sensor data fusion
techniques).
The key advantage is that the safe avoidance is determined by
evaluating the risk-of-collision and then a safe manoeuvring point
is identified from where the host UAV can manoeuvre safely (i.e.,
any manoeuvre can be performed within the UAV operational
flight envelope). The risk of collision is evaluated by setting a
threshold on the probability density function of a near mid-air
collision event over the separation volume. The risk-of-collision is
zero at the safe manoeuvring point. If both the safe-separation
thresholds are violated, a mid-air collision threat is detected and the
SAA WIF is generated. To prevent any WIF, the flight path
optimization process starts when the first CIF is generated. PMO
and DCO techniques are used to generate a new optimised
trajectory free of any integrity degradations. Depending on the
relationship between the available time-to-collision and the
computation time required to generate the optimal trajectory, PMO
or DCO solutions are applied. The optimised trajectory data are
sent to the AFCS (and to the ground pilot) for execution of the
avoidance manoeuvres. In the trajectory optimisation process, the
aircraft 3DOF/6DOF model defines the dynamics constraints,
while the satellite elevations and the aircraft heading rates are used
as path constraints. Results from simulation case studies confirmed
that the Integrity-Augmented SAA (IAS) solution is capable of
performing high-integrity conflict detection and resolution when
GNSS is used as the primary source of navigation data [148-150].
ABIA/SAA integrated architecture [148].
6.1. Resilience in GNSS Challenged Environments
In GNSS challenged environments, measurement models of
distributed sensors and GNSS jammer location estimation models
can support the design of a model-predictive approach. The
developed models address uncertainty in platform navigation and
jammer localization methods.
In the aviation context, complex cyber-physical systems are being
used on board aircraft (avionics/mission systems) and on the
ground (CNS/ATM systems, Airline Operational Centres, Military
Command and Control, etc.). These cyber-physical systems have
integrated computational and physical elements, including CNS
sensors/systems, control systems, data networks and external
communications. The complexity of these ever more
interconnected and interleaved systems can create multiple
opportunities for a number of cyber-physical threats to materialise.
Signals from commercial high power transmitters, ultra wideband
radar, television, VHF, mobile satellite services and personal
electronic devices can interfere with the GNSS signals. There are
three distinct forms of deliberate interference with GNSS signals
including: jamming, spoofing and meaconing. There have been
numerous documented examples of intentional and unintentional
GPS jamming and spoofing. For example, employing Automatic
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) systems based on
GNSS, are subject to a number of cyber-attacks. Three types of
threats ADS-B message have been identified: message corruption,
message denial and message delay. ADS-B using GNSS is
inherently vulnerable to hacking, jamming, spoofing and
meaconing because of its open architecture and unencrypted
signals, and because equipment is easy to obtain. Several anti-
spoofing techniques have been proposed in the open literature and
can generally be classified into two main categories: spoofing
detection and spoofing mitigation. Jamming is likely to produce the
most significant impact on aviation GNSS operations. Jamming
can be split into 4 broad areas: accidental, criminal, red team
deliberate and blue team deliberate.
Earlier attempts on assessing vulnerability of civil GPS receivers
to jamming were made by the UK Defence Research Agency
(DRA), which was later incorporated into the Defence Evaluation
and Research Agency (DERA) and, successively, into QinetiQ.
The effects of a low-power jammer were demonstrated by flight
tests using a BAC-111 conducted at UK’s Farnborough facility.
According to [151], a jammer radiating 1 W of FM noise in GPS
1.6 GHZ frequency band was able to jam a civil GPS receiver at up
to 22 km. The differential signals in a DGNSS receiver are also
vulnerable to various types of jamming including terrorist attacks.
For example, the DGNSS facility can be outfitted with an antenna
designed to null out a jamming signal. Because of the effective
jamming range double every 6 dB increase in transmitter power, it
is possible to build a small jammer capable of interfering with civil
GPS receivers at ranges in excess of 50 km.
To minimize the susceptibility to GNSS jamming, combat aircraft
are outfitted with a Controlled-Reception Pattern Antennas
(CRPA), which are designed to detect a jamming signal and
desensitize the antenna in the direction of the jammer. When the
GNSS receiver is integrated with an INS, the INS can take over as
the principal navigation system until the aircraft tis flown beyond
the range of the jammer. Furthermore, GNSS signals can be
degraded by natural and artificial obstacles in difficult scenarios
(e.g., urban canyons and mountainous areas), requiring the need for
effective augmentation strategies to be implemented [152].
7. Conclusions and Future Research
A detailed review of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
aviation applications was presented. In recent years, various
augmentation strategies have been proposed and developed to
increase the levels of GNSS accuracy and integrity in aviation
mission-essential and safety-critical applications. The review
covered all existing approaches, including Satellite Based
Augmentation Systems (SBAS), Ground Based Augmentation
Systems (GBAS), Aircraft Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS),
Receiver-Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) and multi-
sensor data fusion. Suitable mathematical models were presented
addressing the main sources of GNSS data degradation or loss in
flight including: antenna obscuration, geometric accuracy
degradation, fading, multipath and Doppler shift. Some case
studies were also presented investigating the synergies attainable
from the online integration of ABAS with SBAS and GBAS, with
a special focus on integrity augmentation features. Finally, the
potential of integrating SBAS-GBAS-ABAS with existing UAS
cooperative and non-cooperative SAA architectures was
investigated. It was concluded that this integration leads to an
Integrity Augmented SAA (IAS) solution that is well suited for a
variety of mission-essential and safety-critical aviation
applications. Therefore, the integration of SBAS/GBAS/ABAS is
a clear opportunity for future research towards the development of
a Space-Ground-Avionics Augmentation Network (SGAAN)
suitable for manned and unmanned aircraft applications and for a
variety of mission-essential and safety-critical GNSS operational
tasks, including flight test, precision approach and automatic
landing.
Future GNSS research in the aviation context will concentrate on
the following main areas:
 Evaluate the potential of GNSS integrity augmentation
techniques to enhance the performance of next generation
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic
Management (CNS/ATM) decision support tools for
Performance/Intent Based Operations (PBO/IBO) and 4DT
management;
 Investigate the potential of GNSS integrity augmentation
techniques to enhance the performance of Next Generation
Flight Management Systems (NG-FMSs) for manned and
unmanned aircraft. This will require an evolution of current
FMS architectures introducing suitable integrity monitoring
and augmentation functionalities for 4-Dimensional
Trajectory (4DT) planning and update throughout all flight
phases;
 Evaluate the potential of introducing ionospheric scintillation
models in the GNSS integrity augmentation systems. In
particular, future research should focus on possible mission
planning implementations useful when flying over regions
affected by intense scintillation and/or in times of predicted
high scintillation.
 Further investigate the potential of GNSS integrity
augmentation techniques to support trusted autonomous
system applications by addressing other navigation,
communication and surveillance systems in the CNS+A
context;
 Investigate the potential of integrity augmentation techniques
to enhance GNSS performance in aircraft surface operations;
 Investigate the potential of GNSS augmentation concepts to
support aviation forensic applications (i.e., accident and
incident investigation);
 Investigate the potential synergies attainable by the
employment of GNSS integrity augmentation systems in
urban canyons as well as to provide persistent navigation in
sparse and denied environments.
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